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ABSTRACT
An important indicator of a country’s economic strength is the resilience of its
businesses, as evidenced by their ability to survive insolvency, reorganize, and return
to profitability.1 Before a rescue2 process is commenced, it is important to determine
the viability of the company to avoid deferred liquidations. When a viable corporation
is insolvent, the going concern of the company should be preserved because the
corporation is worth more to its creditors alive than dead. When a corporation is not
viable, the swift sale of the assets as a going concern has the same purpose of rescuing
the business to maximize value for its creditors.3 This thesis compares restructuring in
Nigeria with restructuring in Canada to decipher ways to develop corporate
restructuring in Nigeria. To enable Nigeria to compete globally, recommendations are
provided to adopt effective corporate and business rescue mechanisms.4
Keywords: Corporate insolvency; corporate restructuring; corporate rescue; business
rescue; liquidation; Companies and Allied Matters Act, Companies Creditors
Arrangement Act.

World Bank Group, Doing Business 2020 Comparing Business Regulation in 190 Economies,
Online,
<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/32436/9781464814402.pdf
> This report states that fourteen of the top twenty economies that scored highest for the “ease of
doing business” had insolvency regimes that permitted “a viable business to continue operating
as a going concern during insolvency proceedings” at 5.
2 Rescue is a necessary intervention when a company is insolvent to prevent the company from
failing. Reorganization is used to refer to the restructuring of the debts of an insolvent
corporation. The terms reorganization and restructuring are often used interchangeably.
3 World Bank Group, supra note 1.
4 Incidentally, the World Bank Group states that Nigeria is one of a handful of countries that have
implemented large-scale reforms that have significantly improved the ease of doing business, see
the heading “Main Findings”: https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/reports/global-reports/doingbusiness-2020. However, looking at the actual rankings based on different indicators of the ease
of doing business, Nigeria ranks very well overall but lags behind in insolvency resolution, ranking
148th
out
of
190
countries:
https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/data/exploreeconomies/nigeria#. Recovery rates are low,
costs are high, many proceedings take a long time to complete, and the overall strength of the
insolvency framework is actually lower than the average in Sub-Saharan Africa:
https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/data/exploreeconomies/nigeria#DB_ri
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INTRODUCTION
Capital and credit5 are the lifeblood of modern business relationships.6 Corporations7
need credit when the available capital is insufficient to boost the profitability and
development of the business. Creditors, who believe in the objects of a corporation,
invest their resources with the hope to benefit from the returns when they are due. 8 To
secure their loans, some creditors obtain a security interest in the assets of the
corporation as collateral. Generally, the existence of secured credit should, all things
being equal, increase the overall availability of credit and reduce borrowing costs across
the economy.9 Creditors run certain risks when the company becomes insolvent and is
unable to repay these loans.10

A company is insolvent when its available assets are insufficient to satisfy claims
against it on the due date.11 Insolvency law is the core of commercial and financial

5

Insolvency arises from the extension of credit. Credit could be extended either by loan or sale. In a loan
credit money can be advanced in a contract, in exchange of the assets of the corporation that serve as a
collateral with a specific date of repayment of the loan. (Roy Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency
Law, 4th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2011) at 2.)
6 World Bank, Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Rights Regimes (World Bank
Publications, 2015) at 2.
7 The words corporation and company are used interchangeably in this thesis.
8 Thomas H Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (Fredrick, United States: Beard Books,
2001) at 7–8. This is the traditional method of advancing credit, they are commonly referred to as secured
creditors because they have the right to sell the assets of the debtor when the debtor is unable to repay at
the due date. The other way by which credits can be extended is a sale credit that involves an exchange
of goods and services with a promise of payment at a later date. This applies to suppliers of the company
who supply their resources on credit or employees who work till the end of a full calendar month before
a paycheck is received. They are also creditors and often referred to as the non-traditional creditors or
unsecured creditors. This is why the corporation owes the creditors an obligation not just of repayment
when it is insolvent but also to maximize their returns.
9 Robert E. Scott, “A Relational Theory of Secured Financing”, 86 Columbia Law Review 901.
10 Goode, supra note 5 at 3.
11 The insolvency of a corporation is not a condition to which legal consequences attach. Thus, it is
neither a criminal offence nor a civil wrong for a company to become insolvent. The legal consequences
arise only after there have been some formal proceedings such as a winding up or an administration.
(Roderick J Wood, Bankruptcy and insolvency law, 2nd ed, (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2015) at 16.
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law. 12 In insolvency, commercial law compels the debtor to choose whom to pay
amongst the creditors considering that there is not enough money to go round.13 The
law determines the process of maximization of value by deciding who gets paid out and
whose debt will remain unpaid.14 Just like focusing a camera with several key players
in view, the focus determines whose interest is of greater importance. 15 There are
certain normative attitudes that arise from the existence of a debtor creditor relationship
such as an obligation to save the company during insolvency knowing that all the assets
of the corporation at the time will not be able to satisfy claims against it.16 Insolvency
law provides for a rescue option that protects the debtor and its assets by helping the
debtor reorganize its business to enable it satisfy all the claims against it.

The rationale behind a rescue mechanism is to preserve the status quo ex ante while a
way forward is negotiated and implemented.17 A rescue law substitutes the continuous
race to seize the assets of the debtor once it is insolvent, with a regime that gives the
debtor breathing space to reorganize its affairs. 18 This regime puts the debtor in
possession of its assets and suspends all the rights and remedies of the creditors, to
ensure the creditors get their returns in full. 19 An effective corporate rescue law
regulates the activities of the corporation when it becomes insolvent and it is one of the
peculiarities of a thriving economy. 20 It recognizes the need to preserve the going
concern value of the corporation alongside maximizing the returns for the creditors.
12

Philip Wood, Principles of International Insolvency, 2nd ed (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2007) at 4.
at 3.
14 Ibid.
15 Elizabeth Warren, “Bankruptcy Policy” (1987) 54:3 U Chicago L Rev 40 at 778.
16 Philip Wood, supra note 12 at 4.
17 Rebecca Parry, Corporate Rescue (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2008) at 1.
18 Goode, supra note 5 at 5.
19 This implies that there will be a stay of actions against the debtor to avoid a floodgate of claims.
20 Parry, supra note 17 at 1.
13 Ibid
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The law protects the interests of both the debtor and creditor by ensuring that there is a
stay of actions against the debtor and individual grabs from the assets of the debtor are
prevented in other to maximize returns for creditors.21

At the earliest stage of a financial distress it is necessary to identify the likelihood of
survival or not of a corporation.22 As difficult as this may sound, some corporations in
distress are viable while others are non-viable. It is important to make this identification
to ensure that the restructuring process embarked on is most suitable for the corporation
considering its present assets and due liabilities. Ascertaining the viability or not of an
insolvent company will aid decisions on the insolvency procedure to be embarked on.
According to Rizwaan Mokal, a company can either be financially distressed or
economically distressed.23 A debtor is financially distressed when its business is viable
but it is either cash flow 24 or balance sheet insolvent. 25 In either of these cases,
restructuring the debtor company would yield greater returns for its creditors as a going
concern than if the assets of the viable debtor company were sold piecemeal. 26 For
viable corporations, the optimal rescue outcome is a corporate rescue where the
corporation survives with the management and ownership in place.27 On the other hand,
a debtor is economically distressed when its business is unviable and there is a
fundamental problem with the nature of the business. In this situation the best option is
if the assets of the debtor are sold piecemeal than if the business is allowed to continue

21

Philip Wood, supra note 12 at 4.
supra note 8 at 2.
23 Rizwaan Jameel Mokal, Corporate Insolvency Law: Theory and Application (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2005) at 195.
24 A debtor is cash flow insolvent when the when it is unable to pay its debts as they become due.
25 A debtor is Balance sheet insolvent when the debtors’ liabilities are greater than the value of
the assets making the company’s assets insufficient to discharge the liabilities.
26 Mokal, supra note 23 at 195.
27 Parry, supra note 17 at 2.
22 Jackson,
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as a going concern.28 It is therefore necessary that a company ascertains if it is viable
or not from the onset to avoid seeking to restructure and then discovering that
liquidation is preferable. It is important to ensure that resources of a corporation are
channeled to a fruitful venture beneficial to both the corporation and its creditors. When
a rescue mechanism is embarked upon, certain changes will be made to enable the
corporation to continue carrying on business as a going concern with the same purpose
of retaining the going concern value. Whatever choice of rescue is employed, the
ultimate aim is that the corporation is given breathing space to enable it to reorganize
its business and return to solvency.

The primary law, which regulates companies in Nigeria, is the Companies and Allied
matters Act29 (“CAMA”). The corporate insolvency framework of Nigeria is embodied
in CAMA. The Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990 (“CAMA 1990”) previously
regulated corporate insolvency in Nigeria. Before the enactment of the Companies and
Allied matters Act (“CAMA 2020”), there was no substantial amendment to CAMA
1990, for over thirty years since its enactment. The CAMA 2020 introduced business
rescue mechanisms for insolvent companies in Nigeria. These mechanisms are
Companies Voluntary Arrangement (“CVA”) and Company Administration (“CA”).
This is a paradigm shift from the liquidation and receivership processes that have been
practiced over the years under the CAMA 1990 to a rescue mechanism under the
CAMA 2020.

28 Mokal, supra note 23 at 195.
29

Cap C20, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004.
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In Canada, the primary law regulating corporate restructuring is the Companies
Creditors Arrangement Act (“CCAA”).30 This law was enacted to create an enabling
environment for insolvent corporations to restructure and carry on their business as a
going concern to avoid being put into liquidation.31 There has been an escalating use of
the CCAA in Canada for effecting asset sales, where corporations claim to intend to
undergo a restructuring process in order to get the protection of the CCAA and they
begin the piecemeal sale of their assets. This has been referred to as “liquidating
CCAA’s” and recent CCAA proceedings have been identified to be liquidating
CCAA’s from the outset.32 It is an unreasonable practice to use a scheme originally
designed for restructuring of insolvent corporations to effect liquidations.33 This thesis
while reviewing the corporate insolvency system in Nigeria and engaging in a
comparative analysis of the insolvency practices in both jurisdictions will highlight the
need for Nigeria to beware of this growing trend of Liquidating CCAA’s practiced in
Canada.

This thesis will discuss the Nigerian insolvency law, highlighting the insolvency
procedures previously practiced and how the innovation of business rescue options in
the CAMA 2020 will lead to a boost in the insolvency framework and the Nigerian
economy. This thesis will also analyze the corporate restructuring framework in Canada
in other to determine the gaps and limitations in the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement
Act (“CCAA”), the restructuring law for large corporations while highlighting lessons

30

RSC 1985, c C-36.
Janis Pearl Sarra, Rescue!: The Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, 2nd ed (Toronto: Carswell,
2013) at 13–14.
32 Alfonso Nocilla, “Is Corporate Rescue Working in Canada Papers from the 42nd Annual Workshop
on Consumer and Commercial Law” (2012) 53:3 Can Bus L J 382 at 384.
33 Roderick J Wood, “Rescue and Liquidation in Restructuring Law Papers from the 42nd Annual
Workshop on Consumer and Commercial Law” (2012) 53:3 Can Bus L J 407 at 407.
31
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Nigeria can adopt from the framework in Canada. This thesis will discuss the
importance of the business rescue mechanisms to the restructuring framework in
Nigeria. It will provide recommendations for a separate framework regulating corporate
restructuring to be developed in Nigeria and emphasize on the need for the institutions
administering these laws to be well equipped. This is because if these institutions are
not improved upon, they might become bottlenecks to the administration of the
amended laws.

Research Methodology
The methodology for this research will be a combination of doctrinal, historical and a
comparative law approach. The doctrinal approach will be applied to set out the current
state of the law in Canada and Nigeria, the historical approach will show how the laws
and principles have evolved, and the comparative law approach would involve a
comparison of the corporate insolvency framework in Canada and Nigeria, as the basis
for investigating the suitability or otherwise applying some of Canada’s business rescue
framework in Nigeria. Particularly, the comparative law approach would provide a
framework that will consider corporate insolvency law in Canada to discover how
business rescue options are carried out, how well they have worked, and the lessons
Nigerian law can learn from Canada. To achieve this, the research would be based on
primary and secondary legal sources from both Canada and Nigeria.

This thesis is set out in five Chapters:
The first chapter is a general overview on corporate insolvency. It defines insolvency,
explains how it can be determined and the objectives or goals which a corporate
insolvency law seeks to achieve. This chapter goes further to discuss corporate

7

restructuring law and the idea behind a rescue and its purpose. The underlying theories
of insolvency are also discussed. The discussion in the first provides a background on
why a rescue mechanism should be present in the legal framework of every economy.

The second chapter will discuss the history of Nigerian corporate law. It will discuss
the Nigerian Corporate insolvency system and highlight the shortcomings of the
insolvency provisions in the Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990. This chapter will
discuss the winding up and receivership procedures in CAMA 1990 and show how
these procedures do not rescue insolvent businesses. This chapter will also discuss the
role the Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria (“AMCON”) plays in corporate
insolvency in Nigeria. Additionally, the second chapter will discuss the current
restructuring mechanisms practiced in Nigeria, which are either internal or external.
This chapter will also show that these corporate restructuring procedures do not rescue
insolvent businesses.

The third chapter examines the business rescue provisions in the Companies and Allied
Matters Act 2020 (“CAMA 2020”). It will begin by discussing the ideas behind the
recent amendments in the CAMA 2020 and then proceed to discuss the amendments to
the corporate insolvency framework in Nigeria. Given that these amendments are
similar to the practice in the United Kingdom (UK), this chapter will undertake a
comparative analysis with the current corporate restructuring practices in the UK. The
discussion of these business rescue options will evidence how well they have fared in
the UK and the practicability of these amendments in the CAMA 2020 thriving in
Nigeria. This chapter will also discuss the amendments to the winding up procedure
contained in CAMA 2020.

8

The fourth chapter will discuss the Canadian corporate insolvency system. This chapter
will begin by discussing the major restructuring regimes in Canada which are the
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) or the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act
(“CCAA”) and highlight the differences between the two regimes. The history of the
CCAA will also be discussed to show how the CCAA became the restructuring
legislation of choice for large insolvent companies in Canada. This discussion will
establish the intent of the Canadian legislature while establishing the CCAA and the
purpose of the CCAA. This chapter will then proceed to discuss the commencement of
CCAA proceedings, its key features, its key players and how CCAA proceedings can
be exited. The recent amendments to the CCAA on the key features and the key players
in a CCAA proceeding will be discussed. This chapter will then delve into liquidating
CCAAs, which is a mechanism where the CCAA is used to effect liquidations to show
that this practice has deviated from the goal and purpose of corporate restructuring
under the CCAA.

The fifth chapter calls for the development of the corporate restructuring framework in
Nigeria. This chapter will begin by comparing the corporate restructuring law in Canada
under the CCAA with the recent amendment to the corporate restructuring in Nigeria
to determine how effective these amendments will be in rescuing insolvent companies.
This chapter will then highlight lessons Nigeria can adopt from Canadian laws, which
is not available under its restructuring framework. These lessons will help develop an
effective corporate restructuring framework for Nigeria. It will also review the gaps in
the business rescue options provided by the CAMA 2020 and suggest best ways to

9

develop a separate corporate restructuring framework in Nigeria learning from how
restructuring is practiced in Canada.

The concluding chapter will contain my final thoughts on the corporate restructuring
framework in Nigeria. It will highlight that the recent amendments tin the CAMA 2020
are not very effective mechanisms for business rescue. Suggestions would be provided
on how the business rescue mechanisms can be effectively administered. This chapter
will conclude by providing recommendations on how Nigeria’s corporate restructuring
framework can be developed.
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CHAPTER 1:
GENERAL OVERVIEW OF CORPORATE INSOLVENCY

1.0

Introduction

During insolvency, creditors aim to recover monies owed to them using several
available remedies.34 In addition to the expenses incurred in pursuing their rights and
remedies against the debtor is the tendency of the depletion of assets of the debtor and
a risk that the claims of most creditors will be left unsatisfied. 35 Insolvency law is
primarily concerned with providing a collective proceeding that overrides the regular
civil processes, which are available to creditors for enforcing their claims. This chapter
will define insolvency, how it can be determined, and consider the objectives of
corporate insolvency law. It will further examine corporate restructuring, its purpose,
the idea behind a rescue option, the types of rescue and the underlying theories of
restructuring.

1.1

Definition of Corporate Insolvency

Insolvency is when a corporation is unable to fulfill its financial obligations to its
creditors.36 Insolvency is factual and can be easily identifiable when a debtor is unable
to pay his or her creditors.37 The insolvency regime is different from insolvency itself
because it is a formal proceeding initiated to determine when insolvency exists. Various
regimes arise in response to the insolvency of the debtor and the initiating party has to

34

There are several civil processes where they can enforce their rights such as the right to enforce
interests in the contract, the right to sell the assets of the debtor, the right to a set off and the right of
foreclosure. Vanessa Finch & David Milman, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles
3rd ed (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017) at 9.
35 Thomas H Jackson, supra note 8 at 9.
36 Insolvency law deals primarily with a debtors “inability to pay” rather than a debtors “unwillingness
to pay”. Roderick Wood, supra note 11 at 2.
37 Ibid at 17.
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choose which of the regimes would yield the greatest results.38 Insolvency law does not
compel debtors to pay their debts to creditors but it enables the debtor determine how
the debts owed will be satisfied considering that the debtors’ assets are insufficient to
do so.

Liquidation and a rescue are the two main opposing objectives of an insolvency regime.
A liquidation regime aims to solve the collective action problem by substituting the
race to the assets of the debtor with a scheme that suspends the rights and remedies
available to creditors and establishes a process for the retrieval of the debtor’s assets
from the creditors and a distributes them according to the creditors’ claims. 39 A
liquidation process prevents individual grabs by creditors from the assets of the debtor,
which decreases the value of the assets that would be used to settle their claims.40 In
liquidation, there is always a victor and a victim because the law is compelled to decide
on who bears the risk of the failure of the debtor.41 These are very difficult choices
considering the presence of creditors who are worst hit by the insolvency and the claims
that would be left unsatisfied as a result of insufficient assets.

On the other hand the rescue regime, also known as a restructuring or a reorganization
regime, has the aim of preserving the going concern value of the corporation by
reducing or adjusting the claims of the creditors. In most cases, the financial crises,
which a corporation encounters during insolvency, is of a nature that cannot be resolved
without a reorganization of the firms’ business or structure.42 The purpose of a rescue

38

Ibid.
Finch & Milman, supra note 34 at 9.
40 Jackson, supra note 8 at 14.
41 Philip Wood, supra note 12 at 4.
42 Finch & Milman, supra note 34 at 118.
39
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law is not to prevent corporations from failing but to give financially distressed 43
corporations a chance to reorganize or restructure their business and continue as a going
concern.44 This chapter will now discuss how corporate insolvency can be determined.

1.2

Determinants of Insolvency

These are the indicators or signals to creditors and to the corporation itself that it has
become insolvent. In Nigeria, one of the circumstances for the winding up of a company
is the inability of the company to pay its debts. 45 The Companies and Allied Matters
Act (“CAMA 2020”) in Section 570(a)-(c) has defined inability to pay debts. It states:
A company shall be deemed to be unable to pay its debts if(a) a creditor by assignment or otherwise, to whom the company is indebted in a
sum exceeding N200 000 then due, has served on the company, by leaving it at its
registered office or head office, a demand under his hand requiring the company to pay
the sum due, and the company has for three weeks thereafter neglected to pay the sum
or to secure or compound for it to the reasonable satisfaction of the creditor; or
(b) execution or other process issued on a judgment, Act or order of any court in
favour of a creditor of the company is returned unsatisfied in whole or in part; or
(c) A company shall be deemed to be unable to pay its debts if the court, after
taking into account any contingent or prospective liability of the company is satisfied
that the company is unable to pay its debts.

The Supreme Court of Nigeria, In Afrotech Technical Services v MIA & Sons Ltd &
Anor46 defined an insolvent person:
A person is deemed to be insolvent within the meaning of this Act who has either ceased
to pay his debts in the ordinary course of business, or cannot pay his debts as they become
due, whether he has committed an acts of bankruptcy or not.
43

This is when the corporation is near insolvency or at the verge of insolvency.
Finch & Milman, supra note 34 at 117.
45 Companies and Allied Matters Act, Cap C20, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004, s. 569(d).
46 [2000] LPELR- 219(SC) P.41, Paras.c-d)
44
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In Nigeria, the test used in determining the insolvency of a debtor is the cash flow test.
The law considers the debtors inability to pay past and future debts. The provisions do
not clearly state that the assets of the debtor will be considered in determining the
insolvency of the debtor. CAMA 2020 in section 507(b) includes the failure of a debtor
to satisfy an order of the court in determining the insolvency of the debtor. These orders
given by the court against a debtor could arise in several circumstances and it makes it
easy for companies to be wound up in Nigeria once any of those conditions have been
fulfilled.

In Canada, Section 2(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”)47 has defined
an insolvent person. It states
Insolvent person means a person who is not bankrupt and who resides, carries on business
or has property in Canada, whose liabilities to creditors provable as claims under this Act
amount to one thousand dollars:
(a)
[The debtor] is for any reason unable to meet obligations as they generally
become due
(b)
[The debtor] has ceased paying his current obligations in the ordinary course
of business as they generally become due
(c)
The aggregate of [the debtor’s] property is not, at a fair valuation sufficient, or,
if disposed of at a fairly conducted sale under legal process, would not be sufficient to
enable the payment of all obligations, due and accruing due.

The Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (“CCAA”)48 does not define an insolvent
person but defines a debtor company. It defines a debtor company as any company that
is bankrupt or insolvent. This means that for a person to obtain the protection of the
CCAA the person must be bankrupt or insolvent and admit its insolvency. 49 In Re
Stelco,50 the court stated that:
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In interpreting “Debtor Company”, reference must be had to the definition of "insolvent
person" in s. 2(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act . . . To be able to use the Act, a
company must be bankrupt or insolvent… The company must, in its application, admit
its insolvency.

The determinants of insolvency are imbedded in these provisions. In Canada, the cash
flow and the balance sheet test are the two predominant tests used in determining the
insolvency of a corporation. From the provisions in the BIA, the first two tests in
Section 2(1) (a) and (b) of the BIA are cash flow tests while the third test in Section
2(1)(c) of the BIA is the balance sheet test. The first cash flow test is backward looking
while the first test is forward looking. The Canadian approach differs from the Nigerian
approach. Under the Nigerian law, the balance sheet test is not applicable in
determining if a corporation is insolvent, as the assets of the debtor are not considered.

In the analysis of the two tests, the Canadian statutes and case law will be used. This is
because in a corporate restructuring the creditors are usually drawn to the debtors’
ability to pay the debts as they mature as opposed to the debtor having enough present
assets to satisfy the future liabilities.51 This is because the creditors understand that the
monies the debtors will use to satisfy the debts owed to them might not have accrued.
This chapter will now discuss the two tests.

1.2.1

Cash flow Test

The cash flow test is also referred to as the commercial insolvency test.52 In the first
cash flow test a corporation is considered as insolvent when it is unable to pay its debts
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as they become due. 53 This means that with the available resources that the debtor
owns, the future debt owed to creditors cannot be satisfied. It is irrelevant that the assets
of the debtor exceed its liabilities, what is relevant is that it cannot pay for debts that
would be incurred in the conduct of its business. This test is not concerned with
“whether the debtor has not paid his or her current obligations in the past. The main
issue is whether the debtor is able to pay.”54 There is a distinction between the ability
to pay and the unwillingness to pay. A person will not meet the requirements of
insolvency if they have the sufficient funds to meet their obligations but have simply
refused to do so. Sauders J in Thorne Riddell v Fleishman 55 held that “unable” as
referred to in section 2(1) of the BIA does not mean “unwilling”. A debtor is regarded
as insolvent under this test regardless of the absence of debts currently due if it is
established that the payments will be due in future and the debtor has no means to
satisfy the debts.56 The debtors’ ability to pay can be determined by accessing the value
of the assets the debtor currently has to meet these obligations. A debtor that has a line
of credit that can be used in meeting his obligations to the creditors is not insolvent.
The presence of liquid funds is not necessary. 57 Batshaw J of the Quebec Superior
Court, held in Bel Air Electric Inc58 that:
It is reasonable to conclude that a businessman would be entitled to consider himself
solvent because of the expectation that the bank will continue to finance him and he would
in fact be so, so long as that expectation was fulfilled.
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The second cash flow test is a backward-looking test that considers the past debts
incurred by the debtor and it can be perceived to apply to only a debtor who carries on
a business. This test disregards the ability of the debtor to pay future obligations it
requires proof that the debtor has ceased fulfilling its obligations to the creditors in the
ordinary course of business as they become due. The main issue under this test is if the
debtor has ceased to pay his or her debts.59 The cash flow tests usually easy to apply in
practice as all the court looks at to determine if the debtor is insolvent is examining if
the past debts have been paid and if the debtor is paying its debts as they fall due.60 The
rationale behind this test is to prevent corporations from acquiring large and costly
assets at the expense of paying its creditors.

1.2.2

Balance Sheet Test

This can be referred to as the absolute insolvency test. The idea underlying this test is
that a corporation is insolvent if the liabilities are greater than the value of the assets
making the company’s assets insufficient to discharge the liabilities.61 There is need to
know the value of the assets owned by the corporation and the amount of liabilities.
The assets to be calculated are present assets owned by the debtor at the time the
insolvency test is carried out.62 Spencer J in Consolidated Seed Exports Ltd Re 63 was
of the opinion that the solvency of a person is to be determined on a day-to-day basis.
The assets that may be acquired in the future or an increase in value of the assets that
may occur sometime in the future are not included in determining a debtor’s present
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solvency.64 However, assets that are exempted must be included regardless of the assets
not being available to satisfy the claims of creditors in insolvency.65

The balance sheet test deals mainly with obligations rather than debts and as such
contingent and unliquidated claims are included. The insolvency test must be met by
the debtor before a payment or transfer is made to a third party otherwise it will be
considered as a preference. In Re Challmie,66 the courts considered if the debtor was
insolvent at the time the mortgage was given to his brother-in-law and it held that the
mortgage was void as a fraudulent preference. Proving the balance sheet test is more
difficult than proving a cash flow test which is factual. The burden of proving the
balance sheet test lies on the party asserting insolvency who may not be able to easily
access the books of the corporation to prove the insolvency. A court is unlikely to
liquidate a company by considering the balance sheet test alone.67 The court will only
want to liquidate if the debts owed to the party asserting cannot be met. This is simply
because an inability to pay already demonstrates cash flow insolvency.

Another issue with this test is the liabilities that should be taken into account. According
to Section 2 (c) of the BIA it refers to “all obligations due and accruing due”. In some
cases the court has held that future liabilities are not included but only obligations
currently payable at the time the test is applied. In Enterprise Capital Management Inc
v Semi-Tech Corp 68 the position of the note holders was that the corporation was
insolvent as it did not have sufficient assets to enable payment of the corporations
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obligations due and accruing due. Ground J held that not all debts payable at some
future date are to be included in “accruing due” for the purpose of insolvency tests.

Some other cases have held that future obligations and contingent liabilities should be
included while determining liabilities due and accruing due. In Re Stelco inc,69 Stelco
filed for protection under the CCAA on the basis that it was insolvent.70 The union
representing Stelco’s employees, the United Steelworkers of America (USWA) brought
several motions one of which was to rescind the initial order and dismiss the application
of Stelco from obtaining protection under the CCAA on the basis that Stelco was at no
point insolvent and could not claim protection under the CCAA. Farley J held that the
CCAA does not define an insolvent or insolvency and recourse should be had to the
BIA.71 The BIA tests on their own are disjunctive and anyone who meets either of the
tests is said to be insolvent.72 The view of the USWA would render the test in Section
2(a) of the BIA redundant and no legislative provision should be interpreted in such a
way as to “render it a mere surplusage.” The court stated that Stelco had met the
insolvency test by being unable to meet its obligations as they became due. The
USWA’s motion was therefore dismissed.

The decision of the courts in Semi-tech and Stelco seem contradictory but the difference
between the courts’ decision in both cases lies in the initiating party. In Semi-tech a
creditor initiated the proceedings, whereas in Stelco the debtor initiated the
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proceedings. 73 The provisions of the CCAA also require the debtor to admit its
insolvency before it can be said to be insolvent. Stelco admitted that it was insolvent
and went ahead to seek the protection of the courts on time whereas in Semi-tech the
corporation did not admit that it was unable to meet its future obligations to its creditors.

In the balance sheet test, the assets to be considered should be the assets owned by the
corporation at the time of the test and the liabilities should be those due and not those
that would become due at a future date.74 Roderick Wood is of the opinion that a failure
to include future obligations into the computation would prejudice long-term
creditors. 75 It would be inconsiderate to compute future debts that the corporation
would incur long before the debts have matured. This is because the assets or funds that
would be used in offsetting those debts might not be readily available at the time but
will be at the time the debt has accrued. This chapter will now consider the objectives
of corporate insolvency law.

1.3

The Objectives of Corporate Insolvency Law

The objectives which corporate insolvency law seeks to achieve can also be referred to
as the goals of corporate insolvency law. They tell us what corporate insolvency law
aims to do. The Supreme Court of Canada in Century Services76 explained the nature
of corporate insolvency in Canada regulated by both the BIA and the CCAA. The BIA
is a strict rule-based approach for resolving the corporate insolvency of a debtor while
the CCAA is a more relaxed approach, remedial in nature and should be construed
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broadly. Corporate insolvency laws seek to achieve two main objectives, which are
liquidation and rescue. Liquidation seeks to fairly distribute the assets of the debtor to
its creditors. Rescue which is also referred to as reorganization or restructuring regimes
aim to preserve the business by maintaining it as a going concern by an agreement with
the creditors to accept less than what they are owed.77 The objectives aim to increase
the certainty, efficiency, and transparency of the insolvency process and make the
creditors certain about the outcomes to expect in the future which increases the assets
used to satisfy all claims of creditors.78 The objectives can be summarized as follows:

1.3.1

Maximizing the value of the assets and the returns to creditors

The maximization of value of the assets goes hand in hand with maximizing returns for
creditors. Insolvency law aims to eliminate the rights of creditors to claim individually
against the assets of the debtor and propagating for the need for collective interests of
creditors as a group.79 Other methods of enforcement of claims by creditors are subject
to the collective interests of creditors as a group. Insolvency law eliminates the frequent
individual race to grab the assets of the debtor once the debtor is insolvent and replaces
it with a collective means where the assets of the debtor are gathered and distributed
fairly to the creditors.80 The gathering of the assets of the debtor and the collective
claim on his assets by the creditors prevent the depletion of assets, which would have
occurred if individual grabs were permitted. 81 Insolvency law recognizes that the
maximization of returns for creditors are dependent on the actions taken by other
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creditors who have claims against the debtor. In other words, the collective process is
employed to bring them all together as a group to prevent the assets being destroyed.

1.3.2

Restoring the corporation to solvency

Insolvency law aims to facilitate the recovery of a corporation in financial distress.82
Insolvency law facilitates the recovery of companies in distress and ensures that they
continue carrying on their businesses as going concerns. This goal is usually achieved
in rescue mechanisms such as the company voluntary arrangement and
administration. 83 Jackson argues that insolvency law can be used to keep viable
corporations in operation.84 It provides for how the corporation will be managed during
insolvency. In order to restore the corporation to solvency the debtor has to remain in
control of affairs whilst negotiating with the creditors in order to determine if its
liabilities would be forgone or reduced. The debtors also have the opportunity to agree
with the creditors on a new payment plan.

1.3.3

Preserving the insolvency estate and providing for an equitable system
for ranking of claims during dissolution.

Insolvency law has ensured that the ranking of creditors’ claims has moved from a first
come first served basis where the creditor who first stakes a claim to the assets of the
debtor is entitled to be paid first out of those assets to a priority ranking distribution
scheme where the claims are satisfied in order of priority.85 The law establishes the
rules that govern the ranking of creditors’ claims and the order of distribution.
Insolvency law also provides for an equitable and fair distribution to creditors. It lays

82 Finch & Milman, supra note 34 at 25.
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down ground rules that govern how the assets of the debtor are distributed and protects
and preserves the assets of the debtor for the creditors.86 These rules are only confined
to liquidation or winding up proceedings and do not concern other objectives or goals
which insolvency law seeks to achieve.87

1.3.4

Identifying the causes of a company’s failure by creating rules of
management and sanctioning directors and officers who go against
them.

In recent times, the reason why corporations enter into insolvency has been attributed
to poor corporate governance. When a corporation is insolvent the creditors incur losses
and the employees of the corporation fear the loss of their jobs. Insolvency laws
provides for investigation into the failure of the corporation by the liquidator and
sanctions are placed on the directors and officers for their acts or omissions in relation
to their fiduciary duties to the corporation. The rationale behind this is that people who
are harmed should receive full compensations from the directors and officers
committing the harm.88 There are also stipulated sanctions imposed on the directors
and officers for failure to exercise due diligence in handling the affairs of the
corporation hence leading to financial collapses. This is done to ensure that the affairs
of the corporation are managed properly. 89 This chapter will now discuss corporate
restructuring law and the ways a rescue process can be achieved.
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1.4

Corporate Restructuring Law

Restructuring law can be used to keep viable corporations in operation by allowing
them to reorganize their business.90 Restructuring law is aimed at apportioning decision
and control rights in the insolvent corporation to ensure the maximization of its assets.91
The restructuring law gives room for negotiations between debtors and creditors where
the creditors agree to accept something less than they are fully entitled to as full and
final satisfaction of their debts. 92 A restructuring law provides the corporation in
distress with a reasonable time to draft a proposal that would be given to the creditors
for their approval or disapproval. If the creditors approve the restructuring plan then it
binds them and gives the corporation enough breathing space to continue its business
as a going concern whilst retaining its ownership structure or the sale of the corporation
as a going concern to a third party.

A restructuring law should be tasked with rescuing insolvent businesses and not
liquidations. For a corporation to keep up with global best practices the presence of an
effective corporate restructuring framework is necessary to boost the confidence of
investors whilst enhancing the certainty of creditors rights and debtors obligations.93 In
Canada, the CCAA is one of the enabling statutes that permit insolvent corporations
and business enterprises to restructure their affairs. 94 The CCAA provides various
rescue options for insolvent corporations. When a rescue process has been embarked
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upon, the ability of the company to continue as a going concern can be determined by
several factors, which vary from one corporation to another. According to Janis Sarra:95
The going forward solution to the firm’s financial distress depends on the reason for the
insolvency, the firm’s capital structure, the viability of the business plan and
effectiveness of its governance structure, the availability of capital to refinance the
purchase the business.

The objectives of restructuring are rescuing financially distressed firms which either
permits the debtor to continue its business or it results to a sale as a going concern to a
third party.96 Restructuring also maximizes the value of assets for creditors in a way
that ensures that creditors receive higher returns than would be available to them in
liquidation proceedings. The higher returns are achieved by the preservation of the
corporation as a going concern.97 Restructuring law further recognizes that it is not
only the interest of creditors that should be protected in corporate insolvency but also
the interest of employees, suppliers and the larger community.98 The Supreme Court of
Canada in Century Services99 has also recognized the importance of considering public
interest in a restructuring process. In situations where the debtor corporation envisages
that a restructuring would not be more profitable than a liquidation as a result of the
deterioration of its assets, the case is not to be considered for restructuring but should
be terminated.100
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1.4.1 Rescue
Rescue is a necessary intervention when a company is insolvent to prevent the company
from failing.101 Put differently, a rescue can be referred to as a remedial action taken
when the corporation is in distress. To restructure its affairs the corporation needs an
arrangement with its creditors considering that it may not afford to pay everyone.102
The end results of a rescue can often be referred to as arrangements, restructurings or
reorganizations. Globally rescue is becoming widely accepted and liquidation is only
considered as a tool of last resort when the rescue process is unable to bring the
company back to solvency. 103 The rescue of a corporation can either be a business
rescue or a corporate rescue. These mechanisms will be discussed.

1.4.1.1

Business Rescue

The corporation is an abstract entity that carries on an economic activity called a
business.104 As a result of this, the corporation is separate from the business it carries
on. The directors or managers of the corporation run the affairs of the company and are
responsible for making major decisions in the corporation. The output of managerial
duties such as good decision-making, improved productivity or sustained financial
viability reflects the efforts the directors put in running the company’s business.105 If
the directors fail to carve a viable business plan or if they are not diligent in handling
its affairs, leading to the insolvency of the corporation, a business rescue is
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appropriate.106 This is because the root of the problem lies in the management of the
corporation and not in the corporations’ business. To rescue this company, the sale of
the business as a going concern to pre-filing creditors or to new parties may bring the
company to a healthier state especially when the new owner brings in capital, new
operational expertise, new management skills and other benefits to the business.107 The
sale of the company as a going concern would give a new opportunity to the company
to succeed at the business through a new entity and management.108

Janis Sarra refers to this as “releasing the capital and assets to higher value uses.”109
Goode suggests that the sale of a business as a going concern gives the assets a higher
value than when it is sold on a piece-meal basis.110 This sale of the business to a healthy
entity will enable the corporation to offset its debts with the money recovered from the
sale whilst preserving the going concern value of the corporation. The sale will increase
the likelihood of success of the business by obtaining the control of the corporation
from the ineffective directors and officers as the success of every business lies in the
hands those who call the shots in that business.111 The sale of the business as a going
concern to a third party not only benefits the business but also serves public interest as
it preserves economic relationships with the employers, suppliers and other
stakeholders.112
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1.4.1.2

Corporate Rescue

Corporate Rescue is the preservation of the corporate entity and the business it operates
with the ownership of the corporation remaining intact. 113 This is usually practiced
when the underlying business of the corporation is sound and the problems faced by the
corporation are temporary or external and have a nature that an effective solution can
be found.114 An example of this is a situation where the debtor corporation runs its
affairs properly and utilizes its assets efficiently is affected by unforeseen
circumstances that cause an interruption in its business. As a result of this incident, the
corporation will lack the capital structure to sustain its affairs as it used to. The best
option is for this corporation to understand the new market, draw up a new capital
structure that would complement the market and draft a plan to enable it to continue its
business as a going concern. In a situation like this, there is no need for a change in the
ownership or structure of the corporation. A corporate rescue is appropriate to provide
protection to the insolvent corporation pending when a restructuring plan is carved out,
agreed upon and implemented. 115 This chapter will now discuss the theories of
corporate restructuring.

1.5

Theories of Corporate Restructuring

Several theorists have expressed their various opinions on the reasons for the corporate
insolvency regime.
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bankruptcy law, which are: (1) to give viable businesses time to restructure their

113

Parry, supra note 17 at 2.
These problems could be the loss of a major customer, an increase in the price of raw materials,
excessive interest rates, over expansion, poor management etc. Ibid at 1.
115 Sarra, supra note 31 at 2.
116 When a debtor enters into formal insolvency proceedings, he or she could either be found to be
bankrupt or not. Bankruptcy is a legal regime that responds to the insolvency of a debtor.
114

28

operations and continue their business as a going concern (2) to solve the collective
action problem (3) to enable debtors make a fresh start.117 The first two functions apply
to corporations but the third will not as Jackson has highlighted that debtors who are
corporations are not allowed to make a fresh start.118

1.5.1

Preserving the Value of the corporation as a “Going Concern”

The starting point of this argument is the premise that restructuring is used to keep
insolvent corporations in business because they are worth more as going concerns than
being liquidated.119 Put differently, the value of the business, as a going concern in a
restructuring is higher than the value that would be realized from the piecemeal sale of
its assets to individual buyers.120 A common justification is that if corporations are
allowed to restructure and continue their operations as going concerns, it would yield
greater returns for the creditors when the company becomes solvent.121 Restructuring
can be perceived to be a better option, as creditors seek the maximization of their returns
and this would not be achieved in liquidation.122 When the corporation is allowed to
restructure, the debtor remains in possession of its assets and in control of its affairs
with the aim of working together with the creditors to carve out a restructuring plan for
the healthier future of the corporation. 123 The debtor and creditors decide on an
effective solution to the corporations’ insolvency. Restructuring gives the debtor time
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to carve out a rescue plan and negotiate with the creditors on how the payments of the
debts owed to them will be reduced.124

David Skeel 125 supports that the going concern value of a corporation should be
preserved. He argues that when the corporation remains a going concern and the debtor
remains in control there is a relief from creditors’ control which gives the debtor
breathing space,126 as opposed to a liquidation or receivership where there would be a
change in the control and management of the corporation as receiver managers can now
be placed in charge of managing the affairs of a corporation in distress. When the debtor
is in control, the debtor proposes a plan during negotiations between creditors and
debtors management in a restructuring for the creditors to deliberate on to ensure that
the general interests of the creditors are ascertained. Skeel127 upholds the “Debtor in
Control” principle stating that when a corporation is in financial distress and the debtor
is in control of the corporations’ affairs, the going concern value would be preserved
and the assets of the debtor would be kept far from the reach of creditors who want to
grab its assets.

In the late 1980’s there were constraints on the exclusive rights of debtors to propose a
reorganization plan and a new narrative began in the 1990’s which is called the “No
time to spare.”128 This mode of restructuring seemed contradictory to the “Debtor in
Control” but its purpose remained to ensure that the corporation continued as a going
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concern. The No time to spare narrative by Skeel required the court to urgently approve
a loan proposal financed by the debtor and a lender to prevent the immediate collapse
of the corporation.129 He explained “The judge must sign off on everything right away,
because the company’s assets are a melting ice cube and will… evaporate unless the
court springs immediately into action.”130 This narrative shows the urgency inflicted
on courts to approve a restructuring plan in order to ensure that the assets are not totally
destroyed before the corporation can continue its operations as a going concern.

The opponents of the going concern value believe that time is of the essence and the
timeframe within which the debtor would return to solvency as well as the rise and fall
in value of the currency can be a determining factor why creditors would prefer an
outright liquidation to a restructuring. Wood holds the view that secured creditors may
have a strong incentive to steer the insolvency towards a liquidation to avoid the risk of
not recovering their claims after a long wait for the corporation to bounce into solvency
in a traditional restructuring.131 Janis Sarra believes that many insolvent corporations
are worth more liquidated than as going concerns. 132 She refers to it as “Deferred
Liquidation” and states that the continuous investment in an insolvent corporation
creates an obligation that the corporation would continue running its affairs and the
interest of workers and secured creditors are at a greater risk when the resources could
be used elsewhere.133 Jackson and Baird point out that the sale of a corporation as a
going concern will not maximize value for creditors as much a liquidation would in
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corporations like sole proprietorships with skills and knowledge specific to the owners
which would be lost if the corporation is sold as a going concern to a third party. 134
According to Roderick Wood, the causes of financial difficulty of a corporation and the
appropriate method of addressing the issue are not “immediately apparent” and it would
require a restructuring process to enable the corporation decipher what the problem is
and propose rescue plans. 135

When a corporation is not viable, selling the corporation as a going concern is difficult
but might be considered to preserve the value of the corporation and also maximize
value for the creditors. This is a restructuring option that yields greater value than a
piecemeal sale of assets. Stanley Edwards argues that restructuring preserves the going
concern value of the corporation by preventing fire sale scenarios.136 Roderick Wood
expresses his concern in understanding why the maximization of value cannot be done
in a liquidation regardless of the additional costs involved in negotiating a plan with
creditors that is not present in liquidation.137 Wood suggests that liquidation may be
preferable to restructuring if there is a possibility of liquidating a debtor’s assets while
it remains a going concern thus reducing strategic costs. Wood adds that it is more
commercially beneficial for corporations in distress to carry out a restructuring other
than an outright liquidation, as it might be impossible to sell the business as a going
concern having regard to the secured creditors interests on key assets of the corporation
and during a restructuring other creditors would be stayed from enforcing their
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claims.138 Lopuki and Doherty have also stated that reorganization is the only option
which supports the going concern sales of insolvent corporations as the markets are
inadequate.139

Despite these views, when maximization of value for creditors is in issue, the
preservation of the going concern value should be the main focus. If a corporation is
insolvent and the creditors are paid out at that time the value would be less than that
which would be recovered if the corporation were given a breathing space to restructure
its affairs. Janis Sarra argues that almost always a viable business is frequently worth
more as a going concern than if the assets are liquidated on a piecemeal basis to satisfy
the claims of creditors.140 This theory not only considers the interests of the creditors
or the corporation in distress but also considers the broader interests of the public. For
example, the interests of the employees who might be working with the corporation at
the time, the suppliers who have certain contracts with the corporation to render
services, the community who benefits from their services, etc. This extended
consideration of other interests has been recognized by Professor Finch who holds the
view that corporate rescue requires the continuation of the debtors business in other to
preserve jobs and limit the negative economic effects of corporate failures. 141

From the different views of theorists in support of preserving the going concern value
of a corporation, there are two important outcomes when a corporation is given such an
opportunity to remain in business. Firstly, a situation where the debtor corporation
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company continues as a going concern with its ownership and structure in place.
Secondly, where the business is sold as a going concern and it continues carrying on
business under a different ownership and structure.

1.5.2

The Collective Debt Recovery Platform for Creditors

The major proponent of the maximization of recovery of creditors is Thomas Jackson
who believes that insolvency law should serve as a debt collection tool.142 His view
arises from the understanding that the main goal of insolvency law is resolving creditors
collection problems for greater returns. Not only does he hold the view that the
procedure should maximize value for creditors, he believes that creditors should come
together to lay their claims against the debtor to avoid the scrambling to seize the assets
of the debtor leading to its depletion.143 The proponents of this theory believe that when
individual remedies are substituted with a non-piecemeal collective process there will
be an increase in the aggregate value of the pool of assets and of greater commercial
benefit to the creditors as a group.

According to Jackson, a collectivist system is administratively efficient and quite
attractive to creditors as it reduces the additional costs of restructuring that involves
series of negotiations between parties. He believes that all insolvency laws should be
able to enhance the collective benefits of creditors. 144 Jackson has identified two
reasons why the collective recovery of creditors should be encouraged. Firstly, he stated
that it avoids the duplication of actions against the debtor and enforcement costs.
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Secondly, a more orderly liquidation would yield greater returns to the creditors instead
of creditors rushing to grab assets of the debtor on a first come first served basis. The
collective act of creditors on the assumption that they are better off acting as a group
and their strength being in their numbers is able to do its best in enforcing entitlements
of creditors which existed prior to bankruptcy.145

Douglas Baird agrees with Jackson’s view that creditors should remain entitled to their
rights before insolvency as opposed to a post insolvency redistribution of rights. 146
Some commentators believe a decision to restructure or liquidate should be made
considering which strategy yields the greatest return on the assets for creditors. 147
Lopucki and Doherty argue that a restructuring can maximize greater returns for the
creditors than a liquidation148 but Baird and Rasmussen hold a different view and have
argued that “the days when reorganization law promised substantial benefits are gone,”
and that the rapid sale of the debtor company could lead to greater returns than a
reorganization.149

This theory of insolvency law being a collective debt recovery platform for creditors
has been criticized as being constrained to a specific class who are the traditional
creditors.150 It does not pay attention to other legitimate interests or claims of many
who are not referred to in their contract with the company as creditors. 151 Professor
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Keay and Professor Walton hold the opinion that the debt collection theory fails to take
account that some creditors may possess stronger rights than other creditors. This may
vary depending on the kind of security they possess and their ability to bargain freely
with the insolvent.152 Janis Sarra also agrees that maximizing value for the traditional
creditors is too limited and constrained and cannot be the major aim of a corporate
restructuring but it is just one of the many aims.153 She explained:
Market and debt collection theories are limited in their analysis because their definition
of interest recognizes only equity and debt capital investment in the firm. They ignore
the other investments that contribute value and which may be vitally important to
decision making in terms of wealth maximization.

Jackson’s view tilts towards the economic values of the creditors and has failed to put
into consideration the broader interests of the public such as the preservation of jobs of
employees. Professor Korobkin holds the view that when a corporation is reorganized,
non-economic values, such as moral, political and social values should be
considered.154 Professor Vanessa Finch holds the same view as Korobkin stating that
the debt collection theory “fails adequately to value the continuation of business
relationships that have not been formalized in contracts and may indeed, omit from the
consideration those who suffer the greatest hardships in the context of financial
stress.”155

Baird and Rasmussen argue that “the new world of corporate reorganizations” makes
liquidation more practicable than reorganization. They acknowledge the problem of the
“empty core” and attribute this to the presence of different creditors and key players in
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a corporation whose ownership rights conflict thus making the corporate reorganization
process inefficient. 156 Unlike in bankruptcy where a few familiar processes are
employed in a collective system, Baird and Rasmussen hold the view that a corporate
restructuring process in a holding corporation would involve complex arrangements
between the different subsidiaries and the creditors thus leading to fragmented interests
and the inability for a consensus to be reached. 157 This point is counterproductive
because times are changing, and companies have more innovative ways of ascertaining
where assets of each corporation belong. If corporate restructuring would pose a
problem according to Baird and Rasmussen, then the collective process should be
almost impossible, as the creditors and investors would hardly know themselves.

1.5.3

Loss Distribution and the Consideration of Public Interest.

This theory upholds the consideration of the interests of the greater number of people
who might be affected by the insolvency of the corporation. Janis Sarra believes that
the reason for a restructuring is more than the preservation of a firm as a going concern
and the resolving of debt collection claims of traditional creditors whether individually
or as a group.158 Warren has identified that the inability of the debtor to pay its debts
can lead to distributional issues that would incur costs to some and yield benefits to the
others.159 In Warren’s view, bankruptcy law determines how losses from a business
failure should be borne and effectively distributed. She points out that in order to
achieve this, certain normative questions such as, who suffers more when a business
fails? And whom can best bear the loss? Should be considered and answered.160
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Gross advocates that the impact of a corporation’s failure on the non-traditional
creditors should be put into assessment to ascertain their losses. She holds the view that
a broader understanding of economic interests, such as community interests should be
considered in bankruptcy. She emphasizes the need for certain creditors to be paid when
their survival is at risk.161 This humanistic approach by the proponents of this theory is
uncertain, as community interests are relative. If all community interests are considered
there might not be a closure as to who can claim from the debtor. Bowers has also
identified that the term “community interests” are not strictly quantifiable. 162 The
consideration of the interest of a greater number of people would also mean placing the
cost on secured creditors to pay for the social and economic costs of the firm’s decision.

Korobkin makes it clearer by stating that the courts should be given the discretion to
recognize “public interests.”163 Stanley Edwards agrees that the interest of the public
should be put into great consideration in a decision to continue the enterprise.164 The
Supreme Court of Canada165 has defined the public interest to comprise of the interests
of employees, customers, communities and pensioners as people who should be
considered while preserving the going concern of the corporation. This theory is in line
with the going concern value theory and suggests that the public interest should be
considered in restructuring to maximize value for both the creditors and non-traditional
creditors.
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From the analysis of the theories of restructuring, this paper will be more inclined to
the purposes of restructuring stated by the proponents of preserving the going concern
value of the corporation as the innovations in the CAM Bill aim to preserve the going
concern value of businesses.

1.6

Conclusion

This chapter has given a general overview of corporate insolvency for better
understanding of the key concepts and terms used in this thesis. It has also discussed
the objectives of restructuring law and the theories of restructuring. This chapter has
discussed a rescue and has differentiated a business rescue from a corporate rescue.
Nigeria is a credit friendly jurisdiction that lacked a framework that provided
mechanisms for business rescue till the recent amendments in the CAMA 2020. The
courts also do not exercise restraint in giving orders to wind up a company once the
company is insolvent. Prior to the passing of the CAMA 2020, liquidation and
receivership procedures were usually practiced to maximize value for creditors. The
next chapter will discuss corporate insolvency in Nigeria. It will evaluate the previous
insolvency framework of Nigeria under the CAMA 1990 and will highlight the
shortcomings in the previous framework that led to the reforms in the CAMA 2020.
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CHAPTER 2:
CORPORATE INSOLVENCY IN NIGERIA

2.0

Introduction

Nigeria does not have a separate regulatory framework for insolvency. Prior to the
enactment of the CAMA 2020, the CAMA 1990 regulated corporations and provided
the rules that governed corporate insolvency in Nigeria. In the past 30 years, there was
no significant amendment to the CAMA 1990. The CAMA 1990 provided mechanisms
that focused on debt collection. These mechanisms were winding up, receivership and
arrangement and compromise. The restructuring mechanisms that are available are also
not sufficient in rescuing the business of insolvent companies. In addition to the lack of
business rescue options in Nigeria, loopholes that that make the system unworkable
weakened the existing insolvency framework in Nigeria. This chapter will review the
previous corporate insolvency law in Nigeria. It will begin by discussing the history of
corporate law in Nigeria and then proceed to discuss the corporate insolvency and
restructuring procedures available in Nigeria under the CAMA 1990. While analyzing
the options available in the CAMA 1990, this chapter will identify the shortcomings in
the previous insolvency framework.

2.1

History of Nigerian Corporate Law

During the Pre-colonial era, corporate law practice was alien to the Nigerian legal
system because commercial activities were minimal. At this time, most of the
prominent businesses in Nigeria at that time include fishing, agriculture, farming and
trading were for subsistence.166 With the advent of slave trade in Nigeria, there was a
boost in commercial economic interests; raw materials extracted from agricultural

166 O Akinlola, Corporate Law Practice, 3rd ed (Lagos: Malthouse Press Limited, 2017) at 1.
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produce were exchanged for manufactured goods from other countries. 167 The raw
materials produced in Nigeria became a source of economic power, which slowly
removed the interests of the colonial masters from human trading to trading in goods
and services. This was how commercial activities blossomed in Nigeria. This led to a
need to set up a legal framework to regulate commerce in Nigeria.

Before 1912, there was no local statute enacted to oversee corporate law practice in
Nigeria.168 The rapid growth of trade and commerce in Nigeria led to the enactment of
the first Nigerian Companies Ordinance of 1912 modeled after the United Kingdom’s
Companies Act of 1908.169 The British Parliament passed this legislation to provide for
the incorporation of companies by registration in Nigeria.170 Between 1914 and 1918,
World War 1 interrupted this development. 171 After World War I, the Companies
Ordinance of 1912 was repealed and replaced with the Companies Ordinance of 1922.
The new enactment was introduced to meet the commercial objectives of the Nigerian
economy, enable the economy recover from the setback of the war, and ensure a stable
corporate environment in Nigeria.172 The Second World War, between 1939-1945, also
interrupted the growth of company law in Nigeria. The company ordinances of 1941
and 1954 were subsequently amended but these amendments had no significant impact
on the growth of the company law of Nigeria.173 On the 1st of October 1960, Nigeria
gained its independence and the British Parliament lost the power to make laws for
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Nigeria as the country now had the power to make its laws.174 Subsequently on the 1st
of October 1963, Nigeria became a republic and the office of the Queen ceased as
monarchy was abolished and the president took over control of Nigeria as the
constitutional head of state who made laws for Nigeria.175

In 1968, the Federal military government enacted the Companies Decree of 1968,
which was more detailed and sophisticated, and this remained in force for two
decades.176 This Companies Act required a high level of accountability from directors
to the company and its shareholders. There were defects in the application and
enforcement of the Companies Decree of 1968. Critics noted that the Decree was
modeled after the British Companies Act 1948,177 without considering that the special
features of Nigerian corporate law practice that were different from that of the United
Kingdom at the time. Following a reform of Nigeria’s corporate law in 1990, the
Nigerian Law Reform Commission repealed the Companies Decree of 1968 and
enacted the Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990 (“CAMA 1990”).178 The CAMA
1990 was divided into three parts: Part A deals with the incorporation of Companies;
Part B deals with the procedure for the registration of Business name while Part C
provides for incorporated trustees.179
Previously, the CAMA 1990 was the primary legislation regulating corporate
insolvency in Nigeria. It permitted companies to obtain credit from creditors to keep
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them in business and increase their productivity.180 It also encouraged foreign investors
to invest in companies and do business in Nigeria. 181 CAMA 1990 also permitted
creditors to obtain collateral to secure their loans. When these loans are unpaid, they
become debts in the hands of the borrowing companies. The options available under
the CAMA 1990 to creditors to recover the debts include winding up,

182

receivership,183 and arrangement and compromise.184 The court with the jurisdiction to
handle insolvency proceedings in Nigeria is the Federal High Court (the “court”).185
This chapter is discussing the mechanisms previously available under the CAMA 1990
to illustrate the deficiencies in the framework and subsequently compare this previous
framework under the CAMA 1990 to the CAMA 2020.

The two most practiced debt recovery options were winding up and receivership. A
winding up process aims to dissolve a company while a receivership process aims to
recover debts through the sale of the secured assets. The end result of both processes is
the dissolution of the company. What is significant about these two options is that they
do not aim to rescue insolvent companies.186 Thus, the previous insolvency framework
in Nigeria focused on the interests of creditors with debt collection being the main
objective and no provision for a business rescue. Consequently, the framework
neglected the interests of other key players in the insolvency system such as the debtor,
employees, pensioners, the community and the public. This chapter will now discuss in
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more detail the process of winding up and receivership commonly practiced in Nigeria
highlighting the inefficiencies in both options.

2.2

Winding Up

Winding up proceedings are a special form of civil proceedings that aim to terminate
the existence of a company.187 In a winding up process the assets of the debtor company
are dissolved and distributed to its creditors in accordance with the rules of priority.188
Winding up proceedings are sui generis and are governed by Part XV of CAMA
1990.189 The term “winding up” and “liquidation” are often used interchangeably but
they do not represent the same action. Winding up involves both liquidation and
dissolution of the company. When a winding up order is made against a company, the
business of the company stops, all obligations owed by the company are terminated;
before the commencement of the liquidation process where the assets of the company
are sold off. Therefore, liquidation is only an aspect of the winding up process.

2.2.1

Modes of Winding up

CAMA 1990 provides for three modes of winding up a company and they are: winding
up by the court, voluntary winding up and winding up subject to the supervision of the
court. 190
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2.2.1.1

Winding up by the Court

A corporation may be wound up by an order of the court. This process is commenced
when a petition for winding up of the corporation is filed in court. The company, a
creditor, an official receiver, a contributory, a trustee in bankruptcy or a personal
representative of creditor or contributory, or the Corporate Affairs Commission may
file petitions for the winding up of a company.191 The CAMA 1990 provides that a
winding up petition may be brought by any of these persons or a combination of all of
them.192 The power to make winding up orders is vested in the Federal High Court with
jurisdiction in the territory where the company has a head office or registered office.193
The court has the power to appoint an official receiver or a liquidator to conduct the
winding up of the company.194 Once a liquidator is appointed the powers of directors
cease except the court sanctions otherwise.195

The CAMA 1990 provides for some grounds on the basis of which the court can wind
up a company. They are where: (a) the company has by special resolution resolved that
the company be wound up by the court (b) default is made in delivering the statutory
report to the commission or in holding the statutory meeting (c) the number of members
is reduced below two (d) the company is unable to pay its debts (e) the court is of the
opinion that it is just and equitable that the company should be wound up.196 In practice,
most applications for the compulsory winding up of a company are brought under one
of the last two grounds. With regards to winding up on grounds of company’s inability
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to pay debt, the courts have maintained that before a winding up order can be made, it
must be satisfied that there is a debt, the debt is due and the company to be wound up
is unable to pay the debt.197

2.2.1.2

Voluntary Winding up

A company may be wound up voluntarily by its members or creditors, without the
intervention of the court or occurrence of any of the grounds mentioned above.
Voluntary winding up arises in two circumstances. First, where the company is
incorporated for a limited period or it is stated in the company’s articles that it would
be dissolved upon the occurrence of any event, the company may be voluntarily wound
up when the period expires or when the event occurs, by passing an ordinary resolution
at the company’s general meeting.198 Second, a company may also voluntarily wound
for any other reason by passing a special resolution for voluntary winding up.199

Under the CAMA 1990, there is a distinction between a member’s voluntary winding
up and a creditors voluntary winding up. The distinction between the two is determined
by the solvency or insolvency of the company. The CAMA 1990 provides that for a
winding up to be a member’s voluntary winding up, the directors of the company must
make a statutory declaration of solvency. 200 The statutory declaration of solvency
would state that the directors have made a full inquiry into the affairs of the company
and have formed the opinion that within 12 months from the commencement of the

197 Durumugo Resources Ltd v Zenith Bank (2016) LPELR-40487 (CA) Per Nimpar, J.C.A (Pp. 15-
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winding up the company will be able to pay its debts in full.201 According to the CAMA
1990:
a statutory declaration can only have effect upon fulfilling of the following conditions:
(a) It was made within 5 weeks before the date of passing of the resolution for winding
up the company and is delivered to the commission, CAC for registration before that
date. (b) The statutory declaration embodies a statement of the company’s assets and
liabilities as at the latest practicable date before the making of the declaration.202

Where the directors are unable to make a declaration of solvency, the voluntary winding
up process is classified as a creditors voluntary winding up. 203 This distinction is
important because it determines which party as between the members and creditors that
would have more control over the winding up process. For instance, in a members
voluntary winding up, the company in a general meeting appoint the liquidators,204
whilst in a creditors’ voluntary winding up, creditors appoint the liquidator for the
purpose of winding up the company.205 In both cases, the liquidator has the obligation
to wind up the company in accordance with CAMA, and deliver an account of the
winding up of the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC). The CAC registers the
account, and upon this registration, the company stands dissolved.206

2.2.1.3

Winding up Subject to the Supervision of the Court

In a winding up subject to the supervision of the court, a company passes a resolution
to voluntarily wind up and in addition files a petition in court seeking for the winding
201 CAMA 1990, s 462(1).
202 CAMA 1990, s 462 (2) (a)-(b).
203 CAMA 1990, s. 462(4).
204 CAMA 1990, s. 464.
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up process to be subject to the supervision of the court.207 Winding up may also be
subject to the supervision of the court where the court makes an order for that purpose
pursuant to an application filed by either creditors, contributories or other persons who
the court think are fit to bring the application. 208 A winding up subject to the
supervision of the court applies the rules of voluntary winding up. However, the process
allows the court to oversee and control through prior approval, certain powers vested
on the liquidators including power to pay classes of creditors in full, power to make any
arrangement and compromise with creditors and powers to compromise all calls and
liabilities to calls.209

Having explained the three major modes of winding up in Nigeria, this chapter will
now highlight the drawbacks of the winding up process.

2.2.2
2.2.2.1

Drawbacks of Winding Up
Winding up as a tool for debt recovery

The most common ground petitioners rely on to seek a winding up order against a
company is that the company is unable to pay its debts.210 The Act provides that “a
company shall be deemed unable to pay its debt if it owes a sum exceeding N2000 and
has failed to repay the debt for a period of three weeks after a statutory demand for
payment has been issued by the creditor”.211 The major problem with this section is
that the amount of debt was too low and it created room for abuse by creditors. In
Nigeria, there is an escalated use of winding up by creditors to recover debts owed to a
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company on the basis that the debtor company is insolvent and has failed to meet its
financial obligations.212 This has resulted in abuse of the winding up process; many
winding up petitions are filed in bad faith and just as a means to recover debts, which
in many cases are disputed. In recognition of the damaging effect of a winding up
petition on a company’s ability to continue as a going concern; 213 the courts have
warned that the process should be used sparingly. The court in Tate Industries v Devcom
MB Ltd, 214 stated that “winding-up proceedings is signing the death warrant of a
company or the pronouncement of the death of the company. It is a very serious matter.”
Unfortunately, warnings such as this do not deter creditors from taking advantage of
the very low financial threshold of insolvency in CAMA 1990.

2.2.2.2

Winding up as a punitive measure

Some of the grounds for winding up of a company in CAMA indicates that in Nigeria,
the winding up of a company is a punitive measure employed by courts on a company
for not meeting its obligations.215 For instance, the CAMA empowers the court to wind
up a company for failure to hold statutory meetings or file statutory reports. Given that
a company functions through its directors, the omissions of these directors in charge of
running the affairs of the company should not be borne by the company. The CAMA
should in these circumstances hold the directors, and not the company responsible.
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2.2.2.3

Winding up leads to loss of asset value

A winding up order and the accompanying liquidation are drastic measures that has bad
consequences for the company involved. Among other things, a winding up order can
negatively affect the asset value of the company, and may lead to sale of assets of the
company for less than its market value. 216 According to Adeniran, a winding up is
hardly considered as a rescue procedure. He argued that compared to other insolvency
procedures, its main limitation is that as a result of the stigma society attaches to firms
being wound up, it leads to systematic "underpricing" of the assets of those firms.217
Regardless of how the sales of assets are being procured by the liquidator, they will be
grossly undervalued and there will be no maximization of value for creditors. The
liquidation proceeds of the company will be used to settle more of administrative
expenses than the debts owed to creditors.

2.2.2.4

Moratorium does not prevent a floodgate of litigation

The CAMA 1990 provides for a moratorium for a company in respect of which a
winding up order is made or a provisional liquidator is appointed. During this period,
actions against the company can only be commenced or continued with the consent of
the Federal High Court.218 This stay of proceedings against creditors has been regarded
as necessary because the winding up procedure is a multi-party debt collection
procedure. The liquidator would be tasked with a fair distribution of the proceeds of the
debtor’s assets among the creditors, considering that there are insufficient assets to

216 Loch v John Blackwood (1924) AC 783.
217 Akingbolahan Adeniran, “A Mediation-Based Approach to Corporate Reorganizations in

Nigeria” (2003) 29:2 North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation
291–350 at 321.
218 CAMA 1990, s. 417.
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settle claims against the debtor in full. Adeniran argued, that a possible advantage of
the winding up process is the moratorium provided “against other enforcement actions
by creditors, thereby preventing a race to the courthouse syndrome”.219

However, this protection is not very efficient in preventing a floodgate of actions. The
CAMA 1990 did not state what factors are important for the court to consider in
granting or refusing its consent to commence or continue an action. However, case law
has stated that the most important factors are that the company is a necessary party to
the suit.220 This threshold is too low, and can easily be satisfied by creditors. Creditors
can therefore institute several actions to recover debts against companies undergoing
winding up by simply complying with the procedural requirement of obtaining leave of
court. For this reason, the moratorium on winding up is not effective, as it does not
prevent a floodgate of claims by the debtor against the company.

2.2.2.5

Negative impact on a viable company’s business

Winding up proceedings have a negative effect on the reputation of the debtor
companies, even when winding up petitions filed against them are dismissed. This is
worsened by CAMA’s low threshold, which enables creditors to easily file winding up
petitions. When creditors resort to winding up as a means of debt recovery, the company
involved loses credibility before its investors even after dismissal of the winding up
petition. These investors become discouraged from investing in the company as a result
of the information made available to them regarding the liquidity of the company.221

219 Adeniran, supra note 217 at 322.
220 Bwacha v. Ikenya & ors. (2011) 3 NWLR 610. L.S.B.P.C v. Purification Tech. (Nig.) Limited

(2013) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1352) 91.
221 Rule 19 (1-4) of the Companies Winding up Rules 2001 provides that the petition for winding
up of a company shall be advertised in a gazette, one national daily newspaper and one other
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Thus, a company that may otherwise be viable may become insolvent because of an
improper use of the winding up procedure.

Further, CAMA makes void any dealings and contracts entered into with a company
after the commencement of a winding up proceeding. 222 Thus, advertisement of a
winding up petition would deter a company’s business partners from dealings with the
company. The company might be compelled to pay disputed debts rather than risk the
adverse consequences of the winding up petition being advertised.

223

The

advertisement of a winding up petition causes significant losses to the company
regardless of its subsequent dismissal by the court.224 This chapter has explained so far
winding up as an insolvency process in Nigeria under CAMA, highlighting some of the
challenges with the process. It shall now proceed to consider another important aspect
of Nigeria’s insolvency law; receivership.

2.2.3
2.2.3.1

Receivership
Who is a Receiver?

As a consequence of incorporation, a company gains the power to borrow and provide
the necessary collateral in other to secure their debts. The loan agreements for these
lending arrangements usually include terms that allow secured creditors to appoint a
receiver over the assets and undertakings of the company.225 When a company fails to

newspaper in circulation in the company’s registered office or last known place of business, 15
days before the hearing of the petition on the order of the judge.
222 CAMA 1990, s.413.
223 Air Via Ltd v Oriental Airlines Ltd, (2004) 9 NWLR (Pt. 878) 298 at 327 G-H; Tate Industries Plc
v Devcom MB Ltd, (2004) 17 NWLR (Pt. 901) 182 at 225B-E.
224 Kubi Udofia, An Analysis of Judicial Approach to Disputed Debts in Winding-Up Proceedings in
Nigeria, SSRN Scholarly Paper, by, papers.ssrn.com, (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research
Network, 2018).
225 CAMA 1990, s 180(3).
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repay these loans, creditors have the right to appoint a receiver or a receiver manager.226
The Supreme Court of Nigeria defined a “receiver” as “an impartial person appointed
by the court to manage, collect and receive, pending the proceedings, rents, issues and
profits of land or personal estate which it does not seem reasonable to the court that
either party should collect or receive or for the same to be distributed among the persons
entitled”.227 A company does not have the power to appoint its own receiver or receiver
manager. However, once receivership is concluded, it may appoint a liquidator to
distribute the remaining funds (if any) to the unsecured creditors.228 The court pursuant
to enabling statutes may also appoint a receiver.229

2.2.3.2

In whose interest should a receiver act?

There is a controversy on this subject arising from the uncertainty in CAMA on the
definition of the duties of a receiver. The CAMA states that a person can be a receiver
and a manager of the corporation and defined a receiver to include a manager.230 This
is conflicting because while s 393 CAMA mandates receivers to realize debts on behalf
of the person who has appointed him and nothing more, s 390231 CAMA provides that
when a receiver is also appointed manager, the receiver has a fiduciary relationship
with the company.

226 CAMA 1990, s.209.
227 Uwakwe & ors v Odogwu & ors (1989) LPELR-3446 (SC) per Obaseki, JSC.
228 Bhadmus Hammed Yemi, “Rethinking Corporate Receivership in Nigeria” (2016) 53:0 Journal

of Law, Policy and Globalization 158–165 at 159.
229 CAMA 1990, s. 180.
230 CAMA 1990, s 567.
231 A receiver or manager of any property or undertaking of a company appointed out of court
under a power contained in any instrument shall, subject to section 393 of this Act, be deemed to
be an agent of the person or persons on whose behalf he is appointed and, if appointed manager of
the whole or any part of the undertaking of a company, he shall be deemed to stand in a fiduciary
relationship to the company and observe the utmost good faith towards it in any transaction with
it or on its behalf”
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What is clear is that once a receiver is appointed; the sole duty is to recover the debt on
behalf of the appointing creditor. It is not the duty of a receiver to preserve the business
of the company as the receiver is acting for the benefit of the person who has appointed
him. The Supreme Court in Uwakwe v Odogwu stated, “A receiver as such has no
authority to carry on a going concern. His duty is to stop the business, collect the debts
and realise the assets...A manager, on the other hand, has power to continue a business
or any going concern”.232 In NBCI v Alfijir (Mining) Nig Ltd,233 the Supreme Court
maintained the same view. In this case, the respondent Alfijir Ltd obtained a loan from
NBCI and defaulted to repay the loan on the due date. The loan agreement empowered
NBCI to appoint a receiver upon default.234

After a receiver was appointed by NBCI, a cheque was issued in favour of Alfijir Ltd
by Guffanti Ltd but was held back by NBCI and not delivered to Alfijir Ltd. Alfijir Ltd
initiated an action to recover damages from NCBI for losses incurred during the period
when NCBI held on to the cheque. The High Court granted the claims of Alfijir Ltd on
the basis that NBCI prevented the receiver from performing his duties by holding on to
the cheque. The court noted that if the cheque was handed over to the receiver, the
money would have been applied to the business of Alfijir Ltd and the economic loss,
which it encountered during the period it was deprived of cash would have been
avoided. The Court of Appeal upheld this decision.

On appeal the Supreme Court overturned the judgment of the Court of Appeal. The
Supreme Court stated that once a receiver is appointed the rights of the company to deal

232 Uwakwe v Odogwu (1989) 5NWLR. (pt. 123) at 562.
233 (1993) 4NWLR [Pt. 287] 346 CA; (1999) 14NWLR [Pt. 638] 176 (SC).
234 [Pt 287]. Pp. 352.
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with its assets are suspended. The Supreme Court further held that the duty of a receiver
is not to run the company’s business but to realize assets for the benefit of the secured
creditor who appointed him.235 This decision shows that the Supreme Court concluded
that the duty of a receiver to be only to recover monies for the secured creditor who has
appointed him. The secured creditor is also excused for wrongful acts and would not be
liable for the losses suffered by a business at this time because a receiver has been
appointed. This decision places companies at the mercy of secured creditors when a
receiver has been appointed as they lose the power to run its affairs.

However, when a receiver is also appointed manager, it becomes unclear what the real
duty of receivers are and whose interest they ought to protect, given the fiduciary
obligation imposed on managers. In West African Breweries v Savannah Ventures
Ltd,236 the court held that a receiver appointed manager acts in dual capacity and has to
carry out the duties of both positions. In this case, West African Breweries (WAB)
held 50% equity in the assets of North Brewery (NB) while the Nigerian Federal
Government (FG) held the remaining 50%. WAB was interested in purchasing the FG’s
50% and as negotiations were ongoing, NB defaulted on the loans to its creditors.
Consequently, a receiver-manager was appointed by the creditors to recover the debt.
WAB informed the receiver of its intention to pay off the indebtedness of NB and
proceeded to acquire FG’s 50% in NB. While discussions were still ongoing between
WAB and the receiver, the receiver sold NB’s assets to Savannah Ventures Ltd at gross
undervalue. WAB brought an action against the receiver for the sale of certain assets
belonging to NB arguing that the sale was carried out in bad faith, and sought to have

235 Ogwuegbu, JSC at p. 34, paras a-e.
236 (2008) 10 NWLR [Pt 775] 401 SC.
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the sale set aside by the court. The Supreme Court considered the duty of the receiver
to the company and held that the receiver had a duty to manage NB.237 The court stated
that the receiver abandoned his duty to manage the company and the receiver was
engrossed with the realization and sale of assets.238 Thus, a receiver of a company has
a positive duty, not just to sell the assets of the company but also to manage the affairs
of the company putting into consideration all competing interests.239

It is therefore clear from the foregoing that CAMA provisions on duties of a receiver
and manager appear contradictory in cases where a person is appointed both receiver
and manager. This conflation has created uncertainty as to how a receiver manager in
Nigeria should perform its duties.

CAMA’s imposition of fiduciary duties on receiver-managers has been criticized by
academics. For instance, Bhadmus notes that it is absurd for fiduciary obligations to be
imposed on a receiver-manager who is neither an agent nor an officer of the
company.240 Relying on the wordings of s. 393 CAMA which states that a receiver
appointed pursuant to a debt instrument is an agent of the person of the appointing
creditor, he argues that the goal of the agent should be the same as that of the
principal.241 Bhadmus further argues that since the principal creditor’s objective is to
realize outstanding debt, the receiver manager should only act in the best interest of the
principal and not in the best interest of the company. 242 Bhadmus points out that

237 Ibid, pp. 436-438.
238 Ibid, pp. 440.
239 Bolanle Adebola, “The Duty

of the Nigerian Receiver to ‘Manage’ the Company” (2011) 8:4
International Corporate Rescue 248 at 1.
240 Yemi, supra note 228.
241 Ibid at 163.
242 Ibid.
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provisions of s 390 which creates fiduciary obligations on a receiver manager is subject
to s 393 and is therefore subordinate to s 393 of CAMA.243 In essence, he argues that
the fiduciary duty imposed on managers in s 390 is redundant.

Another academic, Bolanle Adebola disagrees with the arguments raised by Bhadmus.
and claims that s 393 does not override the provisions of s 390.244 Adebola relied on a
historical analysis of the CAMA to argue that the drafters of the CAMA 1990 intended
to impose an additional duty on receivers to manage the affairs of the company and not
just realize assets.245 Accordingly, s 390 CAMA is the overriding statute because it
ensures that receivers “manage the company if that is the best option of [for] the
company and other interests concerned. 246 In summary, Adebola argues that the
primary duty of a receiver appointed by secured creditors is to realize the asset of the
secured creditors that appointed him, whilst at the same time, preserving the company
and other interests in the company.

The foregoing highlights the uncertainty surrounding the question: in whose interest
should a receiver act in Nigeria? It would be noted that the commentators referenced
above did not make a distinction between when a person merely acts as a “receiver”,
“manager” and when these two roles are infused into one; “receiver manager”. This
arguably weakens both arguments. However, making this distinction does not make the
issue clearer. The role of a receiver manager is dual in nature with dual and conflicting

243 The case of Oloruntoba-Oju & Ors v Abdul-Raheem & Ors. (2009) LPELR-2596 (SC) (p.60,

Paras B-E) Per Adekeye J.S.C stated that " Whenever the phase "subject to" is used in a statute the
intention, purpose and legal effect is to make the provisions of the section inferior, dependent on,
or limited and restricted in application to the section to which they are made subject to.
244 Adebola, supra note 239 at 11.
245 Ibid, at 7 – 10.
246 Ibid, at 12.
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responsibilities. Thus, although purport of s 390 CAMA appears to be preservation of
the business of companies and interest of other stakeholders in the company, the
conflicting wordings of that provision and the provisions of s 393 CAMA have defeated
that objective.

2.2.3.3

Concluding remarks on receivership

Receivership can be perceived as a better option for debt recovery than a winding up as
there is a possibility for the continuation of a company’s affairs after a receivership,
however, receivership is equally an unfavourable process for business rescue. Some of
its unfavourable features include: the board of directors cease to function upon
appointment of a receiver, 247 and the right of the company to deal with its assets
becomes suspended.248 Consequently, the company’s business is put on hold till the
receivership process is concluded. In many cases, upon conclusion of receivership, the
chances of a company continuing its business is very slim, and to make matters worse,
unsecured creditors might be left with nothing.

2.3

The Role of AMCON in Corporate Insolvency

The Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON) was established pursuant to
the Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria Act 2010 (“AMCON Act”) to purchase
non-performing loans of banks in Nigeria and realize debts owed to the banks. AMCON
was established at a time banks were failing and there was the need to protect the public,
the banks and the economy.249 The main objective of AMCON is to acquire the non-

247 CAMA 2004, s.393 (4); Unibix (Nig.) Ltd v C.B.C.L. (Nig.) Ltd

(2001) 7 NWLR (Pt.713) p.534.

248 Intercontractors (Nig.) Ltd v U.A.C (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt.78) pg. 280.
249 Van Vilet Trucks (Nig) Ltd v. Amcon & Anor
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performing loans (“eligible assets”) 250 in the books of eligible financial institutions
(EFIs). This is done to enable EFIs reorganize their affairs and continue their core
banking operations without being overburdened by bad loans.251

AMCON was set up as a statutory corporation with a lifespan of 10 years.252 Thus,
AMCON was expected to accomplish its mandate within the 10-year time frame, after
which, it would be liquidated.253 To achieve its mandate, AMCON was vested with
“special powers” to be utilized in recovering acquired assets. Unfortunately, 9 years
after the establishment of AMCON, it currently has a debt profile valued at over N5.5
trillion. 254 As a result of this huge debt profile AMCON has resorted to its stringent
powers to recover the acquired debts.

2.3.1

Special Powers of AMCON

The AMCON Act vested AMCON with very broad powers for the purpose of
accomplishing its mandate.255 The most significant powers are the powers to appoint
and act as a receiver256 and the power to approach the courts for a winding up order in
certain circumstances.257 In 2015, the AMCON Act was amended to include additional
rules and principles for receivership governed by the AMCON Act, amongst other

250 These toxic assets are non–performing loans also referred to as eligible bank assets (“EBAs”).
251 Nat Ofo, “Is the Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria Designed to Fail?", (Rochester, NY:

Social Science Research Network, 2011) at 2.
252 Ibid at 28.
253 Obinna Chima, “AMCON: Stakeholders Propose Tenure Extension”, online: AMCON:
Stakeholders Propose Tenure Extension <https://www.proshareng.com/news/Debtors--Recovery/AMCON--Stakeholders-Propose-Tenure-Extension/11817>.
254 Kubi, “AMCON (Amendment No. 2) Act 2019 and Its Weighty Flaws (1)”, (15 October 2019),
online: INSOLVENCY DISCOURSE <https://kubiudofia.wordpress.com/2019/10/15/amconamendment-no-2-act-2019-and-its-weighty-flaws-1/>.
255 AMCON Act 2010, ss. 48 -55.
256 AMCON Act 2010, s. 48.
257 AMCON Act 2010, s. 52 and s. 54(4).
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amendments.258 The principles of receivership and liquidation in the AMCON Act are
discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

2.3.2

AMCON Receivership

The AMCON Act provides that AMCON “shall have the power to act as or appoint a
receiver over asset charged, mortgaged or pledged” as security for any eligible asset
acquired by the corporation.259 This means that the AMCON Act essentially amended
loan contracts retrospectively to vest on AMCON the power to act and appoint
receivers, even if such powers were never provided for by the contracting parties.

The receivership provisions in the AMCON Act are comparable in some respect with
that in CAMA. Just like the CAMA rules imposing specific duties on a receiver, and a
receiver-manager,260 the AMCON Act provides that a receiver shall have the power to
realize the assets of the debtor company 261, enforce any liabilities of directors and
shareholders of the debtor company 262 , and manage the affairs of the debtor
company263. In addition, the AMCON Act also contemplates that AMCON or a receiver
it appoints may also manage the affairs of the debtor company. 264 Specifically, the
AMCON Act provides that a receiver may elect to manage the affairs of the debtor
company by giving public notice of its election. 265 Once the notice is filed, all
“judgments, claims, debt enforcement procedures existing or being pursued before the

258 Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria (Amendment) Act
259 AMCON Act 2010, s. 48 (1).
260 CAMA, ss. 390 and 393.
261 AMCON Act 2010, s. 48(2)(a).
262 AMCON Act 2010, s. 48(2)(b).
263 AMCON Act 2010, s. 48(2)(c).
264 AMCON Act 2010, ss. 48 (4), (5) and (6).
265 AMCON Act 2010, s. 48 (4).

2015, s. 6.
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publication of the notice” becomes automatically suspended and unenforceable against
the debtor-company for a period of 1 year or during the period the receiver continues
to manage the affairs of the debtor company. 266 Following this notice, the receiver
becomes entitled to take over and continue the management of the debtor company’s
business for the benefit of the company and other body of creditors of the company.267

Similar to the CAMA, the AMCON Act imposes fiduciary duties to a receiver managing
the affairs of the debtor company. Unlike the CAMA, the AMCON Act extends the
benefit of the fiduciary obligation of a receiver manager to other creditors of the debtor
company.268 The AMCON Act attempted to settle any conflict arising from creating a
fiduciary relationship in favour of other creditors on the one hand, and the interest of
AMCON269 by stating that payments be made strictly in accordance with the priority
rules in CAMA.270 However, the AMCON Act has the same defect as CAMA in the
sense that the fiduciary duty imposed on receiver may contradict the receiver’s power
and duty to realize the assets of the debtor company for the purpose of settling its
outstanding debt.

There are provisions in the AMCON Act that are unique to receivers appointed under
the Act. The most striking provision is s 48(3) of the AMCON Act which states that a
receiver can exercise its powers over “all assets and entire undertaking of the debtor
company notwithstanding that only a part of the assets of the debtor company charged”

266 AMCON Act, s. 48(4),(7).
267 AMCON Act 2010, s. 48 (5).
268 AMCON Act 2010, s. 48(6).
269 AMCON’s interest is essentially the interest of the EFI from whom the debt was acquired. See

AMCON Act 2010, s. 34.
270 AMCON Act 2010, s. 6. The priority rule in CAMA states that payment be made in the
following order; See CAMA 2004, s. 494.
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as security for the debt. This provision appears to be arbitrary because all that is
required to trigger it is the sole decision of AMCON to act as or appoint a receiver
without more. Once this is done, the debtor corporation stands at risk of having all its
assets in receivership, including assets used as security for other creditors. Arguably,
the effect of this power may be cushioned when a receiver elects to also manage the
debtor company. However, the fact that the decision to act as both receiver and manager
is entirely that of AMCON lessens this potential advantage.

Another important provision in the AMCON Act on receivership can be found in s 48(8)
of the AMCON Act. This provides that if a receiver elects to manage the affairs of the
company, the receiver has an obligation to prepare and publish a detailed plan for the
“rehabilitation of the debtor-company”. On its face, this appears to be an obligation that
can potentially preserve the debtor-company. However, this is not really the case, as
failure to do so does not have significant consequences for the receiver, neither is the
receiver personally liable for such failure. The only consequence for failure to prepare
a rehabilitation plan is that the ban on enforcement and recovery actions of other
creditors is lifted. This is not sufficient to compel receiver to manage the assets of the
debtor corporation meaningfully where the elect to also act as manager of the company.

2.3.3

AMCON Liquidation

In addition to the power to act as or appoint a receiver over a debtor-company, the
AMCON Act empowers AMCON to seek a winding up order against a debtor company.
The AMCON Act provides as follows:
Where the court gives a decision against a body corporate in a debt recovery action under
this Act, requiring the debtor company to pay any sum to the Corporation and such sum is
not liquidated or paid over to the Corporation within 90 days from the date of the order for
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payment, the Corporation may apply to the court to issue a winding up order against the
debtor company.271

This provision does not consider that a debtor company might intend to enter an appeal
on the judgment debt disputing the debt or the judgment. This would lead to the
unfortunate consequence of creditors being wound up for debts that are disputed, even
in court.

Another ground for winding up under the AMCON Act is where any corporation is
convicted of the statutory offences in s 54 (1) and (2) of the AMCON Act, whether or
not such corporations are indebted to AMCON. 272 Winding up a company on this
ground is punitive because the acts criminalized by these provisions include making
false informations with respect to an eligible asset or a property used to secure the debt.
Given that this false information is made by directors or officers on behalf of the
company, the winding up of the company has no relation to the company’s solvency or
insolvency status and is merely punitive. Nat Ofo noted that “this fact of conviction can
now be regarded as a sixth ground for winding up the company by the court since in
practical terms that is the only mode which can accommodate such winding up.” 273 It
is unusual that AMCON, a body established to remedy the negative impacts of winding
up of financial companies, resorts to liquidation as a primary means of debt recovery.
Given that the offence in s 54 AMCON Act can only be committed by officers in charge
of running the affairs of the company, it curious that the punishment for the offences in
inflicted on the company. In circumstances where these offences are committed, the

271 AMCON Act s 52(1).
272 AMCON Act 2010, s 54 (4).
273 Ofo, supra note 251 at 16.
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corporate veil should be pierced to hold the directors in charge of these acts personally
liable instead of taking the extreme measure of winding up the company.274

On the 7 August 2019, the President of Nigeria gave assent to the new Asset
Management Corporation of Nigeria (Amendment) Act, 2019. Through this
amendment, AMCON is granted the power to apply ex parte for a court order to monitor
the bank account of debtors,275 and the unfettered access to the electronic devices of
debtors.276 AMCON is further empowered by the new amendments to advertise the list
of debtors in a newspaper to procuring entities for the purpose of prohibiting the debtors
from obtaining contracts, conducting businesses or fulfilling their monetary obligations
under existing contracts without a prior written approval from AMCON.277

The recent amendments to the AMCON Act appear to be a statutory sanction of
arbitrariness. As noted by one commentator, Kubi Udofia, the AMCON Act 2019
empowers AMCON to “employ self-help and extrajudicial measures in its debt
recovery drive”. 278 There are stringent and arbitrary powers introduced in the new
amendment. This include enabling AMCON’s to sell or assign a debts to a third party
irrespective of a pending suit disputing the debt.279 The courts are even prohibited in
the Act from granting injunctions or preservative orders against AMCON, its directors
or officers in any proceedings related to AMCON’s exercise of its power to recover
debts.280 To further bolster AMCON’s position, the amendment stated that no action

274 Ibid at 17.
275 S.6(1)(i)
276 AMCON Act 2019, s.6 (1) (ii)
277 AMCON Act 2019, s.50B (2)
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278 Kubi, supra note 254 at 1.
279 AMCON Act 2019, s 34(2), s 39(c)
280 AMCON Act 2019, s.34 (6)
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may be instituted against AMCON for any act done in good faith while executing its
duties; pending actions against AMCON abated.281 AMCON has the power to present
interlocutory applications freezing the funds of the debtors.282 It curious that a statutory
body is vested with so much arbitrary power over debtors, paralyzing their business in
the process, while also preventing them from seeking redress from a court of law for
violations of their rights.

The aim of the Nigerian government in setting up AMCON was to protect financial
institutions and the economy in general by boosting the liquidity of the financial
institutions and recovering non-performing loans. This is arguably a commendable
objective. But the extent and arbitrariness of the powers vested on AMCON is
problematic because it threatens the continuity of debtors’ businesses. To encourage an
effective insolvency system in Nigeria, these arbitrary acts of AMCON should be
controlled. Nigeria needs a sustainable mechanism to be employed to cater for all the
stakeholders in the insolvency system, mostly by ensuring that AMCON’s recovery
processes do not undermine the ability of debtor companies to repay their debt without
becoming insolvent or becoming wound up. The need for a business rescue law that
would render AMCON’s intervention unnecessary is thus imperative.

2.4

Corporate Restructuring in Nigeria

Corporate restructuring is the reorganization of a company’s operational structure,
usually in response to its financial distress, for the purpose of stabilizing the company

281 AMCON Act 2019, s.33 (A) of the Act provides that no action or proceedings shall lie, be

instituted or maintainable against AMCON or any of its directors or officers by reason only of the
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282 AMCON Act 2019, s.50 (1)
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so that it can continue its business as a going concern. According to Adeniran, a
company reorganizes its business to maintain “an optimal capital structure” which
would enable it carry on its business effectively, pay the debts owed to its creditors and
retain its efficient employees. 283A corporate restructuring process can either be internal
or external. It is conventional for a company to first exhaust the internal restructuring
options before embarking on external restructuring.

2.4.1

Internal Restructuring in Nigeria

Internal restructuring refers to the various informal workouts a company may undertake
to improve its capital structure and pay its debts. 284 This procedure is generally
employed when a company is in financial distress and decides to maintain its corporate
identity, and recover on its own without seeking the help of third parties. 285 This
process usually involves negotiations between the company and its members or
creditors to restructure the company’s debt and equity portfolios. Internal restructuring
plans usually range from creating further charges on company’s assets, deciding to pay
creditors before a restructuring and giving creditors the option to take shares or a
combination of debt and shares in the company to liquidate the outstanding debt.286
The two internal restructuring procedures in CAMA 1990 are arrangement on sale and
arrangement and compromise. Both procedures are discussed below.

283 Adeniran, supra note 217 at 299.
284 Uwa, supra note 212 at 1.
285 Habeeb Adekola, “A General Overview of Corporate Restructuring in Nigeria”, (12 September
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286 Uwa, supra note 212 at 1.
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2.4.1.1

Arrangement on Sale

In an arrangement on sale procedure, the members of the company resolve by special
resolution to voluntarily wind up the business of the company, sell its assets to another
company and receive shares or debenture of that company as consideration for the
assets. 287 Arrangement on sale involves the following process. First, the transferor
company by special resolution resolves to voluntarily wind up its business. In the
context of the winding up process, a liquidator would be appointed with the specific
mandate of gathering the assets of the company and selling the whole or part of the
assets of the company to an identified transferee company. Thereafter, the liquidator
distributes the shares or debenture of the transferee company to the members of the
transferor company in order of their priority in liquidation.

The most plausible interpretation of the objective of the arrangement on sale process is
to settle outstanding debts by selling the whole or part of the assets to the creditor
company, such that the business continues as a going concern in the creditor company
(i.e. the transferor company). However, this is a process that can only be undertaken by
solvent companies. This is because it can only be executed through a members’
voluntary winding up of the transferor company. As earlier noted, a condition precedent
to members’ voluntary winding is a statutory declaration by the directors stating that
the company are able to liquidate outstanding debts within 12 months. 288 Thus,
arrangement on sale is not a business rescue option, but an option for solvent companies
that wish to wind up its affairs and achieve better proceeds from the sale of its assets
than would be possible by piecemeal sales in a winding up procedure.

287 CAMA 1990, s.538.
288 CAMA 1990, s. 462.
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2.4.1.2

Arrangement and compromise

Arrangement and compromise is a procedure whereby the company and its creditors,
members or a class of creditor or members accept less than what they are entitled to as
full and final satisfaction of the debt obligations of the company. 289 This process
involves complex negotiations between creditors and the debtor company, in which the
company seeks a variation or relinquishment of its obligations to creditors, debentureholders or shareholders as the case may be.

The arrangement and compromise option in CAMA requires the prior approval and
sanction of the Federal High Court. The first step towards the process is to file an
application to court for a court ordered meeting.290 If the court grants the application,
the company would hold a meeting and, in that meeting, present a scheme of
arrangement for approval by the interested creditors or members.291 At the meeting, if
the scheme is approved by persons holding 75% of the value of the company’s shares,
debt, or specific class of debt, the company would go back to court to seek approval of
the scheme.292 The primary consideration for the courts when called upon to sanction
a scheme of arrangement is to determine the fairness of the entire process. 293 The
CAMA 1990 provides that in making this determination, the court may invite the
Security and Exchange Commission to appoint an inspector to inquire into the fairness
of the scheme and provide a written report to court afterwards. 294 If the court is

289 Adekola, supra note 285 at 1.
290 CAMA 1990, s. 539(1).
291 Ibid.
292 CAMA 1990, s. 539(2).
293 Ibid.
294 CAMA 1990, s. 539(2).
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satisfied with the fairness of the scheme of arrangement, it will sanction the scheme and
then the scheme becomes binding on the company and relevant parties. While this
option may be seen as an effective business rescue option for insolvent companies, its
effectiveness is impaired by procedural challenges. Some of these challenges are
highlighted below.

Drawbacks of the Arrangement and Compromise
2.4.1.2.1

Lack of Moratorium or a stay of proceedings

CAMA makes no provision for a stay of proceedings to assist debtor companies when
an arrangement and compromise procedure is being carried out. A moratorium would
give the insolvent company some breathing space to carry on and finalize the
restructuring process without interruptions from creditors that are not part of the
process. These creditors may institute actions in court against the company undergoing
internal restructuring to enforce their claims. When this happens, the debtor company
would be compelled to settle with creditors and this may in the process diminish the
assets available to effectively conclude the ongoing arrangement and compromise.

Finally, it is unusual that CAMA does not provide for a moratorium in an arrangement
and compromise procedure, which is a restructuring procedure, but the Act provides for
a moratorium for the winding up procedure.295 This is done because the arrangement
and compromise procedure is a negotiation done on an individual basis with the
creditors, hence there are few creditors who will reject the plan of arrangement to file
claims against the debtor and there is no basis for preventing them. Unlike a winding

295 CAMA 2004, s.417 provides that if a winding up order is made or a provisional liquidator is

appointed, no action or proceedings shall be proceeded or commenced against the company
except by leave of the court given on such terms as the court may impose.
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up process where all the creditors race to grab the assets of the debtor thus creating the
need for a moratorium to avoid the depletion of the debtor’s assets. The rationale behind
the lack of moratorium in an arrangement and compromise procedure is the greater
priority placed on the collective interests of creditors than the interests of individual
creditors in an insolvency process.296

2.4.1.2.2

The degree of Court involvement in the process

The courts have a high degree of involvement in the arrangement and compromise
procedure. Indeed, this procedure relies heavily on the courts and its success or failure
is substantially dependent on the courts. As noted earlier, the process can only be
commenced with the approval of the court and its sanction is entirely dependent on the
court’s perception of fairness. This poses a number of challenges. First, it is time
consuming. The initial application for a meeting of members or creditors, as well as the
application for a court order sanctioning the scheme of arrangement are additional
caseloads on an already congested court. 297 Business rescue procedures are time
sensitive given its aim of reaching prompt compromise with the creditors. The entire
process may be defeated by the delay and complexities of Nigeria’s judicial system.298
Second, the reliance on the court to determine fairness of the scheme even when no
complaint is made regarding its unfairness is absurd. The provision essentially allows

296 “Scheme of arrangement as a business rescue tool”, (2012), online: International Law Office

<https://www.internationallawoffice.com/Newsletters/InsolvencyRestructuring/Nigeria/Punuka-Attorneys-Solicitors/Scheme-of-arrangement-as-a-businessrescue-tool>, Library Catalog: www.internationallawoffice.com.
297 Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 as amended. S. 251. The Nigerian
Constitution vests jurisdiction on the Federal High Court to handle a great number of subject
matters arising from different statutes including the CAMA. As a result of this, the Federal High
Court is often overburdened with caseloads; such that a simple application for a court ordered
meeting may take months before it is considered by the court.
298 Bolanle Adebola, “Conflated Arrangements: A Comment on the Company Voluntary
Arrangements in the Proposed Nigerian Insolvency Act 2014”, (15 February 2015), online:
<https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2565491>.
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the court to usurp the duties of directors, and perhaps the creditors as well in
determining fairness of a transaction.

2.4.1.2.3

Expensive procedure

The cost problems associated with the arrangement and compromise procedure cannot
be overstated.299 The arrangement and compromise procedure requires the debtor to
appear in court seeking two different applications, which include an order to convene a
court ordered meeting and an order for the scheme to be sanctioned. The companies
would need the services of legal practitioners to present these two applications before
the court. Adeniran has argued “these expenses could easily run into millions of naira
or other amounts beyond the reach of small companies in financial distress”.300 Given
the uncertainty on the duration of the process, a company in distress might end up
paying legal fees for years instead of channeling these funds to offset some of the debts
owed to creditors.

2.4.2

External Restructuring

This is type of restructuring involves an arrangement between the company in financial
distress and a third party. Usually, companies attempt internal restructuring before
exploring external restructuring. The reason for this is clear; once an external
restructuring procedure is completed, the company loses its identity. There are two
types of external restructuring processes commonly practiced in Nigeria. These are
mergers/acquisitions and takeovers. Both processes are discussed below.

299 Adeniran, supra note 217 at 325.
300 Ibid at 326.
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2.4.2.1

Mergers and acquisitions

A merger is the fusion of two or more corporate entities to become one single entity. A
merger occurs “when one or more undertakings directly or indirectly acquire or
establish indirect control over the whole or part of the business of another
undertaking”.301 An acquisition is: “…The take-over by one company of sufficient
shares in another company to give the acquiring company control over that
company”302 The difference between a merger and an acquisition is in the result of the
two processes. In a merger process, two or more companies are fused to form a new
company. In an acquisition process, a company purchases the shares and assets of
another company, and takes control of it. In this case, no new company is formed unless
the acquiring company winds up the target company.

The principal law that governs mergers and acquisitions in Nigeria is the Federal
Competition and Consumer Protection Act 2019 (FCCPA). The FCCPA has provided
that the key regulator for mergers and acquisition is the Federal Competition and
Consumer Protection Commission. When there is a merger of two companies, the
FCCPA checkmates monopoly by ensuring that mergers are fair and do not hinder
competition in the Nigerian economy. FCCPA performs a housekeeping role regarding
mergers and acquisitions in Nigeria. It provides a comprehensive legal and regulatory
framework for the control of mergers.303 The FCCPA vests on the commission, the
power to consider all pre-merger notifications,304 formal applications,305 and also the

301

Rule 421, Consolidated Securities and Exchange Commission Rules 2013

302 Ibid.
303 FCCPA 2019, s.92-103
304 FCCPA 2019, s.93 (1)
305 FCCPA 2019, s. 97(2)

72

power to approve or refuse a merger scheme. The commission also has the
responsibility of confirming that post-merger requirements are complied with.

A viable company would want to merge with or acquire an insolvent company for
reasons, including (1) management expertise (2) desire for growth and earnings per
share (3) enhancing the economy of scale and expand the company’s productive
capacity (4) risk diversification to guard against possible failure (5) stock exchange
quotation.306 When the merger or acquisition occurs, it prevents the company from
going into insolvency or ceasing its operations as it has joined resources with another
company. Mergers and acquisitions are a good option for restructuring a company but
it comes with some disadvantages to the company’s business.

2.4.2.2

Takeover

A takeover is an external restructuring process that involves the acquisition of 30%50% of the shares or voting rights of the target company.307 A takeover is similar to an
acquisition except that a takeover is a hostile or unilateral acquisition where the target
company does not wish to be acquired.308 The acquiring company makes a bid for the
target company and if its bid is successful, the acquiring company takes control of all
the target company’s operations, holdings and debt.

2.4.2.3

Drawbacks of the External Restructuring Procedure

Firstly is the loss of identity. The insolvent company would lose its identity especially
in acquisitions where the larger company is in control. A merger and acquisition may

306 Adekola, supra note 285 at 1.
307 Section 131(1) Investment and Securities Act 2007.
308 Adeniran, supra note 217 at 322.
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hurt the image of the new company or damage the existing brand the company has built
over the years. Secondly, there would be the duplication of duties. When a company
merges with another or is acquired by another, the duties of the employees in the two
companies might begin to conflict. The company might not need the services of the
employees with conflicting duties and this can lead to job losses. Thirdly, there would
be conflicting objectives. The goals and objectives of the companies may differ. A
merger or acquisition between companies with conflicting objectives might cause
problems for the acquiring company. One company might want to cut costs or expenses,
while the other company might want to invest into new markets to increase
productivity. This might lead to clashes and the failure of the business.

Fourthly, there is financial burden on the new company. The debt of the acquired
insolvent company might overwhelm the viable company and lead it to insolvency. If
expert advice is not sought before a merger or acquisition the merger may bring more
challenges than growth to the existing business. Lastly, there could be a breach in
corporate Representations and warranties. Companies make representations and
warranties in contracts with creditors. Corporate representations and warranties do not
survive the closing and there might be claims against the company for breach of these
representation and warranties which would increase their litigation profile and prevent
the new company from functioning smoothly.

2.5

Conclusion

This Chapter has discussed corporate insolvency and restructuring procedures in
Nigeria. It has also highlighted the challenges faced with the previous insolvency
procedures under the CAMA 1990 and how they are unable to achieve the main purpose
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of a business rescue. The absence of business rescue options made winding up,
receivership and arrangement and compromise the dominant insolvency regimes in
Nigeria. The discussion in this chapter has shown how these procedures are unable to
balance the interests of both the debtors and the creditors and appropriately provide for
the rescue of insolvent corporations.

Times are changing and as an economy evolves, its laws should evolve at the same pace
to meet the present needs of the economy. Considering that the CAMA 1990 was not
amended in the past 29 years, the recent amendment of the CAMA 1990 to include
business rescue provisions is a step toward changing the face of restructuring in Nigeria.
The CAMA 2020 introduces amongst others business rescue options, to enable
financially distressed companies avert insolvency and keep their businesses going. The
next chapter will discuss the CAMA 2020, the idea behind the recent amendment and
will provide some analysis of its amendments.
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CHAPTER 3:
THE RECENT AMENDMENTS TO NIGERIAN INSOLVENCY LAW

3.0

Introduction

The first chapter of this thesis gave a general overview of corporate insolvency and
more particularly discussed corporate restructuring. It highlighted the goals achieved
when a rescue is embarked upon which include a business sale and a corporate or
business rescue. The second chapter discussed corporate insolvency law in Nigeria and
established the loopholes in the previous insolvency framework embodied in the
CAMA 1990, which was created by an absence of a business rescue mechanism in
Nigeria. This chapter will discuss the recent amendments to CAMA 1990 which have
been provided for by the Companies and Allied Matters Act 2020 (“CAMA 2020”).
The CAMA 2020 introduces business rescue procedures into the corporate insolvency
framework in Nigeria. These amendments are a step in the right direction in putting
Nigeria’s business sector in line with international best practices.

This chapter will begin by discussing the idea behind the recent amendments to the
CAMA 1990. In addition, this chapter will discuss the amendments to the corporate
insolvency framework in Nigeria. Given that these amendments are similar to the
practice in the United Kingdom (UK), this chapter will undertake a comparative
analysis with the current corporate restructuring practices in the UK. The discussion of
these business rescue options will evidence how well they have fared in the UK and the
practicability of these amendments to the CAMA 1990 thriving in Nigeria. This chapter
will find that the introduction of these amendments into the Nigerian company law will
improve the position of Nigeria’s business sector considering Nigeria’s ranking prior
to the amendment. However, this chapter will also proffer reasons why Nigeria should
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proceed with caution while applying these new business rescue mechanisms
considering how they have been practiced in the UK. It will also highlight the
amendments to the winding up procedure laid out in the CAMA 2020.

3.1

The Idea Behind the Recent Amendment

The Companies and Allied Matters Act (“CAMA 1990”), the law previously regulating
companies in Nigeria had not been amended for close to three decades. 309 For an
economy to be in tandem with global trends, its corporate laws should be amended to
meet advancing trends. Nigeria was an exception to this, as CAMA 1990 was outdated
and did not meet the standard of corporate laws of fast-growing countries. This resulted
in the Nigerian economy becoming less attractive to investors. Investors gradually
became wary of doing business in Nigeria because they feared that their returns would
not be maximized if a company they have invested in becomes insolvent. As discussed
in the second chapter, Nigeria being a creditor friendly economy only had procedures
such as winding up and receivership, mainly aimed at debt collection. Insolvent
companies did not have the opportunity to restructure their affairs, as there were no
laws that encouraged the rescue of businesses, which maximizes greater returns for
creditors. In order to boost investors’ confidence in doing business in Nigeria, the need
arose to amend the CAMA 1990.310 On 10 March 2020, the 8th Senate of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria passed the Companies and Allied Matters Act (Repeal and Re-
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Udo Udoma & Belo Osagie, The Companies and Allied Matters Act (Repeal and Re-enactment)
Bill 2019 - What you need to know, (May 2019), online: Business Day (Capital & Markets)
<https://www.uubo.org/media/1755/cama-bill-series-part-10.pdf>.
310 Banwo & Ighodalo, Reforming The Business Climate In Nigeria: Critical Changes Introduced By
The Companies And Allied Matters Bill, (February 2019), online: Banwo & Ighodalo
<https://www.banwo-ighodalo.com/grey-matter/reforming-business-climate-nigeria-critical-changesintroduced-companies-allied-matters-bill-2018?leaf=3>.
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enactment) Bill, 2020 (“CAM Bill”) to Repeal the CAMA 1990.311 On the 7th of August
2020, the CAM Bill received Presidential assent and the CAMA 2020 came into effect.
The discussions in this chapter revolve around the amendment made by the CAMA
2020 to provide a clear and practical framework to govern corporate insolvency in
Nigeria. This amendment envisages a business rescue mechanism, which will restore
the financial well-being and viability of the business of an insolvent company. Giving
the insolvent company, greater chances of remaining in business to yield greater returns
for its creditors than would have been achieved from other insolvency procedures.312
This mechanism aims at balancing the interests of the debtor and creditor whilst
preserving the going concern value of the corporation.313

The CAMA 2020 introduces the Company Voluntary Arrangements (“CVA”) and
Company Administration into Nigeria’s corporate insolvency framework. The idea
behind this amendment is to ensure that before winding up and receivership procedures
are considered, the CVA and the administration procedures have been explored. In
other words, the CAMA introduced a shift from the usual winding up of insolvent
businesses in Nigeria to a procedure where the rescue of these insolvent businesses are
considered and explored before a winding up. These two processes are similar as they
permit the insolvent company continue its operations as a going concern. The insolvent
company is therefore given an opportunity to agree on an arrangement with its creditors,
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Vanguard, Senate passes Companies and Allied Matters Act Amendment Bill, (May 2020),
Vanguard newspaper, online: <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2020/03/senate-passes-camaamendment-bill/>.
312 Aelex, The Evolution Of Business Rescue In Nigeria - Insolvency/Bankruptcy/Re-structuring Nigeria, (May 2019), online: Aelex
<https://www.mondaq.com/nigeria/insolvencybankruptcy/809026/the-evolution-of-business-rescue-innigeria>.
313 Ibid.
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which will restructure its business, preserve jobs and maintain existing business
relationships.

The CAMA 2020 addresses the shortcomings of the previous CAMA, enhances the
business environment in Nigeria and aligns it with global best practices.314 The CAMA
2020 aims to promote the ease of doing business in Nigeria and more particularly, in
relation to this chapter provide for business rescue mechanisms. This Chapter will now
discuss the business rescue amendments in the CAMA.

3.2

The Business Rescue Amendments in the CAMA 2020

According to Bolanle Adebola, business rescue entails giving a potentially viable
corporation the opportunity to succeed, by preserving its going concern value. 315 The
provisions in the CAMA 2020 provide for business rescue and are modeled after the
UK Insolvency Act of 1986.316 The two amendments introduced by the CAMA 2020
into Nigeria’s Corporate Insolvency framework are Company Administration and
Company Voluntary Arrangement. These options aim to rescue the business of
Insolvent Corporations and their procedures will be discussed in detail below.
Considering the similarity between the United Kingdom (UK) laws and Nigerian Laws,
the arguments proffered by insolvency experts in the (UK) regarding how well these
procedures have fared in the UK will be discussed.
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Templars, The Repeal and Re-Enactment of The Companies and Allied Matters Act- A Bold Step
Towards Business Reform, (May 2018), online: Templars - Nigerian Law Firm of the Year
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3.2.1

Company Voluntary Arrangements

The CAMA 2020 introduces Company Voluntary Arrangement (“CVA”) into Nigeria’s
insolvency framework.317 CVA is an arrangement by an insolvent corporation, which
is used to structure debt repayment plans to their creditors.318 The CAMA 2020 did not
specifically define the CVA but drawing from the practice in the UK, CVAs are defined
as a mode of rescuing the company through an arrangement with the creditors, to accept
to be paid all or less than what they are owed by the debtor.319 In this procedure, the
repayment of this debt proposed by the debtor to his creditors runs over an agreed period
of time.

3.2.1.1

Procedure

A CVA is a debtor in possession procedure where the debtor is left in control of its
affairs while it continues its business as a going concern under the supervision of an
insolvency practitioner.320 A CVA can either be commenced when a company is in
administration or where a liquidator is winding up the company.321 The process begins
by a CVA proposal being made to the creditors by a person appointed by the directors,
administrator or liquidator, usually acting as a nominee for the purpose of supervising
the implementation of the CVA. 322 The CAMA 2020 requires the nominee to be
qualified to act as an insolvency practitioner and within 28 days of receiving the notice
of the proposal for a CVA; the nominee is required to submit a report to the Federal
High Court (the “Court”).323 The nominee in this report to the Court will state whether
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CAMA 2020, s 432-441.
Udo Udoma & Belo Osagie, supra note 309.
319 Keay & Walton, supra note 102 at 137.
320 Parry, supra note 17 at 131.
321 CAM 2020, s 432(3).
322 CAMA 2020, s 432(2).
323 CAMA 2020, s 433(2).
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meetings of the company and its creditors should be summoned to consider the
proposal. The report will also include the date, time and place at which the proposed
meetings will be held.

324

In situations where the company is already in an

administration or winding up, the nominee is not required to submit a report to the
Court. A CVA may be approved provided that it does not affect the right of secured
creditors to enforce their security or the priority and rights of preferential creditors
except in situations where the secured or preferential creditors concerned permit.325

The meetings of members and creditors are required to be held separately. In situations
where the decision made at the creditors meeting differs from the decision at the
members meeting, the Court may, on application by a member, order that the decision
of the members shall prevail over the decision of the creditors or the Court might make
such orders as it deems fit.326 The decision relating to the approval of a CVA has effect
if both creditors and members agree on it. In situations where the approval of the CVA
is based on the creditors meeting alone, then the decision is subject to an order of the
Court. 327 Once the CVA has been approved, the company becomes liable to pay the
creditors the amount approved under the CVA.328
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3.2.1.2

Drawbacks of the CVA

Firstly, There is no moratorium329 present in a CVA and the arrangement with creditors
might fall apart due to actions filed by other creditors who do not consent to the
arrangement to enforce their claims.330 To enable an insolvent company to successfully
restructure its affairs, it is important that a moratorium is put in place. A moratorium
prevents the creditors of the insolvent company from instituting or continuing actions
against the debtor during the period of the CVA. This is to ensure that the race towards
the assets of the debtor is prevented, giving the insolvent company and its creditors an
opportunity to agree on a restructuring plan without being interrupted by the claims of
creditors who do not accept the CVA. The absence of a moratorium encourages a race
to the bottom, as creditors would resort to several means to gain priority and the debtor
might employ any technique to keep non-consenting creditors away.331 The lack of a
moratorium could work against achieving a business rescue for the insolvent company.

A CVA proposal would be most effective if it were initiated under an administration
where a moratorium is available. However, a statutory moratorium is not available for
small companies under the CAMA 2020. Unlike the UK, where regardless of the
absence of a moratorium in a CVA, small eligible companies enjoy an automatic
moratorium once they embark on a CVA.332

329

A moratorium prevents the company creditors from instituting insolvency proceedings or legal
processes against the company. It acts as a stay of actions against the debtor company when a
restructuring process is ongoing.
330 Keay & Walton, supra note 102 at 137.
331 As discussed extensively in the first chapter at page 38, the mandatory collective system is
important in a rescue process.
332 Parry, supra note 17 at 131.
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Secondly, a CVA is informal in nature. The contractual nature of a CVA requires the
approval of creditors and members of the company to become effective. This is because
the CVA is a contract between the debtor and the creditors that binds the company and
all unsecured creditors. However, the CVA is not binding on secured creditors who do
not accept the CVA and this poses a problem. These secured creditors who do not
consent to the CVA can ignore the CVA and proceed to enforce their claims in court
against the insolvent company.

Thirdly, the CAMA 2020 has failed to provide the voting threshold for the approval of
a CVA at the creditors and members meetings, and this is a significant lacuna in the
Act.

333

The CAMA 2020 only provides that “… each of the meetings shall be

conducted in accordance with the rules.”334 There is, however, no particular indication
of the rules, which the CAMA 2020 implies will govern the meetings of the creditors
and the members. If reference is made blindly to the Nigeria’s Companies Winding Up
Rules 2001 (“CWR”),335 the voting threshold will be a simple majority (i.e. a 50% + 1
vote) for a resolution to have been deemed to be passed at either a members or creditors
meeting. However, if reference is made to the UK Insolvency Rules, 1986, where the
CVA was adopted from, the approval of the CVA requires majority in excess of threequarters (by debt value) of the creditors present in person or by proxy at the creditors
meeting,336 and a simple majority approval of the members present in person or proxy
at the members meeting.337
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The threshold provided for by the CWR is too low when compared to the voting
threshold in the UK. The threshold was clearly provided for in UK’s insolvency rules,
Nigeria should adopt this threshold instead of a simple majority threshold, provided for
in the CWR. This Chapter will now discuss Company Administration.

3.2.2

Company Administration

The CAMA 2020 introduces Company Administration into Nigeria’s insolvency
framework.338 Administration is a restructuring procedure where an administrator is
appointed to manage the insolvent company’s assets with the intention of rescuing
whole or part of the company’s business and preserving the going concern value of the
company.339 Unlike other insolvency procedures such as winding up or receivership
that eventually lead to the dissolution of a company, an administration has the ability
to return the company to solvency.340 However, even though the primary objective of
an administration is a rescue, the CAMA 2020 gives the administrator341 the power to
pursue a different course, which will yield a better result for the company’s creditors,
if the administrator determines that a rescue is not reasonably achievable.342

The CAMA 2020 requires an administrator to be a qualified insolvency practitioner
who will take custody of all assets of the insolvent company.343 The remuneration of
the administrator will be paid from the property in the administrator’s custody and it
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CAMA 2020, s 441-547.
CAMA 2020, s 442.
340 Udo Udoma & Belo Osagie, The Companies and Allied Matters Act (Repeal and Re-enactment)
Bill 2019 - What you need to know, (June 2019), online: Business Day (Capital & Markets)
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will have priority over the claims of holders of a floating charge. 344 Two or more
administrators may be appointed to act jointly or concurrently by the reference to the
appointment of an administrator of an insolvent company.345 In an administration, the
administrator becomes an officer of the court and an agent of the company unlike in a
receivership where the receiver is an agent of the person who appoints him.346

Once a company enters into administration, legal actions or proceedings against it are
stayed and creditors will not be able to enforce their claims without obtaining the
permission to do so by the Court or the consent of the administrator.347 The stay of
proceedings or moratorium gives the company breathing space to enable the
administrator focus on the rescue process. During the administration process, all
enforcement of securities, court actions, sequestration of assets will be suspended. A
company will now have the ability to disclaim onerous contracts that it cannot perform
with the leave of the court.348 The contracts for the supply of essential services will,
however, be continued provided that the insolvent company undergoing a rescue will
give a personal guarantee to the suppliers.349

3.2.2.1

Procedure

An application for an administration order can be brought by (a) the company, (b) its
directors, (c) one or more creditors of the company, (d) a designated officer of the court
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appointed to act as a receiver and a combination of persons listed from (a)-(d).350 An
administrator is usually appointed to oversee the restructuring process and the
appointment can be done in two different ways. Firstly, the court, upon the application
of the insolvent company or one or more debenture holders, may appoint an
administrator.351 Secondly, an administrator may be appointed out of court upon the
application of a floating charge holder, the insolvent company or its directors.352 In
situations where an administrator is appointed out of court, the person who appoints the
administrator is required to file a notice of appointment and such other documents as
may be prescribed with the Corporate Affairs Commission (“CAC”). 353 In some other
instances the person will be required to file a notice of appointment with the court.354

Once an administrator has been appointed, the administrator is required to send a notice
of his appointment to the company and obtain a list of the company’s creditors.355 The
administrator is also required to forward a notice of his appointment to each creditor
and publish his notice of appointment in a prescribed manner.356 After the administrator
has complied with his duty regarding the announcement of his appointment, the
company will provide the administrator with the statement of affairs of the company.357
Within 60 days of the appointment of an administrator, he is required to prepare a
detailed schedule of assets and submit a copy to the person who has appointed him.358
The administrator will then consider the state of the company’s affairs and circulate a
350
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proposal to the company’s creditors on the procedure for achieving the
administration.359 If the creditors do not approve the proposal, the administrator will
apply to the court for further direction.360

An administration process can come to an end in several ways. First, once the duration
of an administration expires, it comes to an end. The appointment of an administrator
expires at the end of one year from the date in which the appointment took effect, except
where the administration process is extended by the court for a specified period (prior
to expiration) or extended for a period not exceeding six months with the consent of
each secured creditor of the company and qualified preferential creditors where
applicable.

361

Second, the administrator may apply to the court to cease the

administration process if he has reached a conclusion that the administration cannot be
achieved or the company should not have entered into administration in the first place
or if the creditors require him to make such an application. On the application of an
administrator the court may make an order that an administration shall cease.362

Third, an administration can come to an end before the statutory period, where the
administrator files a notice to the court and the CAC, stating that the purpose of the
administration has been sufficiently achieved.363 Fourth, the court may also make an
order upon the application by the administrator or creditor, for the cessation of the
appointment of the administrator prior to the expiration of the administrator’s term. 364
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Fifth, an administration might end in a public interest winding up where a winding up
order is made for the winding up of the company on ground of public interest, or by a
petition presented by special banking and financial provisions and markets related
Acts.365 Sixth, an administration might also lead to a creditors voluntary liquidation366
and lastly the administration process might end up in the dissolution of the company.367

3.2.2.2

Drawbacks of Administration

The drawbacks of an administration will be approached from an analogical perspective
of what occurs in the UK. Administration is generally regarded as an effective
restructuring process as it saves viable businesses and ensures that non-viable
businesses effectively exit the market. However, it has a major flaw as a result of its
conflicting dual purpose. CAMA 2020 gives an administrator the duty to rescue the
company and if a rescue is not achievable, the sale of the assets of the company and its
subsequent distribution to its creditors.368 At the first glance, one would wonder why a
restructuring process would offer two conflicting remedies of rescue and liquidation to
an insolvent company. This can lead to an administration merely being a trial-based
process where rescue is merely attempted before the assets of the debtor are sold for
the benefit of debenture holders.

As stated in the first chapter, restructuring law should be rescuing insolvent businesses
and not tasked with winding up, liquidations and dissolving insolvent companies.369 In
the UK, the administration procedure is not totally considered as a rescue option.
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According Rebecca Parry, administration is a restructuring procedure that provides
moratorium protection to insolvent companies pending when an exit strategy is
devised. 370 Professor Keay and Walton argue that the moratorium present in an
administration gives the insolvent company temporary freedom from claims of
debenture holders pending when a solution is carved out to ameliorate the company’s
financial distress. 371 Keay and Walton further note that the moratorium on creditor
actions could either lead to a rescue or other beneficial result to be achieved.” 372 The
dual role administration serves can also create an incentive for debenture holders to
prefer to appoint an administrator to fulfill the second objective of selling the assets of
the debtor to maximize their returns instead of the first objective of a rescue.373 This
process is commonly known as pre-packaged transactions.

Pre-packs or the pre-packaged sale of the business has become one of the most common
outcomes of administration proceedings. In pre-packs, insolvent corporations sell
substantially all of their assets. 374 According to Rebecca Parry, “it is the most
controversial yet common use of administration proceedings.”375 In a pre-pack, the sale
of the assets of the company is agreed upon before the commencement of the formal
administration process as opposed to the usual administration procedure where the
administrator determines each case after his or her appointment. 376 According to
Andrew Keay and Peter Walton, pre-packs are agreed upon prior to the appointment of
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an administrator and the company’s business will be sold as soon as the company is
placed into administration.377

Insolvent corporations, alongside its creditors, decide to pre-pack when attempts to
reach a form of compromise or arrangement with their creditors fail or attempts to sell
the company, as a going concern remain unsuccessful.378 David Brown argues that the
decision to pre-pack could be made when it is difficult to access funds for trading in an
administration, as there is no provision in the UK for funds to be borrowed from a
super-priority lender.379 Keay and Walton argue that, a pre-pack can be embarked on
when a trading administration is perceived “to destroy the company’s goodwill and to
reduce any likely sale price” for the process.380 Rebecca Parry considers it a matter of
practicality, “where there are insufficient funds available for a prolonged period of
trading while in administration.”381 Also in situations where the management seems to
be the potential buyers, it is commercially sensible to sell the business to them.382 The
rise of pre-packs is perceived to enhance the interests of secured creditors and other
stakeholders making them benefit from the process at the expense of unsecured
creditors.383Regardless of this, whatever reason or justification behind pre-packs i.e.
using a restructuring law to effect liquidations whether piecemeal or as a going concern,
has put pre-packs in a bad light. 384 Indeed, it appears to be rebranded form of
liquidation.

377 Keay & Walton, supra note 102 at 118–19.
378 Ibid at 119.
379 David Brown, “Unpacking the pre-pack” (2009) Insolvency Law Bulletin 5 at 2.
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382 G McCormack, Corporate rescue law--an Anglo-American perspective, Corporations,
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There is no intention to rescue the insolvent company in pre-packaged administrations
and the process is secured creditor driven. These secured creditors opt for
administration instead of other insolvency processes because it gives them certainty
that their returns will be maximized. 385 Gerard McComack on this point argued:
“There is a high degree of certainty in a pre-pack and secured creditors also enjoy a
high degree of control. For these reasons secured creditors may consider it a more
attractive alternative than a protracted formal insolvency process.”386

This control by the secured creditors of administration is evident in several ways.
Firstly, the secured creditors are the parties with security in the assets of the debtor
company and as a result possess more information about the debtor than other
parties.387 Secondly, according to Roy Goode, secured creditors are the only parties
involved in negotiating a pre-pack and appointing an administrator with the insolvent
debtor.388 Other parties like the unsecured creditors are not consulted when a pre pack
is to be implemented.

Thirdly, given that the pre-packaged deal is an abridged process that is completed very
quickly, other stakeholders might be unable to scrutinize and challenge the terms of the
pre pack and will rely on the expertise of the administrator to ensure that their returns
would be maximized. To their disadvantage, this would be impossible as secured

385

Finch & Milman, supra note 34 at 373.
McCormack, supra note 382 at 73.
387 Alfonso Nocilla, “Asset Sales and Secured Creditor Control in Restructuring: A Comparison of the
UK, US and Canadian Models” (2017) 26 Int Insolv Rev 60–81 at 68.
388 Goode, supra note 5 at 413.
386

91

creditors choose and appoint the administrator.389 More often than not, given that prepacks would be more beneficial to secured creditors, the administrator will tend to
choose pre-packs as the best option ahead of a rescue. Rebecca Parry argues that the
administrators may misrepresent the urgency of the pre-pack as a means to justify its
dubious legality.390 Finch and Milman also claim that it is unrealistic for unsecured
creditors and other stakeholders to expect an administrator to act in the interests of all
parties. They stated:
The danger is that when powerful creditors agree to a pre-pack such an agreement creates
a momentum that is difficult for the administrator to upset... If this is the case, the prepack commits the administrator to a course of action that is agreed outside statutory
procedures and it is extremely difficult for less powerful creditors to scrutinize the prepack and to renegotiate terms.391

Secured creditors, through pre-packs, are able to control the realization of the assets of
the debtor almost in the same way as they would in a receivership process. 392
Administrative receivership formerly practiced distorted value from the assets of the
insolvent company, lacked transparency and wielded so much control to the secured
creditors over the process.393 Administration, which has one of its dual roles as a rescue
of insolvent companies, faces the same criticisms of administrative receivership. The
effect of administrative receivership and administrations practiced through pre-packs is
one and the same as they both do not aim at the rescue of the insolvent corporation but
debt collection. Additionally, critics have argued that pre-packs disenfranchise
unsecured creditors as the administrator can organize a pre-pack without getting the
prior approval of creditors as long as he perceives it yields better returns than a
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liquidation. 394 Pre-packs create potential conflict of interest as secured creditors
appoint most administrators, giving rise to a greater incentive to act on their behalf
instead of acting in the interest of the insolvent company.395

The critical problem with pre-packs or pre-packaged administrations is that the UK
Enterprise Act of 2002 makes no provision for it and Parliament intended something
different from what the administration process is currently used for. Pre-packs are not
provided for in the insolvency legislation in the UK, hence it would be correct to say
that it is an illegitimate exercise.396 Alfonso Nocilla argues that the role of pre-packs is
out of place as it represents a shift in UK insolvency law - a shift from business rescue
to debt collection that facilitates quick realizations.397 Keay and Walton on this point
argued that:
The provisions of the act dealing with administration do not expressly allow for prepacks. There is no indication that Parliament intended that the new regime should be
used in this way. In fact, parliament intended something quite different with a clear
emphasis on rescuing companies not just their businesses. 398

From the arguments raised by insolvency experts in the UK the CVA process might not
be very successful in rescuing businesses as a result of the lack of a stay of proceedings.
Secured creditors might always institute actions in court claiming the debts from the
insolvent company and this might end up frustrating the entire CVA process. Also,
regarding how administration is practiced and how the first role of the rescue of
insolvent companies is being neglected, Nigeria, whilst adopting the administration as
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a process for business rescue, should tread with caution and be aware of the possible
outcomes of administrations, which include pre-packaged administrations.

3.3

The practicability of the business rescue amendments

The two amendments introduced by the CAMA 2020 provide for measures to keep
insolvent businesses going by devising a means to settle full or part of the debt owed to
creditors. These two business rescue mechanisms aim to consider the interests of all
parties in the insolvency process, while devising a rescue option for the insolvent
company.

A CVA is effective to the extent that it prevents creditors from filing winding up
petitions against the company if the creditors are offered a better return than they would
recover from winding up the company.399 However, this procedure is only effective
provided that other creditors do not file actions in court. If the debt repayment proposal
offered to secured creditors does not guarantee a full repayment, they are unlikely to
consent to the CVA. Enforcing their claims in court might be a better option for them.
Keay and Walton, have argued that “it will only take one creditor to break ranks and
bring an action in court to enforce his or her debt and any proposed arrangement will
immediately fall apart.”400 In other words, when a secured creditor pursues a claim in
court, it could lead to the winding up of the company and the aim of rescuing the
business would be defeated.

399 Ibid at 139.
400 Ibid at 137.
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A CVA is most effective when initiated under an administration where a moratorium is
already put in place. Keay and Walton have noted the strain on the effectiveness of this
procedure caused by the absence of a moratorium. They argued that:
Proposing a CVA without the benefit of first entering into administration has the apparent
weakness that there is no moratorium on actions against the company during the period
when the CVA proposal is being prepared. Creditors may therefore frustrate a possible
CVA by enforcing their rights prior to any decisions approving the proposal.401

It will however be pointless for a CVA to be commenced on its own, considering the
lack of a moratorium in the process.

The second business rescue procedure is an administration. An administration is more
effective than a CVA in rescuing the businesses of insolvent corporations. Once this
process is commenced, it dismisses any winding up petition and vacates any receiver
manager appointed by secured creditors or holders of floating charge. There is also an
automatic moratorium on the enforcement of security or the repossession of goods and
premises. This law, will totally put a halt to the current practice of the appointment of
multiple receiver managers by secured creditors as the administrator will be in charge
of the insolvent company’s affairs.

The Nigerian Courts are structured in a way that several courts adjudicate on several
areas of law. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria has given the Federal
High Court the power to handle cases related to companies in Nigeria.402 However, this
is a wide jurisdiction and insolvency cases are just a little ambit of company law. The
courts play a huge role in the appointments of nominees or administrator and also
certain actions cannot be taken without a prior approval gotten from the court.

401 Ibid at 138.
402
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Considering the urgency at which the attention of the court is needed, these business
rescue procedures might not be concluded speedily and the assets of the debtor might
be depleted. The bill has not provided a timeline for the courts to reach certain decisions
regarding the business rescue procedures. The absence of this might appear to be the
deferring of the winding up of the company to a later date.
The role of the courts in these processes is however purely administrative. But in some
instances, the court will be faced with settling disputes concerning possible unfair
prejudice under the approved CVA, or the procedural impropriety on the conduct of the
meetings.403 These actions have the ability to prolong this process. There is no timeline
for the conclusion of the process and this can lead to pre-packaged administrations.
Regardless of the challenges that might be faced in implementing these amendments,
they are anticipated to reduce the risk of corporate insolvency, directly boost foreign
investment in Nigeria and ensure that the Nigerian corporate insolvency framework
thrives.

3.4

Amendments to the Winding up procedure

The previous chapter discussed the drawbacks of the winding up procedure under the
prior law. The CAMA 2020 has made some adjustments to the winding up procedure
in order to remedy the low threshold afforded to creditors who use the process as a tool
for debt collection. First, the CAMA 2020 has put in place a limitation period for the
recovery of debts owed by contributories.404 Given that the liability of contributories
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constitute debts,405 actions to recover these debts can no longer be brought after the
expiration of six (6) years from the date, which the cause of action occurred.406

Second, the threshold of debt, which may trigger a petition for winding up of a
company, has been increased from N2, 000 (Two thousand Naira) to N200, 000 (Two
hundred thousand naira). 407 Solola and Akpana recognized the necessity of the
amendment but argued that the provision does not envisage inflation in the coming
years.408 Solola and Akpana have recommended that the trigger threshold should have
been left open to be determined by the CAC through the company regulations published
by the CAC frequently.409 This is a valid argument and recommendation, as N200,000
(Two hundred thousand naira) is also a low debt trigger for winding up medium to
large-scale companies. In coming years, the value of the currency may drop and there
will be a need to amend the CAMA 2020. The lawmakers should therefore be on their
toes to amend the CAMA more frequently, instead of waiting to do so in 30 years again
into the future.

3.5

Conclusion

This Chapter has discussed the amendments introduced into Nigeria’s corporate
insolvency framework by the CAMA 2020. These amendments aim to improve
Nigeria’s rank in the business sector to enable Nigeria to compete globally as the
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previous provisions in CAMA 1990 were outdated. The introduction of the Company
Voluntary Arrangement and Company Administration is a step in the right direction in
changing the face of Corporate restructuring in Nigeria. The CAMA 2020 is expected
to ease the mechanisms for restructuring insolvent companies. It will also boost
activities of micro, small and medium sized enterprises (MSMEs), with the overall
effect of growing the Nigerian economy in the process, providing more jobs and
guaranteeing economic stability.

Considering that the UK insolvency laws inspired the amendments in the CAMA 2020,
it will be beneficial if the drawbacks of these procedures in the UK are considered while
implementing these amendments in Nigeria. This chapter has discussed that these
procedures might be challenging as effective business rescue options. The next chapter
will discuss corporate restructuring in Canada to establish how effective the corporate
restructuring laws in Canada are in rescuing insolvent businesses.
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CHAPTER 4:
THE CANADIAN CORPORATE INSOLVENCY SYSTEM

4.0

Introduction

This Chapter will discuss the Canadian Corporate Insolvency system in order to
determine how effective Canadian restructuring laws are in rescuing insolvent
corporations and also to draw lessons Nigeria can incorporate into its insolvency
framework. It will begin by discussing the major regimes through which restructuring
is carried out in Canada which can either be through the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act
(“BIA”) or the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (“CCAA”). This chapter will
discuss both regimes whilst highlighting the differences between the two. The history
of the CCAA will also be discussed in order to show how the CCAA became the
restructuring legislation of choice for large insolvent companies in Canada. This
discussion will establish the intent of the Canadian legislature while drafting the CCAA
as well as the purpose of the CCAA.

In particular, this Chapter will go into an extensive discussion of restructuring in
Canada under the CCAA. It will discuss the commencement of CCAA proceedings
whilst highlighting its key features, which are the stay of proceedings and debtor in
possession financing. The key players in a CCAA proceeding, and the process of exiting
CCAA proceedings will also be discussed. The effects of the recent amendments to the
CCAA on the key features and the key players will be discussed. This chapter will then
delve into liquidating CCAAs, which is a mechanism where the CCAA is used to effect
liquidations to show that this practice has deviated from the goal and purpose of
corporate restructuring under the CCAA.
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4.1

Corporate Restructuring in Canada

Insolvency by its nature entails that available assets of a debtor are insufficient to pay
out all claims.410 The law, therefore, puts the debtor in a position to choose who will be
paid out and who will be left out in the cold.411 To avoid the negative consequences of
this choice and to ensure that value is maximized for all creditors with competing claims
against the debtor, insolvent companies file for restructuring. Before a company is
declared insolvent, the company undergoes several restructuring and reorganization
procedures that involve informal negotiations with its largest creditors. 412 As this
chapter expands, the terms reorganization and restructuring will be used
interchangeably to describe how debts of an insolvent company are restructured.413

In Canada, insolvent corporations have the option of restructuring their affairs either
through Part III of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act414 (“BIA”) or the Companies
Creditors Arrangement Act 415 (“CCAA”) and the courts take an active part in
supervising these restructuring processes. 416 The BIA is a creditor driven process,
which aims at bringing uniformity to administration and liquidation of the estates of an
insolvent company. 417 The rationale behind this is that creditors should control the
administration of the insolvent debtors assets because liquidating these assets should

410 Roderick Wood, supra note 11 at 16.
411 Philip Wood, supra note 12 at 3.
412 Ben-Ishai & Thomas Telfer, supra note 73 at 505.
413 Ibid at 509.
414 RSC 1985 c B-3.
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meet their best interests.418 The BIA is however, accessible to large, medium sized and
small companies who wish to restructure their affairs.

The CCAA on the other hand is used for facilitating the restructuring of large insolvent
corporations in Canada that have debts exceeding $5million. The BIA and CCAA
provide complimentary regimes for companies to reach compromises or arrangements
with their creditors. Over time, the CCAA has become the restructuring legislation of
choice for large insolvent companies as a result of the liberal and flexible nature of the
CCAA process compared to the BIA commercial proposal process. The BIA business
proposals regime is statutorily driven while the CCAA regime is court driven. This
implies that when restructuring is commenced under the BIA, the wordings of the
statute are followed and adhered to very strictly, unlike the CCAA where the courts are
permitted to exercise their discretion in line with the statute and in situations when they
are faced with novel situations not foreseen when the statute was enacted. Large
insolvent companies, therefore, prefer to restructure their affairs using the CCAA as
opposed to the BIA.419

The differences between these two regimes are mainly procedural. The first difference
lies in their commencement. Under the BIA, the debtor initiates the reorganization
procedure by filing a proposal or a notice of an intention to make a proposal. There is
no need for an application to the court as the creditors meet and vote on the proposal
subject to the rules of the statute and the court sanctions it.420 In the CCAA on the other
hand, the debtor or a creditor can initiate the reorganization procedure by filing an

418 Ibid.
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application in court. The debtor carves out a plan for submission to the creditors subject
to the timelines put in place by the court. The creditors then meet and vote on the plan
and the court decides whether to approve the plan or not.421 Second, once a debtor files
a proposal under the BIA, the debtor’s assets vests in the trustee and the debtor loses
control to the trustee who takes control over the business. However, when a company
goes into CCAA protection, its assets do not vest in a trustee but the debtor remains in
control of its affairs and continues to run the company during the proceedings.422

Third, the time limitation in which proposals should be filed is strict under the BIA.
The BIA provides that proposals should be made six months from when the intention
to make a proposal has been filed by the debtor company. However, restructuring
proceedings commenced through the CCAA have no statutory time limit for a
restructuring plan to be presented in court. Fourth, the BIA does not provide for stay
extensions on the expiration of this time limit.423 This is considered a limitation, as the
company might need some more time to figure out the cause of the company’s financial
distress and also the best restructuring plans it may pursue. In the CCAA, the stay of
proceedings remains in force even if creditors reject the restructuring plan. Also, the
stay of proceedings can be extended as long as the pre conditions for granting or
extending the stay are found to exist.424

Fifth, in the BIA, the debtor company will need to get the creditors to vote on the plan
before the expiration of the six months’ time limit. If negotiations with creditors are not
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concluded or the debtor fails to obtain the creditors’ consent or more so, if the creditors
reject the proposal, the debtor is automatically deemed bankrupt.425 In the CCAA, on
the other hand, the debtor has sufficient time and opportunity to re-negotiate with
creditors and file an amended plan.

This Chapter will now discuss restructuring under the CCAA.

4.2

The Companies Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA)

The CCAA is the restructuring legislation of choice in Canada, which facilitates
arrangements and compromises between large insolvent companies and their
creditors. 426 A company can seek protection under the CCAA from court if the
company is insolvent with over $5 million of debt being owed to its creditors.427 The
Act defines a ‘debtor company’ as a company that is bankrupt or insolvent.428

The CCAA does not have an express purpose clause but case law has elaborated the
purpose of the CCAA. The Court of Appeal In Hong Kong Bank of Canada v Chef
Ready Foods Ltd,429 stated that the purpose of the CCAA, is to facilitate an arrangement
between a company and its creditors “to the end that the company is able to continue
its business.” The Supreme Court of Canada in Century Services Inc. v, Canada
(Attorney General)430 reiterated that the purpose of the CCAA is "to permit the debtor
to continue to carry on business and, where possible, avoid the social and economic
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costs of liquidating its assets."431 Very recently, the Court in 9354-9186 Québec inc. v.
Callidus Capital Corp432 recognized that the CCAA’s has the objective of ameliorating
the harsh effects of insolvency. The court stated:
The CCAA is one of three principal insolvency statutes in Canada. It pursues an array of
overarching remedial objectives that reflect the wide ranging and potentially catastrophic
impacts insolvency can have. These objectives include: providing for timely, efficient
and impartial resolution of a debtor’s insolvency; preserving and maximizing the value
of a debtor’s assets; ensuring fair and equitable treatment of the claims against a debtor;
protecting the public interest; and, in the context of a commercial insolvency, balancing
the costs and benefits of restructuring or liquidating the company.

These three court decisions show that the CCAA facilitates the reorganization and the
survival of an insolvent company as a going concern. In circumstances where this goal
is not achieved and reorganization is impossible, the insolvent company can proceed to
liquidation either through a receivership or under the BIA regime.433 However, despite
the intent of the legislature and these interpretations given by the courts on the purpose
of the CCAA, there has been an escalating use of the CCAA as a mechanism used to
effect asset sales.434 This chapter will also discuss this mechanism known as liquidating
CCAAs.

In a bid to interpret the CCAA and its purpose, it is necessary to examine the history of
the CCAA and its function amidst the body of insolvency legislation. This Chapter will
now discuss the history of the CCAA.

Century Services, supra note 76 at para 70.
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4.2.1

History and Development of the CCAA

At the beginning of Great Depression, the parliament of Canada passed the Companies’
Creditors Arrangement Act, 1933 (“CCAA”) in order to provide an insolvency
procedure that encouraged the reorganization of insolvent companies, as opposed to
liquidation, which brought an end to the life of insolvent companies.435 The CCAA was
introduced with the notion that “it was in the public interest to afford corporations the
opportunity to reorganize as an alternative to liquidation.”436 The CCAA majorly aimed
at facilitating compromises and arrangements between insolvent companies and their
creditors.437

The introduction of the CCAA was as a result of the criticism and the obvious defects
in the previous bankruptcy legislation. The Bankruptcy Act of 1919438 was restricted to
effective administration of estates and Liquidations, which received little scrutiny.439
The Act was amended in 1923, and according to the Tassé Report 440 one of the
criticisms that led to this amendment was that debtors in order to obtain creditors
approval of a plan to avoid bankruptcy, bribed their creditors through fraudulent
means. 441 The 1923 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act of 1923 only allowed
companies that were actually bankrupt to restructure their business. 442 There was so
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much difficulty faced with this Act, given that a company was required to be bankrupt
and the debtor was required to hold a first meeting of creditors, before a proposal could
be made.443 In 1933, this Act was met with several criticisms regarding the condition
precedents which had to be met before a debtor could make a proposal. This led to the
amendment of the Bankruptcy Act of 1923 to provide for the CCAA as an alternative
for insolvent companies who wanted to restructure their business.444

The CCAA was adopted from the British Companies Act of 1929, which provided for
compromises with creditors and set out the amount of approvals, which the court will
require before approving a restructuring plan. 445 The CCAA of 1933 required a
majority of creditors by class and three quarters in value to vote in favour of the plan
before the court would sanction it. 446 According to Janis Sarra, the CCAA was
introduced to guard against the improvident sale of assets of a debtor. She stated:
The Act was introduced because of the ‘prevailing commercial and industrial depression’
and was intended to promote adoption of a method by which the courts could supervise
arrangements between creditors and debtor corporations without the improvident sale of
assets of the firm.447

The CCAA was introduced to bind both secured and unsecured creditors, which was
lacking in the previous bankruptcy legislation.448 However, the CCAA was structured
in a way that it facilitated arrangements between the debtor and its secured creditors
only.449 This was because secured creditors were protected by the legislation and trust
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deeds, which gave indenture trustees the power to intervene in the debtor’s affairs.450
As a result of this, unsecured creditors viewed the CCAA as being unable to sufficiently
protect their interests as the debtor wielded so much control over the restructuring
process by being in control of its affairs.451 This led to reforms of the CCAA in 1953.

In 1953, considering the control the debtors had over the restructuring process, the need
arose to give debtors less opportunity to act in their interests alone in the CCAA
proceedings. The CCAA was then amended to restrict its protection to larger and
publicly held companies who had issued bonds or debentures under a trust and running
in favour of a trustee.452 According to Virginia Torrie, at the time “all restructurings
carried out under the CCAA had to include a compromise or arrangement with respect
to these claims. 453 This amendment focused on reorganization of companies with
complex pubic debt profiles and provided for an indenture trustee or monitor to oversee
the restructuring process.454 After the amendments in 1953, the CCAA fell into disuse
for half a century and Canadian insolvency system continued to be creditor driven, with
debt collection as the major goal.455

In the late 1980’s and early 1990s judges, counsel, academics and the press began a
new public interest consideration around the CCAA.456 This ensured that the interest
of everyone with a financial stake in the company was met as opposed to the interests

450 Ibid at 1.2.24.
451 Sarra, supra note 132 at 14.
452 Richard McLaren, Canadian Commercial Reorganization: Preventing Bankruptcy

Canada Law Book, 1999) at 1–4.
453 Torrie, supra note 435 at 4.
454 Sarra, supra note 132 at 14.
455 Ibid at 16.
456 Torrie, supra note 435 at 4.

(Toronto:
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of just the shareholders and traditional creditors. According to Stanley Edwards, those
who supervise restructuring processes should put the interests of the public into
consideration. He defined public interests to include the interests of consumers,
investors and employees.457 Janis Sarra recognizes a wider scope of interests, which
should be considered in a restructuring process. They include, the interests of workers,
trade suppliers and communities. Janis Sarra sums it up by stating that the interests of
everyone with investments at risk should be considered.458

In 1992, the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act was amended to facilitate restructuring for
small to medium sized companies and the debate on the necessity of having two
restructuring legislations arose. Insolvency practitioners opposed the repeal of the
CCAA, as it was a more liberal legislation that afforded the debtor the necessary
flexibility and breathing space required for complex reorganizations of large
companies.459 The CCAA was then amended in 1997, to make it more accessible and
its protection was restricted to large insolvent corporations alone with at least $5 million
in debt. There was also a new requirement for a court appointed monitor who will
protect the interests of creditor and report to the court while the debtor prepares a
restructuring plan.460 These amendments to the CCAA gave a new look to business
reorganizations in Canada.

Prior to amendments of the CCAA in 2009, the courts were permitted by common law
to approve sale of assets under the CCAA. In 2009, the CCAA was amended to

457 Edwards, supra note 136 at 593.
458 Sarra, supra note 132 at 15.
459 Jacob S Ziegel, “Canada’s Phased-In Bankruptcy Law Reform” (1996) 70 Am Bankr LJ 383 at

397.
460 Nocilla, supra note 442 at 15.

108

introduce a new provision that resolves all the controversies relating to the jurisdiction
of the court to approve sales under the CCAA. 461 Section 36 of the CCAA was
introduced which laid down guidelines that the court will adhere to while approving the
sale of assets under the CCAA. In light of the history discussed for far, this new
amendment is indeed a change in the narrative of what the CCAA originally set out to
achieve. The Supreme Court of Canada, while interpreting the provisions of the CCAA
in Reference re Companies Creditors Arrangement Act 462 stated that it was not
envisioned that the CCAA would be used for anything other than restructuring. This
Chapter will now discuss liquidating CCAAs that has sprung up as a result of this new
amendment.

In November 1, 2019 through Bill C-97463 there were extensive amendments to the BIA
and the CCAA. The amendments aimed at making insolvency proceedings more
transparent and accessible to workers and pensioners. The amendments to the CCAA
relating to this thesis will be discussed. They include: First, an express duty of good
faith for any interested person and failing this duty entitles another interested person to
bring an application to court. The court is empowered to make an order it deems
appropriate if the court is satisfied that an interested person has not acted in good faith.
This amendment does not elaborate on who an interested person is or the type of orders
the court can give when it discovers that a party has not acted in good faith.464

461 Ibid at 61.
462 [1934] SCR 659 at para 4.
463 An Act to Implement Certain Provisions of the Budget Tabled in Parliament on March 19, 2019

and Other Measures.
464 CCAA, s 18.6(1)(2).
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Second, there is a reduction in the length of the initial stay of proceedings upon a
company’s application for CCAA protection from 30 days to 10 days. 465 The
amendment limits the relief that a company can obtain from the Court during the initial
10-day period to “relief that is reasonably necessary for the continued operations of the
debtor company in the ordinary course of business”. This has an effect on the amount
of DIP (interim) financing that a court can approve at the first day hearing. 466 This
Chapter will now discuss how restructuring is carried out under the CCAA.

4.3

Commencement of CCAA Proceedings

Restructuring proceedings under the CCAA are commenced through an application to
the court for an initial order.467 The application may be made to a court in the province
within which the company has its head office or chief place of business. 468 The
application can also be made in the province within which the assets of the company
are situated.469 Generally, a CCAA restructuring plan is set out in a way that creditors
with provable claims receive less than the amount they are owed as full and final
satisfaction of their debts. For e.g. the creditors may receive 40 cents on a dollar. Upon
the commencement of a CCAA proceeding, the current management of the company
remains intact and continues to run the affairs of the company throughout the duration
of the CCAA proceedings. It is usually referred to as a debtor-in-possession regime.470
The rationale behind the debtor in possession regime is that the current management is

465 CCAA, s. 11.02 (1)
466 CCAA, s. 11.2 (5) compliments s. 11.02(1) as it aims to limit the terms and amount of financing

which a company can obtain within the period of the stay granted by the initial order.
467 CCAA, s 11.02(1).
468 CCAA, s 9(1)
469 Roderick Wood, supra note 11 at 359.
470 Ben-Ishai & Telfer, supra note 73 at 507.
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more familiar with running the affairs of the company than an administrator who will
have to learn the internal workings of the company to replace them. 471

4.3.1

Stay of Proceedings

The stay of proceedings is by an order of the court and it is automatic upon filing for
protection under the CCAA. According to Janis Sarra, the purpose of the stay is to
maintain the status quo for the plan to be carved out and presented to the creditors.472
A stay guards against the depletion of the assets of the debtor. It bars all creditors from
commencing proceedings against the debtor, including execution proceedings to
recover debts. It also has an effect of staying already existing proceedings. This
protection under the CCAA will ensure that debt enforcement actions initiated by
creditors of the insolvent corporation are stayed to give the insolvent company
breathing space to negotiate with its creditors and enable the insolvent company to
return to financial stability.473

The initial stay of proceedings can be extended based on the assessment by the court
that the debtor has worked diligently and in good faith towards the restructuring plan.474
The initial stay of proceedings in a CCAA restructuring process was recently reduced
to ten days.475 The lawmakers shortened duration of the stay a court can grant arguably
because it would protect creditors, and other stakeholder from the effect of far reaching
orders.

In other words, the reduction may have been intended at limiting the

consequences of a stay order in situations where substantial reliefs are sought in the

471 Ibid.
472 Sarra, supra note 132 at 25.
473 Nocilla, supra note 442 at 1.
474 Re Downtown Lumber (1996), 39 C.B.R (3d) 4 (N.B.C.A.)
475 CCAA, s. 11.02 (1)
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interim, with little or no notice to creditors. However, this limitation might prevent the
smooth operation of a restructuring process because the limited duration of a stay is too
short to achieve the restructuring goals intended by the law. The limitation is also
contrary to objectives of a stay of proceedings. In Re Doman Industries Ltd,476 the
purpose of a stay of proceedings was stated which includes:
…To maintain status quo among creditors while a debtor company endeavors to recognize or
restructure its financial affairs. Another purpose is to relieve the debtor company of the burden
of dealing with litigation against it so that it would focus on restructuring its financial affairs.
Another purpose is to prevent the frustration of a reorganization plan after its implementation
on the basis of events of default or breaches, which existed prior to or during the restructuring
period.

To achieve this goal, the law ought to be designed in a manner that would not impede
a long-term restructuring plan. The reality of insolvency and restructuring is that most
businesses would require a longer period to gain some form of financial stability and
continue as a going concern.

4.3.2

DIP Financing

Once restructuring proceedings are commenced, the debtor is put in control of its
business and creditors are stayed from enforcing their claims against the debtor, giving
the debtor breathing space to restructure its affairs.477 However, to operate as a going
concern, the debtor needs financing. This is known as the Debtor in Possession
financing (“DIP Financing”).478 DIP Financing provides an insolvent company with
working capital for the continuation of its operations, pending when a plan acceptable
to creditors is devised.

476 (2003) BCSC 376, at para 22
477 Ben-Ishai & Telfer, supra note 73 at 585.
478 Ibid.
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DIP Financing also known, as an “interim financing” is a term used in describing a
situation where the debtor remains in possession of its affairs in a restructuring process
and receives financing from either a current creditor or a third party. These lenders are
referred to as a super priority lenders or DIP lenders.479 The financing obtained from
the DIP lender enables the debtor to continue its business during a brief period in line
with the moratorium provisions in the CCAA while the company negotiates a plan with
its creditors.480 DIP Financing is generally considered as less risky venture because
post-filing creditors 481 are usually able to acquire priority for their loans. 482 Put
differently, the DIP lender is granted super priority security interest ranking above the
loans of other creditors.483 This is referred to as (“priming”) and it entails that if the
restructuring process is unsuccessful, the DIP lender will be paid out first from the
assets of the insolvent company, whether encumbered or not.484

The amendment introduced through s. 11.2 (5) of the CCAA limits the courts’
discretion to provide relief pursuant to an initial order to that which is reasonably
necessary for continued operation of the company within the 10 days stay period. s.
11.2 (5) of the CCAA compliments s. 11.02(1) as it aims to limit the terms and amount
of financing which a company can obtain within the period of the stay granted by the
initial order. This section states:

479 Patrick Cleary, “DIP financing basics and recent case law”, (20 August 2014), online:

Alexander
Holburn Beaudin + Lang LLP <https://www.ahbl.ca/dip-financing-basics-and-recent-case-law/>.
480 Janis Sarra, “Debtor in Possession Financing: the Jurisdiction of Canadian Courts to Grant
Super-Priority Financing in CCAA Applications” (2000) 23 Dalhousie L J 33 at 4.
481 Post-filing creditors are creditors who extend financing to the debtor after restructuring
proceedings have been commenced. Pre- filing creditors on other hand are creditors who have
existing claims against the debtor prior to the debtors’ insolvency; their claims are subject to the
restructuring plan.
482 Ben-Ishai & Telfer, supra note 73 at 585.
483 CCAA, s.11 (2).
484 Kenneth Atlas & Kendall Anderson, “DIP Super-Priorities and the Secured creditor’s Dilemma”
(2009) 6 Ann Rev Insol. 12 at 1.
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When an application is made under subsection (1) at the same time as an initial
application referred to in subsection 11.02(1) or during the period referred to in an order
made under that subsection, no order shall be made under subsection (1) unless the court
is also satisfied that the terms of the loan are limited to what is reasonably necessary for
the continued operations of the debtor company in the ordinary course of business during
that period.

The amendments to the DIP is incidental to the amendment that shortens the length of
the initial stay of proceedings. It has to be considered alongside the amendment to the
stay to determine what relief an insolvent company can obtain once it files an initial
order. Considering that the length of the stay of proceedings is now 10 days, this subsection implies that when an application for DIP financing is made, no order will be
made if the court is not satisfied that the terms of the loan are limited to what is
reasonably necessary for the continued operation of the debtor company in the ordinary
course of business within 10 days.

The reduction of the duration for the initial stay of proceedings to ten days has a
significant impact on the quantum of DIP Financing the debtor may obtain.485 Lesser
funds would mean that debtor companies would have to go back to court at the
expiration of the initial period for another DIP Financing order. This could pose a
problem because long-term funding is particularly important at the initial period for
restructuring businesses. In addition, this creates an additional bottleneck to the
restructuring process. DIP Financing being an important tool of restructuring because
it provides the necessary funds for restructuring should be put into consideration when
amendments to the CCAA are made.

485

CCAA s. 11.2(5).
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4.3.3

Key Players in a CCAA Proceeding

4.3.3.1

The Monitor

In a CCAA proceeding, a monitor is appointed to oversee the restructuring process.
This is done to ease concerns about retaining the existing management of the debtor.
The monitor is usually a licensed insolvency professional with an accounting or
turnaround expertise, and is represented by a legal counsel in the proceedings.486 The
monitor is appointed by the court in the initial order and is regarded as an officer of the
court.487 The monitor has the duty to monitor the business and financial affairs of the
company; ensure that the court and the creditors receive accurate and timely
information about the proceedings.488 The CCAA provides for the powers and duties
of a monitor. 489 According to the Supreme Court in Century Services,490 the courts
have the discretion to extend the duties and powers of the monitor however; the exercise
of this discretion by the courts should not be done arbitrarily but in accordance with the
objectives of the CCAA. Very recently in Arrangement relatif à 9323-7055 Québec
inc. (Aquadis International Inc.),491 additional powers of the monitor to institute legal
proceedings on behalf of creditors was recognized. The Quebec Court of Appeal found
that the monitor had a duty in accordance with the CCAA objectives to maximize
returns for creditors by establishing a litigation pool for distribution to Aquadis
creditors. This decision draws the powers of a CCAA monitor closer to those of a

486 Sarra, supra note 132 at 26.
487 CCAA, s 11.7(1).
488 Ben-Ishai & Telfer, supra note 73 at 548.
489 CCAA, s 23
490 Century Services supra note 76 at para 59.
491 Arrangement relatif à 9323-7055 Québec inc. (Aquadis International Inc.) (2020) QCCA 659.
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trustee in bankruptcy thus diminishing the remedial nature of the act. This decision also
provides an additional tool to increase creditor recovery in a liquidating CCAA.492

The monitor generally ensures compliance with the law, the court orders and the terms
of the restructuring plan. The monitor also performs supervisory functions over the
directors and officers of the insolvent company to ensure that they do nothing that will
unnecessarily deplete the resources available to satisfy creditors’ claims and they act in
good faith. The new amendment to the CCAA introduces a broad duty of good faith for
“interested parties” in CCAA proceedings. 493 Prior to this amendment, the CCAA
already imposed duties of good faith on the insolvent company and Monitors in CCAA
proceedings. 494 At common law, good faith implies that parties in an insolvency
proceeding should act honestly, take timely actions and act fairly. 495 The Supreme
Court of Canada in Century Services,

496

stated that “the requirements of

appropriateness, good faith, and due diligence are baseline considerations that a court
should always bear in mind when exercising CCAA authority.” In Bhasin v. Hrynew497
the court recognized good faith as a broad “organizing principle”.

The new duty of good faith lacks clarity. This amendment tends to take away this duty
from the monitors and the court and place it on a wide category of unknown persons.

Sandra Abitan, Ilia Kravtsov & Cristina Cosneanu, The Aquadis Case: Québec Court Of Appeal
Confirms The Broad Powers Of The CCAA Monitor - Insolvency/Bankruptcy/Re-structuring Canada (June 2020), online:
<https://www.mondaq.com/canada/insolvencybankruptcy/959996/the-aquadis-case-qubeccourt-of-appeal-confirms-the-broad-powers-of-the-ccaa-monitor> .
493 CCAA, s. 18.6 (1) and (2).
494 Linc A Rogers, David Sierardzki & Matthew Kanter, “What does “Good Faith” Mean in
Insolvency Proceedings”, (2015) 4 Insolvency Institute of Canada 55. See CCAA s. 11.02(3) and
25(3).
495 Gateway Realty Ltd v Arton Holdings Ltd [1992] NSJ No 175 (NSCA) at para 39.
496 Century Services supra note 76 at para 70.
497 (2014) SCC 71 at para 33 and 86.
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For instance, the new duty of good faith is imposed on an “interested party” and can be
enforced by another “interested party”. Yet the CCAA does not stipulate the
requirements that would make a person “an interested party”. The term is vague, and
arguably can cover a very broad category of persons, including persons that are barely
affected by the activities of the restructuring company. It has been argued that an
interested person is a participant in the proceedings or a non-participant who will be
affected by the outcome of the proceedings.498 This creates a broad duty owed by a
wide range of persons to another wide range of persons.

On the bright side this provides an avenue for vulnerable parties in an insolvency
proceeding to enforce their rights against parties acting in bad faith to their detriment.499
However, this provision may lead to a floodgate of litigation against the debtor thus
slowing down the restructuring process. Considering that creditors want to maximize
their returns speedily, they have the incentive to bring applications that a party is acting
in bad faith to stall the restructuring proceedings. The duty to act in good faith should
be left within the confines of the duties of a monitor who is an officer of the court and
the court itself. Allowing almost anybody come under the guise of an interested party
decreases the responsibility of the monitor and the court.

4.3.3.2

The Court

The CCAA equips the supervising judge or the court with a broad deference to exercise
their discretion to “meet contemporary business and social needs”500 given that new

498 Jules Monteyne, “The New Duty of Good Faith and How it Applies in Insolvency Proceedings”

(2019) 16 Ann Rev Insol L 9 at 2.
499 Ibid.
500 Century services supra note 76 at para 58.
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issues might arise which the legislation did not envisage at the time the CCAA was
drafted. The supervising judges are conferred with powers to exercise their discretion
while handling restructuring of companies, most especially those with complex debt
profiles. The Supreme Court of Canada in 9354-9186 Québec inc v Callidus Capital
Corp501 stated that one of the ways in which the objectives of the CCAA is met is
through the supervisory role of a supervising judge over the process. The supervising
judge has the discretion to make decisions over the CCAA process. 502 A lot of
deference is given to the supervising judge and when there are competing interests in
insolvency, it is the duty of the supervising judge to recognize interests that will work
against the goals of the statute and exercise his or her discretion in getting rid of
them.503

The recent amendments to the CCAA leave a lot of discretion in the hands of the court.
First, to determine the quantum and terms of DIP Financing reasonably necessary for a
debtor company’s restructuring process. Ordinarily, by s. 11.2(1) of the CCAA, the
court has the power to determine the quantum of DIP Financing it may grant by having
regard to the cash-flow statement of the debtor company. However, unlike s. 11.2(1),
this amendment is silent on how the court would determine what is “reasonably
necessary for the continued operations of the debtor company in the ordinary course of
business during that period”. This amendment assumes the court has the expertise to
determine the quantum of DIP Financing that is reasonably necessary for the continued

501 2020 SCC 10 at para 47 [Bluberi].
502 Bluberi, supra note 501 at para 48.
503 Janis Sarra & Barbara Romaine, “The Oscillating Pendulum: Canada’s Sesquicentennial and

Finding the Equilibrium for Insolvency Law” (2016) Ann Rev Insol. at 30.
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operations of the debtor company during the initial period. In my opinion the court does
not have this expertise.

Without prejudice to other arguments advanced above, it is argued that s. 11.2(5) should
have given the courts some guidance on how to determine what would be reasonably
necessary. One suggestion is that the court may defer to the directors or trustees of the
debtor company on this point. An analogy may be made between the court’s attitudes
to director’s decisions under the business judgment rule. Generally, under this rule, the
courts are skeptical and indeed refuse in most cases to interfere with the decisions of
corporate directors. This is because it is presumed that directors have acted in an
informed basis, in good faith, honestly and in the best interest of the corporation.504
Given the court’s lack of expertise on what would be a reasonable DIP Financing for
the 10-day initial period, the courts should also defer to the directors of the insolvent
company and the monitor to make this decision.

In Re Crystallex International Corporation,505 the court considered whether deference
should be made to the business judgment of the debtor company’s directors in granting
DIP financing loans. The court held that the approval of a director would not impact on
the granting of the DIP loan as the court must make an independent determination
considering the factors laid down in s.11.2 (4) of the CCAA. However, in this case, s.
11.2(5) of the CCAA does not provide any factors or guideline to the courts.
Accordingly, the courts, lacking expertise on the internal running of a company, should
not be granted the wide discretion of determining what amount of DIP loan is

504 Christopher C Nicholls, Corporate law (Toronto: Montgomery, 2005) at 303.
505 (2012) ONCA 404.
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reasonably necessary for operation of the company during the initial period. A poor
assessment of the court may impede restructuring even before it starts.

Second, discretion is also given to the court when this duty to act in good faith has been
breached. The statute gives the court the discretion to determine the remedy that it
considers appropriate in the circumstance.506 This leaves wide range discretion in the
hands of the court. It also makes the duty of good faith provision more uncertain. The
legislature is advised to go back to the drawing board and define vague terms in this
amendment and if possible limit the duty of good faith to be owed by the monitors and
the court to all participants in an insolvency proceeding.

4.3.4

Exiting CCAA Proceedings

In Century Services, the court laid down three ways in which CCAA proceedings can
be exited. First, when the stay of proceedings provides the debtor with breathing space
and solvency is restored. The CCAA process terminates and there is no need for
reorganization. Second, when creditors accept the compromise or arrangement put
forward by the debtor and the company is able to reorganize its affairs and continue as
a going concern. Third, if the compromise or arrangement fails and either the company
or its creditors request that the debtor’s assets be liquidated under the BIA or put into
receivership. 507

506 CCAA, s 18.6 (2).
507 Century services supra note 76 at para 14.
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4.4

Asset Sales under the CCAA

The 2009 amendments to the CCAA introduced new guidelines for the court to follow
while deciding whether to approve asset sales.508 S.36 (1) of the CCAA provides:
A debtor company in respect of which an order has been made under this Act may not
sell or otherwise dispose of assets outside the ordinary course of business unless
authorized to do so by a court. Despite any requirement for shareholder approval,
including one under federal or provincial law, the court may authorize the sale or
disposition even if shareholder approval was not obtained.

Section 36 permits not only reorganizations of insolvent companies but also
liquidations where the assets of the insolvent company are sold and the company ceases
to exist. Liquidating CCAAs is a term that refers to the ongoing trend where the CCAA
is used as a tool to effect sales of assets of an insolvent company; after which it ceases
to operate.509 These assets are either liquidated piecemeal or on a going concern basis
under the supervision of the court.510 Regardless of the involvement of the court in
CCAA proceedings, it has been observed that many CCAA proceedings have been
liquidating CCAAs from the onset and in several other cases, no plan is presented to
the creditors and there is no intention of continuing the debtor as a going concern.511 In
view of this practice, it could be said that the CCAA has evolved into a more flexible
mechanism that permits both reorganizations and liquidations.

Liquidating CCAAs can take place in several forms. First, liquidating the company
while it carries on business as a going concern. This type of liquidation entails that the
assets of the company would be sold in an operating or idle state and the new buyers
would be able to run the company with minimal investment. 512 Second, liquidating the

508 CCAA, s 36.
509 Nocilla, supra note 32 at 382.
510 Ibid at 385.
511 Ibid.
512 Bill Kaplan, “Liquidating CCAAs: Discretion Gone Awry” (2008) 3 Ann Rev Insol. 34 at 6.
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assets of the company en bloc as opposed to a going concern sale. This means that the
assets would be sold as a group of assets, which are not in operation but are capable of
being operational. Third, liquidating the assets of the company piecemeal to separate
buyers. 513 The Supreme Court of Canada in Bluberi, listed the several outcomes
facilitated by Liquidating CCAAs which include the continued operation of the
business under a new entity and management,514 others can result in the sale of assets
with no new entity emerging from the sale515 or finally as seen in Bluberi, the sale of
most of the assets of the company while it remains a going concern, leaving the residual
assets to be dealt with by the debtor and its stakeholders.516

Under Canadian insolvency law, liquidation of insolvent corporations either on a
piecemeal or going concern basis can be carried out through receivership or liquidation
by a trustee in bankruptcy.517 However, the practice of liquidating CCAAs gives room
for creditors to avoid this traditional process of asset sales. In situations where the
available assets are insufficient to pay off claims of secured creditors, a fully secured
creditor will prefer liquidation to restructuring regardless of whether the sale maximizes
returns for other creditors. 518 Secured creditors usually initiate CCAA liquidating
proceedings as an alternative to appointing a receiver.519 It is questionable why secured
creditors would abandon the receivership process that enables them to sell the assets of

Ibid.
An example of this is the liquidation carried out in Re Canadian Red Cross Society (1998), 5
C.B.R (4th) (Ont. C.J (Gen. Div.)).
515 An example of this is the liquidation carried out in Re Target Canada Co. (2015) 22 C.B.R (6th)
323 at para. 7 and 31.
516 Bluberi supra note 501 at para 43.
517 Nocilla, supra note 387 at 78.
518 Ben-Ishai & Telfer, supra note 73 at 513.
519 Ibid at 511.
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the debtor, opt for a restructuring process and then use this process to liquidate the
assets of the debtor.

The features of a receivership are similar to that of liquidating CCAAs. First, the
supervisory role the court performs in CCAA proceedings is present in receivership
proceedings (in cases where the receiver is appointed by the court). Second, the duties
of the court appointed monitor in a CCAA proceeding is same as a receiver’s in a
receivership proceeding. Third, the CCAA process provides for DIP financing to cover
costs incurred while running the business as a going concern, while in a receivership
process, the court authorizes super priority charges and payments of administrative
expenses.520 Despite these similarities, there is still one striking conceptual difference
between the CCAA process and a court-appointed receivership which is that the CCAA
process is debtor driven while the receivership is creditor driven.521 The liquidating
CCAA now practiced in Canada now make both processes creditor driven. Given this
conceptual difference, both processes ought not to be one and the same. Roderick Wood
noted the striking semblance between liquidating CCAAs and what goes on in
receivership proceedings in Canada. He argued that “the fact that courts in CCAA
proceedings are applying receivership law when dealing with liquidating sales clearly
brings home the point that the processes used in CCAA liquidations are mimicking
those in receivership proceedings.”522

Roderick Wood’s conclusion simply illustrates that the CCAA has become an indirect
means for liquidation. Further, commenting on the shift of the CCAA process from

520 Roderick Wood, supra note 33 at 412.
521 Ibid.
522 Ibid.
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being debtor driven to creditor driven, Shelley Fitzapatrick argues that the CCAA is no
longer used by the debtor company to prevent its creditors from depleting the debtors
assets, rather the CCAA is used by the secured creditors to liquidate the debtors assets
for their benefit by fusing receivership and liquidation into a single collective
process.523

The incentive behind the secured creditors in Canada choosing liquidating CCAA over
receivership can be deduced from the decision of the court in GMAC Commercial
Creditor Corp of Canada v TCT Logistics Inc524 where the Supreme Court confirmed
that the bankruptcy court lacked the jurisdiction to determine if an interim receiver is a
successor employer within the meaning of the Labour Relations Act. In this case, T.C.T
Logistics Inc.’s (“TCT”) became insolvent and its second largest secured creditor
applied that KPMG be appointed as an interim receiver. The appointment letter
provided that the contract of employment of TCT’s employees be terminated and also
provided that KPMG would not be considered a successor employer. Subsequently,
TCT filed an assignment into bankruptcy with the aid of KPMG. The assets of TCT
were sold to a new company and this purchaser re-hired some of TCT’s employees.
The union filed for a declaration at the Ontario Labour Relations Board that the
purchaser or the interim receiver was a successor employer to TCT. The Supreme Court
held that the Bankruptcy Court lacked the jurisdiction to make successor employer
declarations. The sections of the appointment order which shielded the interim receiver
from successor employer liability were set aside and the court held that an interim
receiver is not protected from successor employer claims filed by a union.

523 Shelley Fitzpatrick, “Liquidating CCAAs-Are We Praying to False Gods?” (2008) 2 Ann. Rev.
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The uncertainty behind the status of receivers becoming successor employers
discouraged secured creditors from appointing receivers to sell the assets of the
company while it remains a going concern. This case had a significant effect on
receiverships in Canada because it led to a preference for using “restructuring” under
the CCAA as a means for the sale of assets without incurring third party liabilities. This
has resulted in a rise in liquidating CCAAs while it remains a going concern. 525
Commenting on the reason why secured creditors favour CCAA liquidations, David
Bish noted that:
In one fell swoop, receivership became an anathema and so insolvency practitioners set
to work doing what they do best: they aggressively and creatively fashioned a new
realization paradigm by looking to the CCAA as a means to leave a debtor in possession
of its assets, yet ensuring that the principal secured creditors wielded significant control
over the process.526

As evidenced by the Supreme Court of Canada in Century Services527 the purpose of
the CCAA is not to liquidate assets. However, insolvency practitioners who adopt the
liquidating CCAA approach do so without considering this objective. Alfonso Nocilla
has argued that liquidating CCAA’s are usually intended before the debtor company
files for protection under the CCAA most especially debtor companies who file for
CCAA protection in the absence of a restructuring plan.528 Similarly, Roderick Wood
noted that the causes of insolvency of a corporation and the appropriate method of
addressing the issue are not “immediately apparent” and it would require a restructuring
process to enable the corporation decipher what the problem is and propose rescue

525 Karma Dolkar, “Re-thinking Rescue: A Critical Examination of CCAA Liquidating Plans

ProQuest” (2011) 27:111 BFLR 10 at 10.
526 David Bish, “The Plight of Receiverships in a CCAA World” (2013) 2 J Insol. Inst. of Can 221 at
235–36.
527 Century Services Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, 2010.
528 Nocilla, supra note 387 at 78.
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plans.529 In circumstances like this, Liquidating CCAAs defeats the purpose of the
CCAA since restructuring is bypassed or treated with mere formality. The question now
remains: if parties are aware of the conceptual purpose of the various insolvency
processes, why should the CCAA, a restructuring law be used to achieve liquidation.
In other to justify liquidating CCAAs, Karma Dolkar has tried to draw up a distinction
between liquidation and a liquidating plan by arguing that “liquidation occurs when
assets are sold on a piecemeal basis, while a liquidating plan occurs when the assets of
the debtor company are sold on a going concern basis to a willing buyer.”530 He lays
emphasis on a liquidating plan being more beneficial than liquidation as the business is
sold with prospects and as a viable concern. He further argued that a liquidating plan is
similar to a restructuring plan as a liquidating plan avoids the socio- economic effects
of liquidation, which include loss of jobs, loss to creditors, supplies, customers, the
government and the community. 531 Karma Dolkar argues that the only distinction
between a liquidation plan and a restructuring plan is that in a liquidating plan the assets
of the insolvent company can be sold as a going concern resulting to a change in the
management of the debtor company. 532 Despite these arguments, the goal of
Restructuring remains to rescue the insolvent company and a liquidating plan does not
achieve that.

Liquidating CCAAs are controlled by Canadian courts by requiring sale plans to be
presented for approval when a restructuring plan is present. However this requirement
is restricted to companies that are viable. In Re Fracmaster,533 the court refused to

529 Roderick Wood, supra note 11 at 339.
530 Dolkar, “Re-thinking Rescue”, supra note 525 at 9.
531 Ibid.
533 (1999) 11 CBR (4th) 204 (Alta QB)
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approve a sale plan where no restructuring plan was produced and stated: “it is generally
accepted that the CCAA is not to be used to wind up or liquidate a company, although
there are some circumstances in which the CCAA can be used in such a way.”534 In this
case, the courts recognized that when an insolvent company is non-viable, restructuring
under the CCAA is not in the interest of the creditors and a liquidating plan is therefore
necessary.

Proponents of Liquidating CCAAs have distinguished Liquidating CCAAs from mere
liquidations stating that Liquidating CCAAs are in line with the purpose of the CCAA;
to avoid the negative social and economic consequences of bankruptcy. 535 They argue
that there are insufficient arguments against liquidating CCAAs because even if it fails
to rescue the company, jobs and existing relationships with customers and suppliers are
nevertheless preserved.536 In my view, this argument misses the point, which is that a
restructuring law should not be used to effect liquidations. It must be noted that this
paper is not inquiring into the appropriateness or not of employing liquidating CCAAs
to serve a broader public interest. Rather it argues that the CCAA should not be used
for the purpose of liquidations in the first place.

Professor Janis Sarra identifies the problem with incorporating section 36 as a policy
issue. She stated: 537
One policy issue that has not to date been fully explored is whether the CCAA should be
used to effect an organized liquidation that should properly occur under the BIA or
receivership proceedings ... there may be some public policy concerns regarding the use
of a restructuring statute, under the broad scope of judicial discretion, to effect liquidation
... While the courts have endorsed liquidating CCAAs, there has not yet been a judgment
534 Re Fracmaster at para 20.

537 Sarra, supra note 31 at 82–83.
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that carefully considers both the benefits and prejudice to expanding the scope of the
CCAA to allow for this ...

There are also arguments by proponents of Liquidating CCAAs that the process is
embarked upon to gather funds to sustain the company as a going concern. Again, this
argument is not valid. The CCAA has provisions for Debtor in Possession (DIP)
financing, designed to allow an insolvent corporation to obtain fresh funds to enable it
to remain in business and possibly bounce back to solvency. That option should be
explored instead of a liquidating CCAA as the company may be unable to operate as a
going concern if its major assets are sold. In fact, a research into major CCAAs
liquidations in recent years including those of Nortel Networks538, Canwest Global539
and Indalex540 show that the CCAA process is mainly driven by secured creditors to
maximize their returns.541

The Supreme Court of Canada in Bluberi, has recognized instances where the
reorganization of a debtor company is impossible, a liquidation of the company on a
going concern basis would be the best option as the maximization of creditors returns
will be the main focus. The court stated,
Similarly, under the CCAA , when a reorganization of the pre-filing debtor company is
not a possibility, a liquidation that preserves going-concern value and the ongoing
business operations of the pre-filing company may become the predominant remedial
focus. Moreover, where a reorganization or liquidation is complete and the court is
dealing with residual assets, the objective of maximizing creditor recovery from those
assets may take center stage.542

The Supreme Court in Century Services has also stated that liquidation should only be
considered as an option where restructuring has failed, and where this is the case;
538 Re Nortel Networks Corp, (2009) 56 CBR (5th) 224 (Ont Sup Ct).
539 Re Canwest Global Communications Corp, 2009 CarswellOnt 7169 (Ont Sup Ct).
540 Re Indalex Limited, 2011 ONCA 265.
541 Nocilla, supra note 442 at 86.
542 Bluberi supra note 501 at para 46.
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liquidation should be carried out under the BIA.543 The court in Century Services was
clear that sale of assets, whether piecemeal or as a going concern basis, is not the
purpose for which the CCAA was enacted. Consequently, liquidating CCAA’s does not
play any role in rescuing insolvent corporations, and in line with the intent of the
legislature for establishing the CCAA, should not be used in the CCAA restructuring
process.

4.5

Conclusion

This Chapter has discussed the corporate insolvency system in Canada. It has discussed
the CCAA, its purpose and history. It has also discussed how CCAA proceedings are
commenced and the roles of the key players in a typical CCAA proceeding. This chapter
has also discussed the new amendments to the CCAA, which are broadly speaking,
important innovations for achieving transparency in a restructuring process. However,
transparency is only one of the goals that an ideal restructuring plan must aim to
achieve. In addition, transparency ought to be balanced with efficiency and certainty,
which are important goals that would benefit a restructuring process. The major concern
of the legislature for the CCAA should be to ensure that it enables the smooth carrying
out of the restructuring process, in order to return the company to solvency.

This Chapter has also discussed the amendments to the CCAA, which encourage asset
sales under the CCAA. Liquidating CCAAs generally do not serve any purpose in
rescuing insolvent companies and the control secured creditors have over this process
has made the process entirely debt collection driven thus creating no room for rescue.
Liquidating CCAAs could imply that the liquidation laws are not sufficient. The

543 Century Services, supra note 76 at para. 14.
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legislature may need to go back to the drawing board to make the processes of
maximizing returns either using receivership of liquidation in bankruptcy more
effective. This may prevent secured creditors from abusing restructuring procedures.

This Chapter has provided an overview of the Canadian corporate restructuring regime
to assist the comparative analysis, which will be done, in the next chapter. The next
chapter will compare the Canadian restructuring law and the proposed amendments to
Nigerian Restructuring law highlighting lessons to be drawn from the restructuring
practices in both jurisdictions.
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CHAPTER 5:
DEVELOPING A CORPORTE RESTRUCTURING FRAMEWORK FOR
NIGERIA

5.0

Introduction

This first chapter of this thesis began with an overview of corporate restructuring and
established the goals a restructuring law should aim at accomplishing. It established
that a restructuring law should have the ability to return an insolvent company to
solvency either by preserving the going concern value or rescuing the business to enable
the insolvent company to continue as a new entity. The second chapter discussed the
corporate insolvency system in Nigeria and established that the previous insolvency
regime embodied in the Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990 (“CAMA”) did not
have any mechanism to rescue insolvent businesses as it is mainly focused on
liquidations. The third chapter went further to discuss the recent amendments to the
CAMA 2020. These amendments aim to incorporate mechanisms or procedures that
will facilitate the rescue of insolvent companies. However, these procedures are
practiced in the UK and have not been very successful in rescuing businesses.544

The fourth chapter discuses corporate restructuring in Canada highlighting the
restructuring procedure under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (“CCAA”)
to determine procedures practiced in Canada that facilitate the rescue of insolvent
corporations. This chapter will begin by comparing the corporate restructuring law in
Canada under the CCAA with and the recent amendment to CAMA in Nigeria to
determine how effective these amendments will be in rescuing insolvent companies.

544 The lack of a stay of proceedings in a CVA prevents rescue from being actualized. Also as

discussed in the third chapter, the administration procedure often leads to pre-packaged
administrations.
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This chapter will then highlight lessons Nigeria can adopt from Canadian laws, which
is not available under its restructuring framework. These lessons will help develop an
effective corporate restructuring framework for Nigeria. It will also review the gaps in
the business rescue options provided by the CAMA 2020 and suggest best ways to
develop a separate corporate restructuring framework in Nigeria learning from how
restructuring is practiced in Canada.

5.1
A Comparative Analysis of Corporate Restructuring in Nigeria and
Canada
Globally, there is an increasing practice that when a failing business has viable
prospects it is more beneficial that business rescue options are considered before
liquidation.545 In many circumstances when a company is insolvent and its underlying
business is sound, all it needs at this time is a prompt arrangement with its creditors
considering that it may not afford to pay everyone.546 Nigeria is not fully equipped with
business rescue practices prevalent in other jurisdictions. The detailed analysis of the
recent amendments in the CAMA 2020 demonstrates that the business rescue
provisions in the recent amendments need to be improved upon.

In Canada, the CCAA is the restructuring law of choice for rescuing large insolvent
companies as a result of its liberal application.547 Based on the discussion in the fourth
chapter, the development of corporate restructuring laws in Canada is worth emulating
and countries without a strong corporate restructuring framework such as Nigeria have
a lot of lessons to learn from the CCAA and its administration. As stated in the second

545 Udofia, supra note 103 at 16.
546 Keay & Walton, supra note 102 at 137.
547

Chapter 4 at pages 106-108.
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chapter, there is no separate law governing corporate insolvency or restructuring law in
Nigeria as the corporate insolvency framework is embodied in the CAMA. This chapter
aims to improve upon the recent amendments in the CAMA 2020, which introduces
business rescue mechanisms for insolvent companies in Nigeria. The chapter will
compare the proposed restructuring procedures in the CAM Bill with the restructuring
procedure in the CCAA. This comparison between the laws in the two jurisdictions will
be carried out using the fundamental principles governing restructuring law as a guide.

5.1.1

Debtor in Possession

The act of placing the debtor in possession and control of its affairs is a good mechanism
that is perceived to aid the smooth running of the restructuring process. This is because
the debtor is better equipped with the skills of tracing the business decisions the
company made that led to its financial distress and will then work on returning the
company to solvency. Upon a bankruptcy order being made or an assignment being
filed against a debtor, all of the debtors’ assets vests in the bankruptcy trustee. 548 In a
receivership or winding up proceedings, the assets of the debtor remain in the debtors
possession but a receiver or administrator takes over the control of the management of
the debtors business.549 However, when restructuring proceedings are commenced in
Canada under the CCAA, there is a divergence from the features in bankruptcy and
receivership or winding up proceedings as the debtor retains both possession and
management of its affairs.550 The debtor therefore has the ability to run the affairs of
the company as a going concern while trying to reorganize its affairs under its control.

548 BIA, s 71.
549 Roderick Wood, supra note 11 at 344.
550 Ibid.
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In Nigeria, the Debtor is not in full possession of its affairs in the proposed restructuring
mechanisms. Just one of the two business rescue procedures proposed in the CAMA
2020 gives the debtor possession and control of its affairs. This procedure is the
Company Voluntary Arrangement (“CVA”). CAMA 2020 provides that the directors
of the company remain in control of the business while the company continues as a
going concern. Regardless of the control the debtor may possess, the rights of secured
creditors, who do not consent to the repayment plan, limit the control the debtor has in
a CVA. The Company Administration (“CA”) on the other hand leaves possession in
the debtor but takes away the control of its affairs from the debtor and places it on an
administrator appointed to manage and control the affairs of the company.

This principle of letting the debtor remain in possession of its affairs appears to be a
very effective mechanism for business rescue. When third parties such as administrators
are involved, business rescue will just be one of their duties that they may merely
attempt to fulfill. Nigeria will need to adopt a business rescue mechanism that reserves
the possession and control of the debtors’ affairs with the debtor. The debtor knows its
business better than third parties. In situations where the expertise of third parties is
sought, they should act as monitors and not take over full control of the insolvent
corporation. The Debtor being in possession of its affairs should be backed up with a
stay of proceedings.

5.1.2

Stay of Proceedings

When restructuring proceedings are commenced, it is important for the debtor to have
sufficient breathing space to negotiate with its creditors. According to Roderick Wood,
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a stay of proceedings during restructuring creates an environment that facilitates
negotiations with creditors.551 A stay of proceeding is imposed is to prevent the assets
of the debtor from being depleted by creditors. It prevents creditors from seizing the
assets of the debtor or enforcing their claims against the debtors assets. The stay of
proceedings keeps the assets of the debtor intact and prevents any creditor from having
undue advantage over other creditors while restructuring proceedings are ongoing.

Under the CCAA, once restructuring proceedings are commenced a stay of proceedings
takes effect and all actions and claims (including secured claims) against the debtor are
put on hold. As stated in the fourth chapter, this stay applies to both secured and
unsecured creditors and lasts for an initial period of 10days.552 The problems that might
be created as a result of the short duration of the stay in Canada have been discussed in
the previous chapter. However, in Nigeria, under the CVA there is no stay of
proceedings. The approval of creditors to a CVA is only binding on the company and
the unsecured creditors. This means that upon the commencement of a CVA, secured
creditors who are not bound by the CVA can file actions such as winding up petitions
or enforcement of actions against the debtor. This procedure aimed at business rescue
is clearly a shift from what was previously obtainable in Nigeria and it does not create
a sustainable environment for the CVA process to be carried out.

A stay of proceedings is absent in a CVA, which renders the debtor’s possession, and
control futile. Therefore, using the CVA to rescue insolvent corporations will be mainly
unproductive, as the secured creditors who do not consent to the CVA will deny the

551 Ibid.
552 Chapter 4 at pages 115-117.
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company the breathing space to run its affairs smoothly. Several applications will be
filed in court preventing the company from properly restructuring its affairs. The CVA
mechanism needs to be amended to include a stay of proceedings

Under the CA, once an administrator is appointed, there is an automatic stay of
proceedings or moratorium that binds both the secured and unsecured creditors of the
insolvent company.553 The stay protects the company from the enforcement of legal
actions against it and gives the administrator the necessary breathing space to focus on
returning the company to solvency. This stay of proceedings imposed under an
administration process is subject to an order from the Federal High Court or the consent
of an administrator to lift the stay. After the debtor has been put in possession of its
affairs and a stay of proceedings is enforced, the creditors in the restructuring process
should be furnished with adequate information.

5.1.3

Creditors’ right to information

For a company to attain financial stability, it is necessary that an effective creditors’
rights system is put in place.554 This ensures that when restructuring proceedings are
commenced, creditors are furnished with sufficient information regarding the steps
taken in the restructuring process. The relationship between the corporation and its
creditors is contractual in nature.555 In contract law, there is an implied covenant of
good faith556 and fair dealing present to ensure that the “reasonable expectations” of

553 Bloom v Harms AHT ‘Taurus’ GmbH & Co KG

[2009] EWCA Civ 632, [2010] Ch 687

554 World Bank, supra note 6 at 1.
555 Stephen McDonnell, “Geyer v Ingersoll Publications Co.: Insolvency Shifts Directors’ Burden

from Shareholders to Creditors” (1994) 19 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 177 at 183.
556 This is also evident in the CCAA in the new duty of good faith imposed on an “interested
party” to be enforced by another “interested party”. This is discussed in the fourth chapter at
pages 121-122.
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the parties in a contract are met and neither party deprives the other of the fruits of the
contract. 557 These implied contractual obligations would be breached if one party
prevents the performance of the contract or withholds its benefits. As it is in the best
interest of the corporation to preserve it’s going concern value when insolvent, it is also
in its best interest to perform its contractual obligations to its creditors by maximizing
their returns.

The directors of corporations are not necessarily required to bring the company’s
business to an end when it is insolvent, hence these directors will explore the option of
restructuring and continue carrying on business with the assets of the corporation at the
expense of creditors. 558 Given that companies are not certain that it will return to
solvency and its debts will be paid, the directors’ efforts to save the company could
compromise creditors interests.559 Therefore, it is important that creditors are furnished
with sufficient information.

In restructuring proceedings in Canada, after the debtor has carved out the restructuring
plan, the creditors will determine whether to accept or reject the plan. According to
Roderick Wood, the rationale behind this is that the debtor is in control of the
company’s business during this period and creditors are required to be supplied with
full and accurate information to enable them, make informed decisions on the merits of
the plan.560 Creditors are also guaranteed the flow of relevant information from the

557 Ibid.
558 Mehreen Rehman, Directors’ Duties to Creditors - Mapping the Twilight Zone (University of

Western Ontario, 2012) [unpublished] at 1-2.
559 Ibid at 2.
560 Roderick Wood, supra note 11 at 345.
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monitor. The court generally appoints the monitor as discussed in the fourth chapter,561
to oversee the restructuring process and act on behalf of all the parties. The monitor
performs supervisory roles to keep the debtor who is in possession and control of its
affairs in check thus avoiding any discrepancies and foul play. Very recently in Canada,
the monitor was given an additional duty to initiate litigation proceedings on behalf of
the creditors.562

In Nigeria, under the two restructuring regimes, creditors are given information
regarding the restructuring proceedings. First, the CVA can only be initiated and carried
on by the consent of the creditors and members of the company. When the creditors
consent to a CVA and the process is begun, a nominee is appointed by the directors of
the debtor to make a proposal to the creditors on their behalf. The nominee basically
acts in the interest of the directors of the insolvent company who has appointed them.
Secondly, Under the CA process, an administrator is in charge of running the affairs of
the insolvent company. The administrator is an officer of the court and an agent of the
company and has the duty to act on behalf of all interested parties in the restructuring
proceedings. As stated in the third chapter,563 once an administrator is appointed, he is
required to notify the creditors and carry them along with the restructuring process.

The role of the nominee in a CVA is different from the roles the administrator and the
monitor play in a CA and under the CCAA respectively. In a CVA, the nominee acts
on behalf of the person who has appointed him who is the director, whereas the monitor
and administrator who are appointed by the court, act on behalf of all parties. Limited

561 Chapter 4 at page 119-120.
562 Arrangement relatif à 9323-7055 Québec inc (Aquadis International Inc)
563 Chapter 3 at pages 92-93.

(2020) QCCA 659
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information is provided to creditors in a CVA, as a result of the lack of a stay of
proceedings. Secured creditors therefore have the right to enforce their interests and
recover monies owed to them by the debtor. However, the unsecured creditors under
the CVA are at a greater risk because they do not have sufficient information and are
bound by whatever restructuring plan the debtor decides to undertake.

The monitor and the administrator are one of the key players in restructuring
proceedings who ensure that creditors are furnished with relevant information regarding
the restructuring proceedings. The role of the administrator in a CA and a monitor under
the CCAA appear to be the same in both jurisdictions. However, there is the likelihood
that the duties of the monitor and the administrator, which is usually for the benefit of
all parties, might be compromised. The recent decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal
in Aquadis as discussed in the fourth chapter,564 creates some difficulty for a monitor
to be totally independent, as an extra duty to institute litigation claims on behalf of the
creditors has been placed on them. This could create problems in the restructuring
process and slow things down. This could even cause a shift of the goal of restructuring
from preserving the going concern value of the insolvent company to a collective debt
recovery platform for creditors as discussed in the first chapter.565

Similarly, in an administration as discussed in the third chapter, the additional duty
placed on an administrator to pursue some other course that will yield better result for
the company creditors if a rescue cannot be achieved places a debt collection duty on
an administrator on behalf of creditors and most times the initial duty to rescue the

564 Chapter 4 at page 120.
565 Chapter 1 at pages 39-42.
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company would be neglected. After relevant information has been furnished to
creditors, it is important that the creditors exercise their right to determine how the
restructuring plan should be carried out. They do this by voting on the plan. The need
for creditor approval in a restructuring process will now be discussed.

5.1.4

The need for Creditor Approval

As a result of the stake creditors have in a company in distress, creditors have the right
to take part in the major decisions taken in a restructuring process. In a restructuring
there is a business plan and a restructuring plan. The business plan is usually drawn up
by those managing and controlling the company to lay down a mechanism for the
insolvent company to return to solvency. This may include plans to downsize operations
by cutting off units or products that are not necessary. 566 Given how particular the
business plan is to preserve the going concern of an insolvent company, creditors are
not required to vote on the business plan. The restructuring plan deals with how the
creditors will be treated during the restructuring process and the creditors are required
to vote on the plan for it to be approved. The creditors are not bound by the restructuring
plan unless they approve it.567

In Canada, before the court approves a restructuring plan, the creditors are required to
vote on the plan and either accept or reject it.568 The approval by creditors is required
because it is expected to kick start the restructuring negotiations between the debtor and
its creditors.569 However, in circumstances where the debtor intends to sell the assets

566 Roderick Wood, supra note 11 at 345.
567 Ibid at 346.
568 Ibid at 345.
569 Ibid.
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of the company piecemeal, the debtor may not present a restructuring plan to its
creditors. As stated in the fourth chapter,570 in Liquidating CCAAs there is usually an
absence of a restructuring plan, which implies that no platform is provided for creditors
to cast their votes.

In Nigeria, the CVA requires the approval of creditors to take effect, however despite
this, there is a lacuna in the voting threshold for the approval of a CVA. Given that the
votes cast can only determine an approval of creditors individually, it is necessary that
the voting threshold for either an approval or a rejection should be clear. As discussed
in the third chapter, the absence of this threshold might create a problem in the CVA
being actually used to rescue insolvent businesses. 571 Under the CA, after the
administrator has carved out the mechanism to be employed in returning the company
to solvency, the monitor is required to present a proposal to the creditors. The creditors
now have the duty to accept or reject the proposal. However, the rejection of the
creditors of the proposal is not final as the administrator has to seek further direction
from the court.572 The courts have a role to play in both initiating and wrapping up the
restructuring process.

5.1.5

Court involvement in the procedure.

In restructuring proceedings, the courts play a unique and crucial role of ensuring that
restructurings are carried on smoothly. Courts have the duty to supervise the
restructuring proceedings and ensure that parties who are seeking protection under the

570 Chapter 4 at page 125-126.
571 Chapter 3 at page 88.
572 Chapter 3 at page 91-92.
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CCAA have satisfied the baseline considerations. The considerations are that the order
sought is appropriate, that the applicant has acted in good faith and with due
diligence.573

Under the CCAA, the courts are bestowed with a broad discretion to make orders in
addition to the rules laid down in the CCAA. The courts exercise their discretion on
novel issues which were unforeseen by the legislature at the time the statute was drafted.
According to Lopucki and Triantis,574 the courts serve gatekeeping roles of monitoring
applications for CCAA protection and screening out inappropriate applications. The
courts decide whether or not to approve a plan, even after the creditors have voted in
favour of the plan. This duty is placed solely on the courts, as the plan is not binding
on creditors until the court has approved it. The courts also have the duty and the
jurisdiction to sanction and oversee the sale of the companies’ assets.575

In Nigeria, the courts are also involved in the restructuring process. The nominee and
the administrator report to the court and seek the courts approval before major decisions
are taken in the restructuring process. However, the courts in Nigeria do not necessarily
have the broad discretion bestowed on courts in Canada. The judges do not have so
much discretion bestowed on them as it might lead to an abuse. Therefore, the judges
are expected to follow the restructuring laws to the letter, otherwise they may be
perceived to be acting in bad faith. The courts also do not have the duty to approve asset
sales of insolvent companies under restructuring laws. While Nigeria might want to

573 9354-9186 Québec inc v Callidus Capital Corp.

(2020) SCC 10 at para 49; CCAA, s18.6

574 L LoPucki & G Triantis, “A Systems Approach to Comparing US and Canadian Reorganization

of Financially Distressed Companies” in J Ziegel, ed Current Developments in International and
Comparative Corporate Insolvency Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 109 at 125
575 CCAA, s 36.
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adopt some procedures from Canada, it is advised that one should thread with caution
to avoid the practice of liquidating CCAAs being inculcated into Nigeria’s restructuring
procedures.

5.2
Developing a Corporate Restructuring Framework for Nigeria: Lessons
learnt from restructuring procedures in Canada.

In 2012, Bolanle Adebola, identified the greatest challenge to corporate rescue in
Nigeria as the inadequacy of the institutions.576 I hold the same view that this is still
currently a challenge that hinders not only corporate rescue but also the business rescue
amendments in CAMA 2020. This is because the institutions charged with
administering these laws are either not properly equipped or trained and this can render
the laws ineffective. First, as stated in the third chapter, there is no separate court that
handles issues relating to the insolvency or restructuring of a company. In other words,
restructuring proceedings, which are supposed to be expedited, are taken to one court
and it is often delayed. Several months would have gone by before the case is listed for
hearing. The lawyers of the debtor might even stall the proceedings themselves to
enable them to continue operating the company as a going concern at the expense of
the creditors. Even when these cases are finally listed for hearing, the numerous cases
the judge handles might prevent the case from being heard on the hearing date and
hence adjourned. Also, the adjourned date might be prolonged and this will have a great
effect on the entire rescue process as some secured creditors might not have the patience
to wait to receiver an order from the court. This might result to self-help, depleting the
assets of the debtor.

576 Adebola, supra note 104 at 314.
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Given that rescue of a corporation requires speed, a tardy legal system will pose a
challenge to its application.577 There is need for separate courts to be created to handle
insolvency and more particularly restructuring proceedings. Insolvency and
restructuring proceedings are currently treated as part of cases arising from disputes
surrounding company law and are handled by the Federal High Court (the “court”). The
court in addition to handling matters bothering on corporate insolvency has several
other matters they are handling.578 It is important that a separate court is created to
handle restructuring proceedings to avoid rendering these business rescue amendments
futile.

Second, Canadian judges have an in-depth understanding of the purpose of a rescue and
the intent of the legislature when drafting the law. This is evident in several Supreme
Court decisions in Canada.

579

However, by contrast, Nigerian judges always

misinterpret or misapply statutes. The judges have failed to exhibit that they understand
what a restructuring process entails. This is evident in how quickly the courts grant
orders to wind up a company when very little debt is owed as seen in the second chapter.
Not only are the courts uncertain about the law, the lawyers also lack the requisite
knowledge of insolvency law.580 If the lawyers and the judges are not detailed in the
application of the law, there is a great need to improve upon the competence of these
institutions. There is need for the judges and the lawyers to attend mandatory and
continuing legal education programs, which keeps their knowledge of restructuring law

577 Ibid at 317.
578 CFRN, s 251(1)a-s

Sun Indalex Finance, LLC et al. v United Steelworkers et al., (2013) SCC 6; Canwest Publishing
Inc., (2010) ONSC 222; Timminco Limited (Re), 2012 ONSC 948.
580 Adebola, supra note 104 at 315.
579
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up to date. These programs will expose the world's best insolvency practices also enable
them view how restructuring is carried out in other jurisdictions.

Third, for a restructuring proceeding to be successful, a debtor in possession financing
scheme needs to be introduced into the restructuring laws. The financing would be
sufficient to ensure that the company returns to solvency within that period. The new
amendments to the CCAA in Canada, limit DIP Financing through the reduction of the
length of the stay of proceedings. As highlighted in the third chapter,581 AMCON acts
as an agent for banks by acquiring debts owed to them. 582 AMCON does this by
employing stringent measures to seize assets of the debtors. To ensure that the proposed
business rescue mechanisms proposed by the CAM Bill is achieved, AMCON instead
of acting as a debt collection agent, can step in and act as a DIP lender who will have
priority over the existing lenders of the debtor to assist insolvent corporations to
restructure their affairs.

5.3

Conclusion

This chapter advocates that the corporate restructuring framework of Nigeria should be
developed. It began by comparing the recent amendments in the CAMA 2020, which
provide for business rescue options with the CCAA, the corporate restructuring law for
large companies in Canada. This comparison was done using the key principles of
restructuring of insolvent companies as a guide. The CCAA procedure was examined
to determine the practicability of adopting these procedures into the Nigerian corporate

Chapter 2 at pages 63-70.
AMCON purchases non-performing loans of banks in Nigeria and realizes debts owed to the
banks. The current role of AMCON is discussed in Chapter 2 at pages 63-70.
581
582
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restructuring law. This chapter has also discussed the lessons Nigeria should adopt from
the restructuring practice in Canada.

The recent amendment in the CAMA 2020 focuses on both corporate and business
rescue and is in line with the need to preserve the going concern value. The going
concern value theory for restructuring accommodates the need to maximize value for
creditors and it considers the interest of the large number of people affiliated with the
insolvent company. The amendment envisages a shift from liquidation, making it a tool
of last resort after all business rescue options have been exhausted. The amendment
supports the debtor being in possession of its business to ensure that the corporation
remains a going concern and returns to solvency. Regardless of the amendments in the
CAMA 2020, Nigeria has to improve on the competence of its institutions. From what
is practiced in Canada, Nigeria can adopt a separate framework that provides for
corporate insolvency. This is to enable the amendments in the CAMA 2020 to be
implemented effectively. This new framework should also provide for separate courts
to enforce these business rescue mechanisms.
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CONCLUSION

This thesis has examined the corporate insolvency framework in Nigeria with particular
reference to the recent amendments to the CAMA, which introduces business rescue
provisions into Nigeria’s insolvency framework. The rescue process discussed in this
thesis is in relation to insolvent viable corporations and non-viable corporations so as
to guard against deferred liquidations. These amendments tend to balance the interests
of the debtor, its creditors and third parties by preserving the going concern of the
company for better maximization of creditors returns and preservation of existing
relationships. The amendment is a progressive development from what was obtainable
in the previous insolvency framework in CAMA 1990. More particularly, the
restructuring legislations now accommodate broader interests.

The first Chapter began by stating the goals and objectives of a restructuring legislation
and concluded that a restructuring legislation should have the primary purpose of
rescuing insolvent companies and not liquidating them. The second chapter examined
the previous insolvency framework under the repealed CAMA 1990 and highlighted
the major problems and constraints associated with the previous regime. This chapter
highlighted the absence of business rescue mechanisms as huge defect in Nigeria’s
restructuring law, which makes it difficult for insolvent companies to bounce back to
solvency. This has also posed as a bottleneck for investors who want to do business in
Nigeria. The third chapter discussed the recent amendments in the CAMA 2020, which
provides business rescue mechanisms for insolvent companies. These amendments are
commendable and a step in the right direction to improve restructuring in Nigeria. This
chapter also compared these new business rescue mechanisms with the practice in the
UK since these procedures were adopted from the UK. This chapter evidenced that
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these procedures have not been very efficient in rescuing insolvent companies in the
UK. First, the CVA procedure is an informal procedure, which lacks a moratorium. For
a rescue process to be effective it has to be binding on all creditors and the creditors
should be estopped from instituting actions against the debtor during the period of the
rescue. Unfortunately, the CVA cannot guarantee a quiet and peaceful rescue free of
claims from secured creditors and this renders this procedure less effective. Second, the
administration process is not just a rescue process. Business rescue is not the sole
purpose of the administration, it is just the primary purpose and as discussed in the third
chapter, this particular duty to rescue the insolvent company might not be achieved.
This is because if the administrator has the option that a better result can be achieved
for creditors other than a rescue, that option would be explored.

There is also an express provision for the conversion from an administration to
liquidation in the statute. In the UK the administration procedure is also used as a
winding up procedure in a situation where a rescue is impossible. The administrator has
the duty to make distributions to creditors in the same manner, which a liquidator will.
In situations where there are no assets to be distributed an administration goes into
dissolution. If the Nigerian law emulates the UK Insolvency law then it appears that the
two procedures laid out for the rescue of insolvent companies might not necessarily be
effective in a business rescue. This chapter concluded that these mechanisms are not
sufficient in rescuing insolvent companies, as they have not been very successful in the
UK. This chapter also suggests that Nigeria looks to another jurisdiction such as Canada
to learn how Canadian restructuring laws are able to rescue businesses and balance the
competing interests using their restructuring laws.
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The fourth chapter discusses the Canadian corporate insolvency system. It discussed
how restructuring is carried out in Canada under the CCAA and highlighted the practice
of liquidating CCAA which deviates from the goal and purpose of the legislation
earmarked by Parliament. This fifth chapter advocates for the development of a separate
corporate insolvency framework in Nigeria. This chapter utilizes a comparative
analysis between the recent amendments in the CAMA 2020 and the restructuring
mechanism under the CCAA in Canada. The discussion of the restructuring in Canada
provides another view of restructuring in another jurisdiction for Nigeria to adopt some
practices from. Whilst adopting the restructuring practice in Canada, Nigeria is required
to thread with caution to avoid liquidating CCAAs.

This thesis advocates for the Nigeria’s insolvency framework to be separate from the
CAMA. There should be a separate body of rules that govern insolvency matters. There
should also be separate courts and trained insolvency practitioners who handle
corporate insolvency matters. From the discussion of what happens in Canada, Nigeria
will need to improve upon the competence of its institutions. This is because even
though the insolvency laws are continuously amended to meet evolving trends in other
jurisdictions, if the institutions administering these laws are incompetent they will
continue pose challenges to the effectiveness of the amendments.

Balancing competing interests in an insolvency system is a very difficult task. In a
restructuring process, the two major interests are the going concern value, which needs
to be preserved for the debtor and the maximization of value for the creditors. To
effectively balance these interests, a viable rescue plan needs to be mapped out. This is
because if a non-viable rescue plan is carved out, it will just defer the failure of the
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business to a later date and put the insolvent company into more debt. After a viable
rescue plan is carved out, it is important to consider that the assets of the insolvent
company are like a melting ice cube and might vanish away very quickly. In other
words, the rescue process should be carried out expeditiously. Speed is necessary to
preserve the assets of the insolvent company to prevent the rescue process from being
converted to a pre-pack.

One of the major challenges to a rescue process is the cost associated with the process.
This is because the professionals involved in rescuing the insolvent corporation must
be paid regardless of the insolvency of the corporation. As a result of this, it is also
necessary that an existing creditor or a third party finances the insolvent corporation
intending to rescue its affairs to ensure that there are sufficient funds to pull through
the rescue process. If these recommendations are implemented, Nigeria will be a step
closer to perfecting its business rescue mechanisms thus creating a healthy corporate
insolvency system.
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